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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines landlord politics in the rural Pakistani Punjab and 
contributes to the literature on the state and criminalised politics in South Asia as well 
as to broader debates on factionalism and violence, class formation, proletarianization 
and bonded labour. The thesis also examines whether, and in what sense, Muslim saints 
play a role in legitimising and consolidating a highly personalised and hierarchical 
political order. The principal aim of the thesis is to document, and to account for, the 
entrenchment of violent factional politics in the Punjabi countryside and to consider 
how this may have forestalled the emergence of horizontal, class-based, political 
assertiveness.
Members of the landed elite still wield considerable power over much of the 
rural population through tenancy relations, patronage and coercion. This enables them 
to obtain votes during elections and to command corvee labour, as well as to enforce 
debt-bondage. The thesis illustrates how this remains true despite the growing, 
although partial, proletarianization of former tenants and of members of menial and 
artisan occupational groups. One implication of this situation is that in addition to 
members of marginal landless groups voting for landlords during elections they also 
frequently fight on their behalf rather than against them.
Competition for political office remains largely restricted to the landed elite and 
resembles a zero-sum game where winners appropriate the spoils of power for 
themselves and, to varying degrees, for their clients. The fact that winners take all, 
combined with the widespread availability of Kalashnikovs and other weapons, means 
that political competition is intense and involves high levels of violence. The thesis 
analyses how the regional political coalitions of landlord politicians are often structured
on the basis of pragmatism, kinship, feuds and local rivalries, rather than on that of 
ideological commitment to political parties.
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Glossary of Terms
abadkar: Migrant settlers.
ashrafi: People of noble descent, a category of higher caste. 
astana: Lodge, abode, threshold.
Barelvi: Name of the religious movement in South Asia originated from the city of 
Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh, India, whose members venerate Sufi saints and shrines.
begaar. Corvee
bhai\ Brother.
biraderi'. Agnatic lineage, in-marrying affinal group, Muslim caste, brotherhood. 
chak: Planned village. 
charpai: String cot.
chowdri: Honorific term for a landlord which indicates chieftainship. 
darbar/dargah: Royal court, Muslim saint’s shrine, tomb, or, by extension, lodge. 
darra: Men’s house
darwesh: A religious mendicant, a beggar, a Muslim Saint.
Deobandi: Islamic school of thought that began in North India during the nineteenth 
century. It is generally associated with the rejection of aspects of Sufism and of the cult 
of Sufi saints.
dera\ A single farm house or a farm house with a small settlement around it. 
dunya: the present world, world of creation. 
dushman: Enemy
Eid: Islamic festival. Eid-ul zoha marks the last day of the Hajj, Eid-ul Fitr, celebrates 
the end of Ramadan.
fakeer: An ascetic on the sufi path, mendicant, saint who practices asceticism needy of 
God’s mercy.
ghairat: Shame, decency, honour, control. 
ghar: House, household. 
ghar-wale: Members of a household.
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goonda: Gangster, muscleman.
gyarvi sharif. Communal meal held on the 11 of the month, commemorating the 
birth/death of Abdul Qadir Gilani of Baghdad.
hafiz-e Qur'an: A person who has memorised the whole Qu’ran.
halal: Lawful, meat of an animal slaughtered in a ritually appropriate way.
haqiqat: Truth, ontological reality.
haram: Forbidden, taboo, sacred and protected life.
hayaa: Female modesty.
hookah: Waterpipe.
ilm: Knowledge, scholastic religious knowledge.
imam: Leader of prayers in the mosque, founder of a Sunni legal school.
izzat: Honour, respect.
jamaat\ Congregation, community, fellowship. 
jangal: Jungle, areas outside human habitation.
jangli: Wild person from sparsely populated areas, uneducated, ill mannered.
Jat: Dominant landowning caste/tribe of the Punjab.
Julaha\ Weaver.
Juma\ Friday.
kabza: Capture, illegal land grabbing. 
kaffir. Unbeliever, an infidel, a non-Muslim. 
kala: Black.
kalma: Islamic profession of faith.
kammi: Kammis are traditional artisanal and menial occupational groups. 
khandan: Family. 
khu: Well.
Kumhar. Potter. 
lakh: 100,000.
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lambardar. Generally a landowner who acts as an intermediary between the village and 
the state in terms of revenue collection and governance.
langar. Place where food is cooked and distributed freely at a Sufi lodge in South Asia. 
Lohar. Blacksmith.
lota: Jar with a curved spout that is used for ablutions and for cleaning oneself after 
going to the toilet. The term is also used to refer to people who frequently shift their 
political allegiances.
Machi: Breadmaker.
Makhdoom: Head of a shrine, descendant of a saint. 
malang: Wandering sufi ascetic, renouncer, mendicant. 
malik: Literally the owner of an estate. Also refers to status as a chief. 
masjid: Mosque.
maulvi: A muslim religious expert on legal matters, cleric. 
maund: A measure that is equivalent to forty kilograms.
Mirasi: Bard. 
mochi: Cobbler.
mullah: Religious prayer leader or dignitary. 
munshi: Manager of a landlord.
mureed\ Lover and desirer (of God), disciple of a Sufi saint.
Muss alii: Sweeper.
nafs: Carnal, vital soul or spirit, seat of desires.
Nai: Barber.
nalka\ Hand pump for extracting water from the ground. 
napak: Impure.
nazim: Elected representative at the union, tehsil or district level. 
pagal: Mad. 
pak: Pure.
patwari: Revenue officer in charge of keeping land records.
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pir. Saint, spiritual guide, founder or head of a religious order. 
pir-bhai: Fellow initiate or spiritual brother of the same saint.
Purdah: Veil, curtain, female seclusion.
qaum: People, nation, tribe. The term can also be used to refer to endogamous
lineages and occupational groups.
rassagir: ‘Holder of the rope,’ patron who protects thieves (buffalo thieves in
particular).
roti: Flat bread.
sajjadda nishin: Successors, those who sit on the seat of a departed sheikh or saint. 
savaab: Merit, religious merit.
seyp: An informal contract in which village artisans and menials provide services to 
zamindars in exchange for payments in kind.
sharia: Body of Muslim jurisprudential law, including the Qur’an and Hadith, along 
with later interpretations.
sharif. Noble, good, of noble descent.
silsilah: A spiritual genealogy.
takat: Strength.
taliban: Seekers.
Tarkhan: Carpenter.
tauheed: Belief in the unity of God.
tehsil: An administrative division smaller than the district and larger than the union 
council.
thana: Local police station. 
thanedar. Local police officer.
ulema". Learned scholars and religious leaders, especially in matters of Islamic 
jurisprudence, plural of alim.
urs: Religious ceremony held annually to commemorate the death/unification with God 
of a Muslim saint.
wali: Friend of God, Muslim saint, intimate of God.
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zaildar. Zaildar’s assisted the colonial administration with revenue collection and 
administration within a set of villages.
zamindar. Landowner.
zat\ Species, caste, lineage.
zikr: Rememberance of God’s names through repetition done either alone or in 
company in order to purify the heart.
Note on the use Urdu and Punjabi words, Exchange Rates, and Names
The first instance of all Urdu and Punjabi words is italicised, thereafter italics 
are dropped. For the sake of simplicity, the plural of Urdu and Punjabi and words is 
denoted by the addition of an ‘s’. English translations have been used were they were 
deemed adequate to convey the meaning of the original.
The exchange rate at the time of fieldwork was roughly Rs.100 for £1 
The name of the village, the names of villagers and the name of the dominant 
caste within it have all been changed in order to protect the identity of informants.
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Chapter One: Introduction
In his collection of short stories entitled In Other Rooms, Other Wonders, 
Daniyal Mueenuddin describes a feudal world reminiscent of that described by 
nineteenth century Russian novelists. It is a world inhabited by absentee landlords with 
vast rambling estates in the Southern Punjab, large retinues of servants, peasants, cattle 
rustlers, criminals, peasant girl mistresses and unscrupulous farm managers and 
politicians. Like their counterparts in nineteenth century Russia, these Punjabi feudal 
lords belong to a class of cosmopolitan elite that looks up to the cultural achievements 
of Europe. While their Russian counterparts spoke French and spent their winters in 
Paris and the South of France, they speak English and spend their summers in London. 
Their mansions in Lahore are staffed with valets, butlers, drivers, cooks and maids, all 
brought from the villages on their estates. Here parties are hosted where high ranking 
military officers, politicians, businessmen and civil servants gather and drink smuggled 
Black Label Scotch whisky. Their children study in prestigious universities in the 
United Kingdom and, increasingly, the United States.
However, the world that Mueenuddin describes is changing. Members of this 
landed aristocracy are no longer necessarily the wealthiest or the most politically 
influential people in the country. The more wealthy aristocratic {ashrafi)1 landlords 
whom the British once used to rule the Punjab, and who remained politically prominent 
after independence, are in many cases being overtaken both politically and 
economically by members of a prosperous Punjabi yeomanry as well as by 
industrialists. These changes, however, have not represented a transition from a feudal
1 The term ashrafi in South Asia generally refers to people of noble descent. Amongst the 
Muslims the ashrafi landlords were predominantly those claiming Arabian and Central Asian descent.
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order, where the economic realm is subordinate to the political, to a bourgeois social 
order. Political influence and the capacity to mobilise force remain central to the rise 
and fall of individual fortunes. The landlord class continues to wield disproportionate 
power in Pakistan, but there have been power shifts within it. As Mueenuddin’s short 
stories and this work document, aristocratic feudal lords who grow complacent, and 
who shy away from the feuds and from the violence of rural Punjabi politics, are 
overtaken politically and economically by traditionally less wealthy and influential 
members of the landed classes. Those who overtake them then adopt similar lifestyles to 
theirs. They buy or rent property in Lahore, send their children to elite English medium 
schools and to universities abroad, and invest in properties abroad, particularly in 
Dubai.
In Mueenuddin’s short stories this trend is illustrated through the case of the 
absentee landlord K.K. Harouni. Harouni, who lives in a large air conditioned mansion 
in Lahore and who only occasionally visits his vast estate, is oblivious to the fact that he 
is being swindled by the manager, a local landlord, to whom he has delegated the 
estate’s management. When K.K. Harouni needs money to invest in unsuccessful 
business ventures—in order to keep up with upstart industrialists and to plug holes into 
the leaky finances of his Lahore mansion—he trustingly gives his manager Jaglani 
powers of attorney to sell some of his land. Since Harouni doesn’t even know the value 
of his lands, Jaglani buys the plots himself at prices far below market value and soon 
owns several hundred acres. Jaglani runs the estate with an iron fist, more for his own 
benefit than for his master’s. Although villagers and servants Jaglani, to them Harouni 
is a distant figure, and they exploit his careless attitude towards his finances by stealing 
from him whenever they can. While Harouni leads a cosmopolitan lifestyle in Lahore 
and abroad, it is Jaglani who deals with the grittier aspects of life on the estate and in
the surrounding area. He supervises labourers, deals with village disputes, and works 
with local toughs to achieve control over the area’s inhabitants. Eventually Jaglani’s 
local influence allows him to become a provincial minister. Although Mueenuddin does 
not say so, political office probably allows him to further consolidate his landholdings 
through the multiple opportunities for enrichment it offers.
The present work is interested in landlords that resemble Jaglani more closely 
than they do K.K. Harouni. Focussing on an extended patrilineal clan of Jats, the 
Gondah, the central aim of this thesis is to account for the landed elite’s continued 
stranglehold in the rural Punjab and for the persistence of hierarchical political 
alignments whereby members of poorer communities either willingly or unwillingly 
continue to provide political support to powerful landlord patrons. The thesis explores 
some of the implications that this has for the political assertiveness of labourers. 
Moreover it aims to illustrate the central role that control over the local state institutions 
played in consolidating and augmenting the political and economic fortunes of 
landlords. It illustrates how members of a patrilineal clan (biraderi) of prosperous Jats 
not only overtook members of an aristocratic lineage of landlords, often more concerned 
with polo and hare-coursing than politics, as the political overlords of a region of the 
Sargodha District but also directly challenged and fought them. These Jat landlords had 
no qualms about the use of force and involvement in corruption and crime in their 
efforts at achieving upward social mobility. Around this focus, this thesis describes and 
accounts for the entrenchment of violent factional politics in the Punjabi countryside 
and examines how this has forestalled the emergence of horizontal, class-based politics.
2 Jats are the dominant landowning group of the Punjab. The Gondals, with whom this thesis is 
primarily concerned, are a sub-clan of the Jats.
3 In the Pakistani Punjab the terms biraderi and qaum are often used interchangeably to refer to 
the patrilineal clan although the latter is more frequently used for more inclusive forms of identity such as 
ethnicity (e.g. Pathan, Baluch, Punjabi) or nationality (Pakistani, Indian, etc.). The term caste (zat) is not 
very frequently used. See especially Chaudhary (1999: 11)
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Whereas India’s formal commitment to democracy has allowed for the growing political 
assertiveness of formerly disenfranchised lower caste groups, military rule and a 
powerful landed elite in Pakistan have effectively prevented similar groups from 
becoming politically assertive. This has meant that political competition and conflict in 
rural areas largely remains a contest between elite-led factions, who lack a common 
political ideology save that of appropriating the spoils of power and gaining ascendancy 
over rivals and enemies.4 There is little evidence to support an argument that the rural 
masses were somehow content with their lot and that they voluntarily aligned 
themselves with powerful leaders on a transactional basis.5 Rather, this work will show 
that labourers and tenants were often compelled to participate in a system that 
reproduced their own subordination. Members of the landed elite continued to wield 
considerable power over much of the rural population through tenancy relations, 
patronage and coercion. This enabled them to obtain votes during elections and 
command corvee labour, as well as to enforce debt-bondage.
Contrasts Between the Indian and Pakistani Experiences
In both India and Pakistan the local colonisation and personalisation of state
institutions by prosperous peasants and merchants contributed to the emergence of what 
Harris-White has called ‘shadow states’ (2003: 77), wherein people, principally from 
intermediate classes, nurture webs of useful social connections “primarily based on 
ascribed criteria (such as caste, gender and class) and maintained through face to face 
contact” (Jeffrey 2000: 1018). Individuals use these networks to reinforce their power.
4 F.G. Bailey defines a faction in the following way: ‘There are two connected characteristics 
which mark out a political group as a faction: firstly the members do not co-operate because they have a 
common ideology which their co-operation will serve; secondly they are recruited by a leader with whom 
they have a transactional relationship.” (Bailey 2001 [1969]: 52). When Bailey claims that factions lack a 
common ideology he means that they lack a social programme beyond the narrow goal of appropriating 
the spoils of power for members of the faction.
5 As was argued by Bailey (2001 [1969]) and Barth (1959) in their respective works on Indian 
and Swat Pathan politics, as well as by Wiser (1939) in his description of the Indian Jajmani system.
Through their influence with the police and other branches of government they are able 
to get involved in a variety of criminal activities and to emerge as local political 
strongmen.6 In places like Uttar Pradesh the result has been widespread rural violence 
as political strongmen compete to control the local police and civil services. For Paul 
Brass the decline of the Congress Party organisation in Uttar Pradesh led to the 
increased political clout of local strongmen with control over the police force, meaning 
that “rule in the countryside is not based on abstractions but control over resources and 
safety. It is a Hobbesian world in which security and safety are not provided by the 
state, but are themselves values—that is valued objects—integral to and inseparable 
from the struggle for power and influence (Brass 1997: 92-93). Similarly, this work will 
demonstrate that politicians, the police and the civil services do not serve the ‘public’ in 
rural Pakistan. Instead they have often pursued their own predatory agendas in collusion 
with local strongmen.
Prosperous peasants in the Pakistani Punjab became increasingly assertive in the 
1960s roughly around the same time that prosperous Jat peasants in Uttar Pradesh in 
India became politically assertive under the banner of the Bharatiya Kisan Union (Brass 
1997, Gupta 1998, Jeffrey 2000). In both cases the growing political assertiveness of 
prosperous peasants was aided by the increase in their disposable incomes following the 
green revolution. However, while in Uttar Pradesh they organised under the banner of a 
political party, their counterparts in the Pakistani Punjab were first supported by 
General Ayub Khan on a non-party basis under military rule when severe restrictions
6 The now classic work of Anton Blok (1974) on the Sicilian Mafia illustrates similar themes. 
Blok shows how the abolition of feudalism under Bourbon absolutism led to the rise of a land-owning 
bourgeoisie that became allied with the former feudal barons against the poor peasantry. Together these 
two groups functioned as “brokers between the community-oriented peasants and nation-oriented groups” 
(Blok 1961: 163) and emerged as what eventually came to be referred to as the mafia. In this vision, as in 
Harris-White’s and other works including this one, crime and banditry are intimately linked to the state 
rather than occurring outside of it. This goes against Hobsbawm’s (2000) depiction of what he terms 
‘social banditry’ whereby peasants act outside of the state and challenge it in order to redress social 
injustices, often by stealing from the rich in order to give to the poor.
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were placed upon political parties.7 Nasr (2001) argues that they were supported in 
order to weaken the political power of the old landed elite. Thus, while prosperous 
peasants in Uttar Pradesh were able to colonise state institutions in what was for the 
most part a formally democratic polity, their counterparts in the Pakistani Punjab were 
able to colonise state institutions in an often formally authoritarian polity.
The fact of authoritarianism in Pakistan and formal democracy in India led to 
divergent social and political trajectories in the two countries. However, in both 
contexts the colonisation of the local state by strongmen and their networks cannot be 
fully understood in isolation from higher level national politics. In other words, it isn’t 
only local factors that account for the formation of shadow states whereby informal 
networks of individuals interact with and come to control the police and the local civil 
services. With respect to the Indian context Kohli (1991) has argued that Indira 
Gandhi’s personalised authoritarianism did much harm to provincial institutions, and 
strongly contributed to the politicisation of the police and of the civil services. In 
Pakistan, where authoritarian rule in either civilian or military guise has largely been 
uninterrupted, the politicisation of the civil services and of the police was arguably far 
more comprehensive. As this thesis will illustrate, authoritarian central governments in 
Pakistan frequently carried out the mass transfer and dismissal of recalcitrant officers in 
order to replace them with more pliable ones. Having done this, authoritarian 
governments used the police, the intelligence services, the judiciary (including newly 
created prosecutorial bodies) and the civil services to marginalise, intimidate and harass 
political opponents. Whereas in India the higher level judiciary remained somewhat 
independent, the higher level judiciary in Pakistan, along with the constitution itself, 
were manipulated by almost every government that came to power. It therefore appears
7 See chapter two for a further discussion. Also see Wilder (1999:74).
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that authoritarianism at the centre played a role in the personalisation and politicisation 
of government institutions in both countries. Nevertheless, central authoritarianism was 
far more persistent and comprehensive in Pakistan than it was in India, where a formal 
commitment to democracy and constitutional rule was retained.
India’s commitment to democracy meant that although state policies could often 
be subverted locally as a result of local strongmen and their networks of influence, 
elections redistributed “opportunities to colonise and co-opt state institutions caste- 
wise” (Jeffrey 2000: 1033). Thus Jeffrey and Lerche’s (2000) work on Uttar Pradesh 
illustrates how the rise of the Dalit-based Bahujan Samajwadi Party (BSP) allowed a 
segment of society traditionally excluded from the state to colonise local state 
institutions (such as the police) and thereby curb the abuses traditionally perpetrated 
against them by the upper and middle-ranking castes. To a certain extent this signified 
the decline of a factional style of politics (Alavi 1971, Bailey 2001 [1969], Brass 1983, 
Nicholas 1965) whereby lower castes aligned themselves vertically with members of 
higher landed castes, and the rise of more horizontally constituted political alignments 
based on caste and class. Political competition and conflict ceased being solely a contest 
between members of the upper castes as members of intermediate and lower castes 
started to compete in order to gain political power and office. Political power and access 
to state institutions allowed individuals from groups that were traditionally excluded 
from politics and state institutions to emerge as members of a new political and 
economic elite. Thus the BSP’s colonisation of state institutions gave the Dalits their
o
turn to engage in strongman politics. Put bluntly, in places like Uttar Pradesh 
democracy and a formal commitment to promoting equality at least served to
8 Edward Luce reports that within her first year of office Mayawati ordered the transfer of 1400 
IAS officers (Luce 2006: 128). Her opponents accused her of seeking to humiliate upper caste civil 
servants and trying to raise money from IAS officers who were prepared to pay bribes either to stay put or 
to move back to where they had been stationed before.
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redistribute the opportunities for corruption.9 On the other hand, successive Pakistani 
governments’ lack of commitment to democracy and the promotion of egalitarianism 
greatly restricted the redistribution of opportunities to colonise the state, such that 
political competition largely remained a contest among the elite.
Context and Background
The Punjab is home to the five rivers that give the province its name.10 The river 
Jhelum serves as the Punjab’s Western boundary with the Sutlej serving as the region’s 
Eastern boundary. In between these two rivers lie the Chenab, the Ravi and the dry bed 
of the Beas River.11 The areas between these rivers, known as doabs,12 constitute some 
of the most fertile land in all of Pakistan. The research for this thesis was carried out in 
the village of Bek Sagrana in the central Punjabi district of Sargodha located in the Jech 
doab, demarcated by the Chenab River to the East and by the Jhelum River to the West. 
According to Wilder, the Central Punjab is the Punjab province’s
.. .political, economic and cultural centre. It is the most urbanised, industrialized, agriculturally 
productive, and densely populated of the four regions of the Punjab. The sixty-one National 
Assembly Seats of central Punjab comprise more than half of the total seats of the Punjab and 
more than a quarter of the entire country’s seats. The key to success in Punjab politics and to a 
considerable extent Pakistani politics lies here. (Wilder 1999:34-37).
Sargodha is one of the districts that comprise the central Punjab, with five national
11assembly seats and eleven provincial assembly seats. Subsequent to canal colonisation
9 Corbridge et al. (2005) argue that there are reasons for greater optimism than this and that there 
is reason to believe that “an exclusive emphasis on the shadow state, or on a relentlessly ‘vertical’ 
political society, sometimes fails to point up the spaces of citizenship that are being created, or perhaps 
widened, in the wake of the good governance agenda and the popular mobilizations to which it can give 
rise (ibid: 5).
10 Punjab derives frompanj ab meaning five waters.
11 The water of the river Beas along with some of the water from the Sutlej and Ravi rivers was 
diverted to India as part of the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan in 1960.
12 The term doab literally means ‘two waters.’
13 These districts include Gujranwala, Gujrat, Sialkot, Narowal, Lahore, Kasur, Sheikhupura,
Sargodha, Faisalabad, Toba Tek Singh, Sahiwal and Okara.
17 See Imran Ali (1988) for a comprehensive account of canal colonisation in the Punjab.
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that began in in 1885, the area became one of the most agriculturally productive areas in
17 18Asia as well as the most densely populated area of the Punjab. Fertile land and an 
extensive irrigation system contributed to making the central Punjab the centre of 
Pakistan’s green revolution. In addition to being the richest region of the Punjab 
agriculturally, it is also the most industrialised one. In 1989, 71.9 per cent of the 
Punjab’s industry was located in the central Punjab, principally concentrated in the 
cities of Lahore, Faisalabad and Gujranwala (ibid: 40).
Prior to canal colonisation, most permanent settlements on the Jech doab were 
around the banks of the Chenab and Jhelum rivers. Here irrigation was principally 
carried out through the use of wells (khus) and occasionally through inundation canals. 
Away from the rivers, scant rainfall made the Jech doab largely unsuitable for settled 
agriculture despite its rich alluvial soils. These inland areas were sparsely populated by 
semi-pastoral people (charaghs) who kept livestock and practiced limited single 
cropping agriculture. Near the banks of the Chenab River in the Eastern part of the Jech 
doab, where the research for this thesis was carried out, the two dominant semi- 
pastoralist Jat clans were the Gondals and the Ranjhas.19 Once canal colonisation was 
underway the colonial administrator Malcolm Darling reported that these pastoralists, or
7 0  •janglis as he pejoratively referred to them, were poor cultivators
18 In 1993 the population of the central Punjab was 34,500,000, more than half the Punjab’s 
population (Wilder 1999: 38).
19 Both the Ranjha and Gondal populations were spread across a large geographical area that 
spanned from the district of Gujrat to the east and across the Jhelum River to the west. Within both of 
these Jat clans there sub-clans that often acquired their names from a patrilineal ancestor. Thus, for 
example, the descendants of a man called Kala Gondal were known as the Kaliana Gondals. Alongside 
the Gondals and Ranjhas other dominant landowning clans in the area of Sargodha included Pathans, 
Rihans and Nissuwanas. To the West of them, in the Jhelum valley, the dominant landowning clans in the 
district included Bhattis, Khokars, Mekans and Jhammats as well as Baloches and Sayyids. Tiwanas, 
Noons and Awans were other important landowning clans to the East of the District.
20 The term literally refers to ‘people of the jungle’ and pejoratively indicates savagery and lack 
of education. In Urdu the term jangal is used not to refer to tropical rainforests as in English but to any 
wild and uninhabited area of land.
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“like all primitive folk who have an abundance of land” (Darling 1934: 14). He claimed 
that “if the jangli is not a good farmer, he is at least a good sportsman. Faction and feud 
are rife in his villages, and he likes to settle his quarrels in old fashioned ways without 
recourse to court and police” (Darling 1934:15). Moreover he claimed that “once there 
was hardly a zaildar who was not in the cattle-thieving business, and even now it would 
be difficult to find anyone of any prominence who had not a relative or two connected 
with it” (ibid). Canal colonisation made perennial agriculture possible and transformed 
these sparsely populated doabs into the agricultural heartland of the Punjab. Settlers 
(abadkars) were brought in from other areas of the Punjab and were given titles to 
canal-irrigated land. Most of these people settled in newly built, planned villages known 
as chaks. The geometry of these villages was one of squares and straight lines, and 
reflected the colonial government’s self-professed civilising mission which aimed to 
create modem and enterprising farmers (Gilmartin 2004). Groups that were native to the 
region such as the Gondals and the Ranjhas were also given titles of land-ownership 
over the newly irrigated land and became settled agriculturalists. However, many of 
them, including the Gondals, continued to live in the old, unplanned village settlements.
As a result of colonisation the Sargodha district became a major producer of 
cotton, wheat, barley, maize, millet, rapeseed and pulses. By 1947 the Sargodha district 
had become one of the largest agricultural hubs in Asia, with a major market for grain
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(particularly wheat) and ten large and well equipped cotton ginning factories. At the 
time of independence, when Pakistan emerged from partition with a poor industrial 
base, the district was a major contributor to Pakistan’s tax revenue and a major focal 
point of foreign exchange. Agriculture in the district received a further boost during the 
green revolution starting in the 1960’s. In the 1970’s the extensive irrigation system of 
the district made it possible for many landlords to start substituting citrus orchards, 
requiring significant amounts of irrigation, for cotton cultivation. By 2004 the 
Sarghoda tehsil of Bhalwal, where the research for this thesis was carried out, came to 
have the highest density of citrus orchards in the district and was often referred to as the 
‘California of Pakistan.’ The production of citrus was not only more profitable them 
cotton, and boosted the district as a centre of foreign exchange, but was also 
significantly less labour intensive. As chapter four will illustrate, this allowed wealthy 
landlords to spend less time supervising agricultural activities and more time in cities 
such as Sargodha and Lahore, where their children could obtain a better education than 
in their home villages.
Given the highly unequal distribution of land and access to formal state 
institutions (which were to a large extent the legacy of the colonial practice of indirect 
rule through landed notables), the benefits from both the green revolution and the 
introduction of citrus orchards accrued principally to the landed elites. The World Bank 
(2002) estimates that less than half of rural households in Pakistan own any land and 
that more than half of rural farm holdings are of less than five acres (ADB 2006: 46) 
and account for 16 per cent of Pakistan’s total farm area. On the other hand, Malik
25
(2005) reports that in 2000 only 5 per cent of farms were 25 acres or more in size but 
that they accounted for 38 per cent of all land owned. Moreover statistics for the Punjab 
from 1976 show that landowners with more than 50 acres of land accounted for more 
than 18.2 per cent of all land owned. Hussain (1989) and Zaidi (1999) point out that 
during the green revolution it was principally the large farmers who could get credit to 
finance the use of new inputs and technologies. These farmers not only possessed 
substantial collateral in the form of land but also had privileged access to the state 
distribution of inputs and technologies through their personal connections. On the other 
hand, tenants and smallholders had to obtain credit through informal institutions, often 
through landlord farmers, who required them to repay in kind and who often valued 
their produce at rates that were below market rates. In addition, access to the market in 
remote areas was often controlled by landlords who owned trucks and marketing 
outlets, and who could thereby extract a surplus from local smallholders and tenants. 
The net result was that smallholders derived little benefit from the green revolution and 
that many even ended up highly indebted and were forced to sell their land. This trend 
continued well after the initial onset of the green revolution. Hussain (2003) claims that 
many such smallholders were increasingly being forced to sell their land, and that 
between 1990 and 2000 as many as 76.5 per cent of the extremely poor and 38.9 per 
cent of the poor had done so.
Sharecroppers were also negatively affected by the green revolution. Saghir 
Ahmad (1977) reported that prior to the green revolution and to the tractorisation that 
came with it, landlords in the Sargodha village of Sahiwal begged tenants to cultivate as
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much land as they could in exchange for 50 per cent of the harvest. The reason for this 
was that many landlords were unable to organise the cultivation of their lands 
themselves due to the vast number of bullock teams and workers that this would have 
required. Chakravarti’s (2002) work on Bihar shows that whereas a single bullock team 
was able to prepare 0.42 acres of land in six hours, a tractor could prepare twenty five 
acres in twenty hours. Thus, tractorisation meant that landlords could replace a large 
number of tenants and their bullock teams by a single tractor driver. Tractorisation also 
meant that a lot of land dedicated to the cultivation of fodder for the bullock teams 
could be turned over to other crops, which dramatically speeded up the turnover of 
crops in single fields. Lastly, tractorisation allowed wealthy landowners to do away 
with tenants who, under both General Ayub Khan’s and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s land 
reform programmes, might have decided to claim legal title to the land they cultivated. 
The result was that between 1960 and 1990 the total area of land in the Punjab 
cultivated by sharecroppers declined from 37.2 per cent to 14.2 per cent (Zaidi 1999:
42). Finally, in districts like Sargodha, the introduction of citrus orchards also played a 
significant role in displacing agricultural tenants.
In this way many former smallholders and tenants, as well as village artisans 
whose goods were to a large extent replaced by mass produced ones, joined the ranks of 
the mass of “unorganised and unprotected workers” (Breman 1996: 2) bogged down in 
the transition from agrarian to industrial production. Workers pushed out of agriculture 
and cottage industries by mechanisation were not formally incorporated into a growing 
industrial sector. Instead the majority of this work force was employed in a variety of 
petty trades, services and casual labour in the agricultural sector, the industrial sector 
and in construction work. Construction work was a particularly important source of 
employment. The 1998 Government Census claimed that 35.8 per cent of the district’s
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population was employed in construction, followed by 31 per cent who were employed 
in agriculture. What the census statistics do not show, as will be described in chapter 
four, is that the majority of labourers were casual, and moved between agriculture, 
construction and industry principally located in neighbouring districts.
Upward Mobility and the Changing Balance o f Power
As noted above, the world that Daniyal Mueenuddin evokes in his fictional
accounts of Punjabi life is changing. While some members of the old aristocratic elite 
continue to wield enormous power and wealth, the fortunes and political influence of 
many others have been substantially eroded. Those who were careless about their 
estates, who stayed clear of gritty local politics, and who didn’t diversify their sources 
of income lost land through sales, land reform, subdivision through inheritance and the 
encroachment of local strongmen from among the middle and gentry landholders. As in 
Chakravarti’s account of Rajasthani politics control over the land was insufficient to 
guarantee political power in the face of “political entrepreneurs” (Chakravarti 1975: 
210).
It is from among the ranks of the middle and gentry landholders that the Gondals 
of the district of Sargodha, the principal subject of this thesis, emerged to political 
prominence, and it is they who filled the power vacuum caused by the absentee 
lifestyles of the old ashrafi elite. It should be noted that although the middle and gentry 
landholders did not individually possess the vast tracts of land that the ashrafi landlords 
did, they generally owned between a dozen and hundred acres. Moreover, they 
generally possessed significant political influence in their villages and localities rather 
than at national and provincial levels like the ashrafi landlords by virtue of the status 
and powers granted to them under British rule. Thus, they were often local chiefs
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(ichowdris) and revenue collectors (lambardars) possessing significant ties with the 
local authorities, including the courts and the police, and they typically spent much of 
their lives in their home villages. Members of the old anglicised feudal elite were often 
educated in British colonial establishments like Aitchison College in Lahore or 
Lawrence College in Murree. In contrast, these middle gentry were mostly educated in 
village schools together with villagers from different class backgrounds. Even though 
they might have known some English, they spoke Punjabi rather than English at home. 
Their attitudes with respect to matters of honour (izzat) and female modesty Qiayaa) 
were often more conservative than those of the older, more cosmopolitan, feudal elite. 
For example, the women of the feudal elite didn’t necessarily maintain strict seclusion 
(purdah ) outside their villages, were sometimes sent to study abroad, and even went to 
parties in Lahore where men and women mingled freely and alcohol was served. In 
contrast, the women from this upwardly mobile landlord class maintained strict purdah, 
and it was unthinkable that they would go to parties or be sent to study abroad.
People like the Gondals—the Jaglanis of Mueenuddin’s Punjab—knew the value 
of money and closely scrutinised the everyday operations on their farms. Unlike the 
aristocrats of Harouni’s ilk, they controlled labourers and servants with a firm hand and 
frequently tied them down with debts. Aristocratic landlords like the fictional but 
accurately portrayed Harouni had such great wealth that they could afford to be 
charitable towards villagers and dependants. In the district of Sargodha for example, the 
extremely wealthy and politically influential Noon family built schools and hospitals in 
their villages.26 In the village of Nurpur they set up a small flour mill where villagers
26 The grandfather of the current head of the Noon family was Firoz Khan Noon, Chief Minister 
of the Punjab from 1953 to 1956. He was then foreign minister between 1956 and 1957 and Prime 
Minister of Pakistan between 1957 and 1958. Firoz Khan Noon’s eldest son wasn’t extensively involved 
in politics but successfully diversified the family’s sources of income by investing in a large sugar mill, 
milk processing plants and cement factories. His grandson was once a member of the national assembly
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could turn their wheat into flour for free.27 But those aristocratic landlords who failed to 
be vigilant could find themselves overtaken politically or even directly challenged by 
this ambitious and forceful class of landlord farmers, as was the case in Mueenuddin’s 
fictional account. Even the Noons of Nurpur faced challenges from Jat cultivators in 
their own village. Although the Noons still possessed powerful political connections 
and their wealth remained undiminished, the fact that they didn’t reside in Nurpur, and 
that they preferred to keep their distance from corrupt and often murderous rural 
politics, created a space for local toughs to start flexing their muscle.
A good illustration of differences in attitudes and approaches between some 
members of the old aristocratic elite and the forceful class of landlord farmers is
* 9 ftprovided by Malik Sahib, a man in his forties and the present day heir to the wealthiest 
branch of the Noon family of Nurpur. He had become a member of the national 
assembly in his early thirties. Because of his young age he had dropped his clean­
shaven urban look and grown a moustache in order to appear older. His moustache also 
helped him to blend in better with his rural constituents and with fellow politicians, for 
whom the moustache was a sign of virility. Politicians were expected to be virile in 
order to defend the interests of their clients and constituents better. Malik Sahib’s 
family’s vast estate and sugar mill, which employed around ten thousand people on a 
seasonal basis, meant that he had a virtually guaranteed seat in the national assembly 
regardless of his age and lack of experience. Having been brought up in Lahore and at a 
boarding school in England, he hadn’t found rural Punjabi politics to his taste and had 
subsequently decided to avoid it. He complained about how, while he was a member of
and virtually had a guaranteed seat in it because of the vast vote bank he commanded through his 
landholdings and his local factories.
271 was able to visit Nurpur and meet members of the Noon family in 2006.1 was put in contact 
with them through an Argentinian agronomist who was working in Pakistan.
28 The term Malik, like the term chowdri was an honorific. In the Punjab it was generally used to 
refer to members of families who had received the largest land grants from the British during canal 
colonisation (see Ali 1988).
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the national assembly, many prosperous farmers who had mobilised votes on his behalf 
had incessantly assailed him with requests to remove uncooperative police officers and 
local land registration officers (patwaris). Other landlords requested that he obtain 
government jobs for their servants so that the government would pay the servants’ 
wages while they continued working for them. He also complained about how 
supporters frequently asked him to arrange release from jail for relatives of theirs 
involved in criminal activities and acts of violence.
After abandoning politics Malik Sahib resumed his urban lifestyle and only 
occasionally visited Nurpur. His lack of attention to village affairs created a power 
vacuum which eventually allowed a set of brothers from an intermediate ranking Jat 
family to gain power. They started to grab poorer people’s land and to harass and 
intimidate villagers. When, acting on the requests of numerous villagers, Malik Sahib 
decided to take them to court, they responded with threats of violence, and Malik Sahib 
and his family were compelled to take hired gunmen with them each time they visited 
Nurpur. It took four years for this situation to be resolved, but in the meantime several 
people were killed and injured. The leader of the Jat brothers was himself killed when 
he and his brothers attacked a car in which Malik Sahib’s gunmen were travelling. The 
remaining siblings later launched a second attack on Malik Sahib’s gunmen who were 
drinking tea at a roadside stall, and an innocent bystander was caught in the crossfire 
and permanently crippled as a result of a bullet through his spine. Immediately after the 
shootout Malik Sahib’s lawyer, a man extensively involved in rural litigation and 
conflict, told him that he needed to quickly fabricate some evidence to prove that his 
men had been attacked, and that otherwise the troublemakers might themselves file a 
case against him and his men. The lawyer told Malik Sahib that one of his gunmen 
needed to shoot himself in the arm in order to show the police evidence of an attack.
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Malik Sahib, who had little experience with this type of conflict and litigation, thought 
the suggestion was absurd. It was only once his local friends and allies, to whom the 
fabrication of evidence in cases in which the police got involved was a well known 
practice, also insisted on the necessity of it that he gave one of his gunmen the order to 
shoot himself in the arm.
Malik Sahib told me that he had no experience or taste for practices such as 
these, which came naturally to many local landlords and politicians. It took him four 
years to finally have the troublemakers jailed, and he admitted that people who were 
brought up dealing with these sorts of disputes would have dealt with the matter faster 
and more brutally. For example, he could have ordered his gunmen to kill the 
troublemakers, or could even have organised a fake police encounter to have them 
eliminated. However, both options would have involved mobilising the support of 
politicians, judges and police officers. Indeed, high ranking provincial politicians and 
police officers had offered their help but, since accepting it would have meant having to 
return the favours at some point, Malik Sahib refused so as not to be indebted to them 
later. Such indebtedness might have involved giving political support to, or mobilising 
votes on behalf of, a particular politician, for example. Moreover Malik Sahib 
disapproved of violent methods and preferred to do things through the courts. His case 
clearly illustrates the fact that even the wealthiest landlords could at any time find their 
authority challenged by individuals willing to use force and had to be constantly 
vigilant. It also illustrates the fact that absentee aristocratic landlords who were more at 
ease in a cosmopolitan crowd in Lahore (let alone abroad) were often unwilling to dirty 
their own hands with corrupt and violent rural politics.
The domestic and farm servants of the leading Noon family in Nurpur earned at
least twice as much as the servants of the prosperous farmers who are the subject of this
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thesis and who have become increasingly dominant in Punjabi politics. Although they 
were prosperous these landlords still did not have sufficient wealth to remain idle, so 
they pursued careers in the legal profession, in various branches of local government 
including the land revenue departments and the police, and in politics at various levels. 
But education, careers and measures of cosmopolitan respectability notwithstanding, 
they didn’t shy away from the use of force in order to pursue criminal ventures in cattle 
theft, heroin trafficking and bootlegging, as well as to fight rivals and intimidate unruly 
villagers. The links that they cultivated with the local authorities, particularly the police, 
played a crucial role in determining how successful they were in these pursuits.
Through these activities they were able to consolidate their local influence, enrich 
themselves through crime and corruption and emerge eventually as powerful strongmen 
and power brokers, and even as parliamentarians and ministers, beginning in the 1960s.
Social Setting
As was generally the case throughout the rest of the Pakistani Punjab the 
principal social distinction among people living in the village of Bek Sagrana and its 
surrounding area was the one between the landowners, (or zamindars), and the landless 
menial and artisan biraderis referred to as kammis.
Among the zamindars in the area of Bek Sagrana the Gondal biraderi of Jats was 
dominant in terms of status, political influence and wealth, principally in the form of 
land dedicated to citrus orchards. They made up fourteen out of the 120 households in 
the village and owned most of the land surrounding it. They all shared a common apical 
ancestor four generations back and generally married endogamously among themselves 
with first and second cousin marriage being very common (see Alavi 1972). In the cases
29 See Ahmed (1977) for whom the principal social distinction in Punjabi villages is that between 
zamindars and kammis. Throughout this work I will follow both Alavi (1972) and my informants who 
generally use the term biraderi, referring to the patrilineal clan, rather than the term zat for caste.
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where they married outside the Gondal biraderi it was generally with members of other 
Jat zamindar biraderis of roughly equivalent socio-economic standing. Some Gondal 
households, for example, had intermarried with members of allied Ranjha households 
for more than two generations. The status of the Gondals was reflected by the fact that 
they were usually referred to with the honorific term chowdri indicating chieftainship, 
but could also be referred to as Mian Ji or Sufi Sahib if they had a reputation for piety 
and saintliness. One very wealthy Gondal landlord in the village even managed to 
establish himself as a saint (pir). It was in fact not uncommon for major zamindars in 
the Punjab to be hereditary saints (pirs) thereby giving them particularly high social 
status.
On the other hand the kammis, who constituted the majority of the population in 
the area of Bek Sagrana, largely owned no land and had low social status in relation to 
the zamindars. I was frequently told by chowdris, including impoverished ones whose 
means of subsistence had little to differentiate them from labouring kammis, that the 
very term kammi indicated scarcity. This suggested that kammis not only suffered 
from scarcity in terms of material resources but also in terms of their physical, mental 
and moral stature. Some informants went so far as to tell me that the abusive term 
ikamina,’> referring to poor, dirty and, above all cowardly and stingy people, derived 
from the term kammi. Both terms indicated lowliness and scarcity. The kammis 
included carpenters (Tarkhan), potters (Kumhar), blacksmiths (Lohar), cobblers 
(Mochi), breadmakers (Machi), weavers (Julaha), barbers (Nai/Hajaam), bards
30 The term chowdri will be used frequently throughout this thesis to refer influential zamindars, 
particularly the Gondals.
31 In the village itself kammis made up 35 per cent of the population but this proportion was 
much higher in clusters of houses surrounding farmsteads known as deras. In the deras all houses other 
than that of the landlord were kammi households. On the dera where I lived sixteen out of eighteen 
households were kammi households. See the tables in Appendix One.
32 Whether there is an etymological relationship between the terms kammi and the term for
‘little’ or scarcity (ham) is unclear. Nevertheless informants did make a link between them.
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(Mirasi), drummers (Pirhain), and sweepers (Mussalli) among others. Members of these 
groups traditionally carried out a variety of tasks for several village patrons who paid 
them in kind with wheat following the yearly wheat harvest. These exchange 
arrangements were known as seyp. The payment usually consisted of a couple of 
maunds34 of wheat depending on the amount of work that was carried out by the kammi. 
In addition to payments in wheat the patrons of kammis customarily allowed them to 
occasionally gather fodder and firewood from their lands as well.
Although there was a clear status distinction between zamindars and kammis 
there was no clear cut ranking between most kammis, though there was a general 
consensus about which ones among them ranked highest and which ones ranked lowest. 
Thus it was generally agreed that Tarkhans and Lohars ranked highly while Mussallis, 
Mirasis and Pirhains ranked the lowest. On the other hand there appeared to be no 
consensus about the ranking of the biraderis in between these including Machis, Julahas 
and Kumhars. The reason that people gave for the ranking of certain kammis generally 
made reference to the perceived quality of the occupation that they pursued. Thus 
Tarkhans and Lohars were considered to be skilled artisans that were indispensable to 
the village economy and who could frequently make a decent living out of their trade. In 
contrast, the occupations of the Mirasis, Pirhains and Mussallis were considered to be 
somewhat demeaning and their members tended to earn a meagre livelihood from 
them. In Bek Sagrana the village Tarkhans and Lohars were among those who had 
managed to turn their traditional occupations into successful businesses. But those
34 One maund is equal to forty kilograms.
35 The Mirasis, for example, were traditionally associated with singing and with reciting the 
genealogies of their chowdris for whom they often also served as domestic servants. Singing, other than 
of religious songs, was generally frowned upon as un-Islamic. Moreover the traditional occupation of 
reciting genealogies for landlords was also considered demeaning because the flattering that it involved 
was thought to be debasing. As a result of this Mirasis were stereotyped as being flatterers (khushamad). 
See Ibbeston (1993 [1916]) for detailed accounts of the various traditional occupations of Mirasis in the 
Punjab.
artisans who had for some reason or another been unable to transform their occupation 
into a successful enterprise increasingly turned to wage labour in order to subsist. 
Nevertheless, and although it was generally the case that, like the zamindars, kammis 
also married endogamously (so that, a Lohar wouldn’t marry a Tarkhan, for example), 
unlike in Hindu India there were no explicit purity based rules governing the 
interactions between members of different kammi qaums or, for that matter, between 
zamindars and kammis.37 Thus kammis and zamindars smoked from shared hookahs 
and occasionally ate together. The most common occasions when kammis and 
zamindars ate together were on religious occasions when the brotherhood of Muslims 
was asserted.
The landowning Gondal chowdris held all of the significant economic power, 
and they buttressed it with political power by also controlling access to various state 
institutions. Their entry into provincial politics had allowed many to secure an upwardly 
mobile path, and the generation now between the ages of twenty and forty was more 
educated than that of their parents. Members of this generation were frequently brought 
up in cities such as Sargodha or Lahore and were fluent English speakers. As noted 
above, many of them were becoming lawyers, politicians and civil servants while others
36 For a sociological account of this trend in the district of Sargodha see Rouse (1983:320).
37Certain scholars, including Barth (1960), Ahmad (1973) and Dumont (1980), argue that 
Muslim forms of social stratification should be seen as akin to the Hindu caste system. Ahmad, for 
example, has argued that even though Muslims themselves deny that they have a caste system, in reality 
caste or an analogous system of stratification does indeed exist among Indian Muslims. According to 
Ahmad this is a result of the fact that Muslims in India have historically lived among, and are largely 
descended from, Hindus. Similarly, Dumont (1980: 207-08) has echoed this point and argued that even 
with respect to questions of commensality and intermarriage, Indian Muslims imitate Hindu codes of 
caste purity when it comes to forms of interaction between ashraf and non-ashraf groups (although he 
concedes that these ‘caste-like’ codes are less rigid given the influence of Islamic laws). However, 
according to Islamic law there are no rules of ritual purity governing the interactions between Muslims as 
these contradict the egalitarian tenets of Islam. Neither does Islam acknowledge the division of society 
into four vamas—priests (Brahmins), warriors (Kshatriyas), artisans and merchants (Vaishyas) and 
servants (Shudras)—and notions of untouchability for people outside this fourfold classification. It is for 
this reason that so many former untouchables in South Asia converted to Islam. However in modem day 
Pakistan rules of purity do frequently apply for interactions with non-Muslims. Moreover there are 
notions of female pollution and gender inequality which, as pointed out by Vatuk (1996) are specifically 
set out in the Sharia (1996:257).
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joined the police and the armed forces. As a result of this the Gondals were becoming 
increasingly established within the highly personalised institutions of the Pakistani State 
thereby further enhancing their capacity to act as political patrons for the local 
population.
In stark contrast to this, members of the kammi biraderis were largely excluded 
from politics, and the highest status that they were likely to achieve within state 
institutions was as low ranking school or hospital guards (chowkidars) with the 
patronage and good will of a chowdri being the only way they could obtain such 
positions in any case. In fact, villagers relied almost exclusively on personal contacts 
with Gondal patrons for most of the things they needed to do involving state and other 
major institutions such as the police, the courts, public and private hospitals and even 
schools. Kammis and poor zamindars were unlikely to have such connections and for 
them to personally approach the police was at best futile and at worst costly and 
dangerous. The Punjabi police was and remains notorious for extortion, torture and 
extra-judicial killings, and villagers greatly feared them accordingly. Fear of the police 
was in fact a pervasive theme of village life and was important because it consolidated 
the villagers’ need of well connected chowdri patrons to protect them from predatory 
police officers. This fear was illustrated in a variety of ways. In exchange for such 
protection, as will be further illustrated below, chowdris demanded political loyalty as 
well as labour. It was often in this way that individuals who were being pursued by the 
police for actual criminal offences ended up becoming the gunmen of chowdris. The 
predatory nature of the police therefore made the chowdris indispensable to villagers 
and also served the purposes of the chowdris more generally. It was a situation that 
effectively resembled a protection racket because the chowdris protected villagers from 
a predatory force over which they personally exercised a certain degree of control. As
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will be discussed throughout this thesis, like their leverage over the police their leverage 
over other state institutions also gave the chowdris a high degree of control over 
villagers.
The Village
The village of Bek Sagrana is situated to the east of the district towards the 
banks of the river Chenab. For the village landlords the trip by car to the city of 
Sargodha takes around forty minutes, while the trip to Lahore, along the Korean-built 
motorway completed in 1997, takes about two hours. For poorer villagers without cars 
or motorcycles, the trip to Sargodha takes an hour and a half on a cramped bus with a 
deafening musical horn.38
Villagers claim that Bek Sagrana had once been on the banks of the river 
situated to the east of the village. With time the shifting course of the river had moved 
further east, and what was now left of its former course formed a marshland (buddhi). 
Some villagers claimed that the river had moved east as a result of the prayers of a local 
village pir whose shrine lay to the east of the village cemetery facing the lowlands. 
Many landless villagers used these lowlands as pastureland for their livestock. The 
extremely wealthy and formerly politically influential Makhdoom39 landlords from the 
neighbouring village of Nawabpur had once used the area for hunting wildfowl. Elderly 
villagers recalled how the Makhdooms had brought Europeans along during their 
hunting excursions. However, like other erstwhile powerful aristocratic families, the 
fortunes of the Makhdooms had steadily declined since the 1970s and they were no 
longer seen hunting. As observed above, the Makhdooms had been absentee landlords 
more concerned with hunting and sport than with village affairs and the everyday 
running of their estates. Their failure to defend their landed interests through effective
38 The bus was owned by the younger brother of one of the village leaders.
39 In South Asia the term Makhdoom is used to refer to families that descend from a saint (pir).
38
involvement in politics meant that they lost significant amounts of land during Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto’s land reforms. As will be illustrated in chapter two, their unwillingness to 
sully themselves with local politics also meant that the far less wealthy Gondals of Bek 
Sagrana were able to overtake them politically. After obtaining seats in the provincial 
and national assemblies, some Gondals came close to being as wealthy as the 
Makhdooms who, despite land reforms, remained the biggest landowners in the area.
The Gondals claimed that the village had always been theirs but that long ago, 
when the river had moved east, they had moved with it because of the need for 
irrigation water. In their absence the Sagranas, a local cultivator lineage (biraderi), had 
overtaken the village. Subsequently one of the ancestors of all of the present day 
Gondals in Bek Sagrana, around whom a great deal of legend revolved, had managed to 
re-conquer the village by force. His descendants boasted about how this ancestor, 
known as Kala Gondal, or Black Gondal, had called for a gathering with leading 
Sagranas and had got his men to ambush and kill them as they were making their way to 
the meeting. In any case, despite the fact that the Gondals had retaken the village and 
claimed that it was rightfully theirs, the village retained the name of the Sagranas.
At the time of this fieldwork, starting in 2004, the Gondals owned the majority 
of the land in the village and were the politically and economically dominant lineage 
(biraderi) not only in the village but in the surrounding region as well. Even though the 
Gondals were often resented by other villagers, they showed deference towards the 
Gondals and spoke of Bek Sagrana as a Gondal village. There were 118 households in 
the village of which thirteen were Gondal households. Altogether these thirteen 
households owned 77.5 per cent of the land owned by villagers. The second most 
important group of landowners were the fourteen Rajput households, who owned 9.7 
per cent of land owned by villagers followed by fourteen Lurka households who owned
4.8 per cent of the land owned by villagers. The Sagranas, Ranjhas, Gurus, Gogs, 
Khokars, Theims, Jaras, Dhulayas and Sayyids altogether made up seventeen 
households and accounted for 7.2 per cent of land owned by villagers.40 In contrast, the 
kammis made up sixty households and owned only 0.8 per cent of the villager-owned 
land.
Slightly beyond the village proper, in the settlements surrounding landlords’ 
farmhouses {deras), land ownership was even more concentrated. These settlements 
generally emerged wherever a landlord built a farmhouse around which his servants and 
kammis came to settle. In some instances these deras had up to two dozen kammi 
households. In the area around Bek Sagrana the largest dera was that of Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas Gondal, who owned approximately 300 acres of land. As will be shown in 
chapter six, Sufi Ahmed Abbas Gondal moved out of the village in the early 1980s in 
response to a spiritual calling to set up a Sufi place of worship, taking several kammi 
families from the village along with him. By 2004 the dera had grown to have twenty- 
two households. Of these, twenty were kammi households, one was the village Imam’s 
and one was Sufi Ahmed Abbas’s. Apart from Sufi Ahmed Abbas, only the village 
Imam’s household and one Mirasi household owned any land. Within less than a mile’s 
radius of the village there were three other such deras owned by the wealthiest Gondal 
landlords 41
Like many villages on the banks of the rivers running through the Punjab, Bek 
Sagrana was an old settlement (purani abad). Unlike the planned chaks, its square mud 
and brick (kaccha) houses and its few concrete (pakka) ones had been erected 
haphazardly, so that the narrow alleyways of the village rarely formed a straight line.
40 The Ranjhas, Khokars, Gogs, Jaras, Theims and Dhulayas all claimed to be Jats. However 
there were Khokars and Theims in other areas who claimed to be Rajputs. For Khokars see Ibbeston 
(1993[1916J: 172).
41 See Appendix One for land distribution and occupation by biraderi.
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The sides of these alleyways had open gutters where dark water covered with black 
froth flowed out of people’s houses towards the village pond (talaab), and the 
alleyways themselves were strewn with litter. Behind the mud and brick walls, and the 
closed doors facing the alleyways, lay dusty courtyards at the end of which stood the 
square mud and brick houses of the majority of villagers. Only 37 out of the 118 houses 
that composed the village were pakka, and all of these belonged to Gondal and other 
zamindar households. The rest of the houses were built with bricks that were held 
together with mud rather than cement, while some were built purely with mud and 
straw. These houses generally possessed two or three rooms in a row. One of these 
rooms was normally used to keep the bulk of the family’s most prized possessions, 
which often included ornately painted string cots (charpais) as well as copper and tin 
vessels and plates displayed on shelves that covered one or more walls. This room also 
generally contained large metal trunks where people stored the wheat that they ground 
and consumed as bread (roti) throughout the year.42 This was also the room that was 
generally given to valued guests when they came to spend the night.
Other than during the cold and foggy months of December and January, people 
spent their time at home mostly in their courtyards, where charpais were neatly set out 
side by side or in a “c” shape, and in such a manner that their ends, where people lay 
their feet, didn’t point westwards towards Mecca. In the mornings the men would sit on 
these charpais in a cross legged position, and would be served their breakfast by their 
wives before setting off to work. Breakfast for the poor generally consisted of the 
warmed-up leftovers from the previous night or left-over roti with a chunk of unrefined 
sugar (gur) and, if lucky, a cup of watery tea. For those who were slightly better off
42 There were two small flour mills in the village where people could turn their wheat into flour. 
One of these mills was owned by the village blacksmiths (Tarkhans) and the other was owned by a potter 
(Kumhar) family. Both mills retained an eighth of the flour produced as their fee.
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breakfast might include a glass of buffalo milk, a valued source of nutrition held to be 
an important source of strength (takat) and vitality. For the wealthiest chowdris 
breakfast might include eggs and parathas fried in desi ghee, mango pickle (achaar), 
yoghurt and sweet tea prepared in fresh boiled milk. They too ate on charpais placed in 
their courtyards, although during the devastatingly hot summer months some of them 
ate their breakfast in air conditioned rooms. While the men sat on charpais, their wives 
and daughters (and servants in the case of the rich) squatted in a comer of the courtyard, 
where they prepared the fire and cooked.
During the day the women of the Gondal zamindar households, who maintained 
strict purdah, spent much of their time in the courtyard attending to household chores 
while their men were away on business. On sunny winter mornings they laid out their 
charpais in the sun to warm up, and when the heat mounted they retired under the shade 
of a tree or to the shade under the gallery. Poorer kammi women, who couldn’t afford 
the luxury of purdah, often had to leave their houses in order to fetch wood for cooking, 
fodder for the livestock and kitchen provisions. Some of the poorest women also left 
their houses in order to do domestic work for the Gondals. Afterwards they would 
return home to prepare a simple lunch for their husbands and children, and a somewhat 
more substantial meal in the evenings.
During the hot summer months, when temperatures could reach fifty degrees
centigrade, entire families would sleep in their courtyards at night. Those who could
afford to do so brought out their electric fans and kept them running throughout the
night. Those who had a fan but couldn’t afford to pay their electricity bills stole
electricity and, before sunrise, furtively pulled down their illegal electricity connections.
In houses without a fan the men would sleep on the roof in the hope of catching a cool
gust of wind while the women, for the sake of modesty (hayaa), generally stayed below
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in the courtyard. The wealthiest Gondals had air conditioners so, if they were in the 
village and not away in their town houses, they slept inside and caught colds in mid­
summer. They too sometimes stole electricity in order to avoid the massive bills that 
resulted from running air conditioners.43 When there was too much strain on the 
electrical grid, which was largely caused by wealthy people running their air 
conditioners, blackouts and load-shedding meant that, for some hours, both rich and 
poor suffered together. Perhaps during these hours the rich, accustomed to comfort, 
suffered more than the toughened, weather-beaten poor.
Almost all courtyards possessed a hand-pump (nalka) for drinking water and 
washing, with only a few households having running water. Those who could afford to 
do so erected walls around the hand pump in order to be able to wash themselves with 
greater privacy. Only the wealthiest Gondals built bathrooms with hot running water 
inside their large houses. Many people also used their courtyards to keep chickens and 
tether their livestock overnight, when cattle and buffalo thieves roamed the area. For 
their part, wealthy landlords had cowsheds where their servants and bondsmen spent the 
night in order to guard the livestock from thieves. While most households possessed 
nalkas, very few possessed latrines (only about fifteen out of the 118 households in the 
village did so). All but two of these were Gondal households. Men whose houses didn’t 
possess latrines either used the latrines within the compound of the Friday mosque 
(jamia masjid)in the centre of the village, or went out into the citrus orchards where 
they could perform their bodily functions out of sight. Because their wives and 
daughters weren’t meant to enter the mosque the women went out into the orchards in 
groups, either under cover of darkness for the sake of modesty, or in the early morning.
43 Running a single air conditioner every night could result in electricity bills of over Rs. 10,000 
per month. In order to avoid such bills landlords sometimes set up clandestine connections to the 
electrical grid or bribed the local Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) official to tamper 
with their electricity meters. The poor couldn’t afford the bribes so they simply hoped not to be caught.
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Villagers told me that women went out in groups to protect each other in case 
wandering men, particularly local Gondal chowdris, tried to take advantage of them.
In the centre of the village, towering above the rest of it, were the fortress-like 
houses of the wealthy and politically influential Gondal chowdris. Unlike all other 
houses in the village, these houses had two storeys and some even had towers from 
which their owners could keep an eye on the activities of villagers. All of them 
possessed a walled courtyard where the women of the chowdris’ households often spent 
their days attending to guests and chatting with the other women of the village, as well 
as supervising their servants sweeping the courtyard, washing clothes and cooking.
Some of the older houses, built or refurbished around the 1950s, had art-deco designs 
plastered upon their walls and ornately carved heavy wooden doors. Their insides were 
cool as a result of the thick walls and the high ceilings with small vent-like windows at 
the top, which were opened with long wooden poles in order to release the hot air that 
accumulated near the ceiling. The furniture in the older houses was old and often 
rickety, and the rooms containing it had a musty smell suggesting the decay of long 
years.
At the time of fieldwork three out of five of these large houses had been 
abandoned as a result of the violent factional conflict that raged in the village 
throughout the 1990s (see chapter three). Thanks to the rising incomes that followed 
from the green revolution and from the introduction of citrus orchards (and in two cases 
from involvement in formal politics and political brokerage) the houses’ owners had 
been able to move out of the village and build new houses inside walled compounds on 
their lands within a mile of the village. When they moved they took their servants and 
kammis along with them. In this way three large settlements were created outside the 
village. As mentioned above, these settlements were referred to as deras. The houses
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that the landlords built there were closer in style to the houses with imitation neo­
classical features found in the housing colonies of suburban Lahore than to their former 
village dwellings. As noted, they sometimes had several storeys, and some had 
entrances that were flanked by tall white columns. Unlike the older dwellings some of 
these houses had large windows, which were tinted green or black in order for the 
women to be able to look out without being seen from the outside. Rather than dusty 
paved courtyards at their centre, these houses had large walled gardens at their back 
where the women, who now spent most of their time in Lahore, could spend their days 
in seclusion. The walls around the perimeter of these gardens, which in some cases 
covered well over an acre of land, had high walls studded with shards of glass in order 
to prevent thieves and enemies from entering.
The kammis and servants who accompanied the landlords when they moved out 
of the village settled around the outside perimeter of the landlords’ walled compounds. 
The green lawns and the imitation neoclassical buildings inside the walled compounds 
contrasted sharply with the traditional flat-roofed mud dwellings that clustered on the 
outside. The physical distance of these compounds from the village, as well as the 
stylistic distance between them and more traditional dwellings, reflected the widening 
social and economic gulf that increasingly separated the Gondals whose fortunes had 
soared from the majority of villagers. Whereas the previous generation of village 
leaders, who were now either very old or dead, had lived most of their lives in the 
village, their sons, and particularly their grandsons, increasingly spent their time in 
cities such as Lahore or Sargodha. One important factor that had facilitated their move 
to the cities had been the introduction of citrus orchards which only required minimal
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supervision from their owners.44 The older generation had gone to school in the village, 
where they had studied and played with poorer villagers whom they had come to know 
intimately. Later on in life they had assumed village leadership and spent their days 
attending to village problems in the village men’s house (darra) next to the Jamia 
Masjid. Nostalgic old villagers recalled how the village leaders, who at the time weren’t 
divided by factional rivalries, had presided over men assembled at the darra and 
exchanged gossip and jokes with them on a daily basis.
Since the early 1990s the village darra had rarely been used as a place where 
chowdris and other villagers gathered in the evenings. The only people who used it were 
some disreputable Gondal siblings who owned ten acres of land and who gambled and 
drank there. They were often abusive towards kammis that walked past. Sometimes they 
would imperiously send them on errands and reward them with abuse and denigrating 
jokes when they returned. On one occasion I witnessed them making fun of a kammi by 
mockingly referring to him with the honorific term of address ‘Chowdri Ji,' a term used 
to refer to zamindars, because he was wearing brand new clothes and therefore putting 
himself above what they considered to be his true station in life. The kammi in question 
later told me that they were abusive towards him because it bothered them to see a 
lowly villager dressing the same way they did. He said that they would rather see him 
walking around in rags because they wanted people like him to remain poor and 
dependent so that they could continue to boss them around.
44 In a similar manner the Anavil Brahmin landlords described by Jan Breman in Patronage and 
Exploitation (1974) had been able to move to the cities as a result of the introduction of mango orchards. 
However, because the economic and political fortunes of the Gondals were closely linked to their 
involvement in politics they needed to maintain control over their constituencies. This meant that if they 
became excessively urbanised and lost touch with their rural constituents, they risked losing their political 
clout. Thus unlike Breman’s Anavils, whose relationship with labourers had become largely contractual, 
the relationship between Gondals and labourers and other villagers continued to incorporate political, 
economic and religious factors. Whereas for the Anavils having large numbers of dependents no longer 
played an important political function, the Gondals still needed dependants to settle their feuds and to win 
elections. One of the aims of this work is to explain why political power remained central in guaranteeing 
the fortunes of Gondal and other landlords.
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Figure 2: View of Bek Sagrana with low lying mud houses in the foreground and towering Gondal 
houses in the background.
Figure 3: Abandoned Gondal house in the centre of Bek Sagrana.
47
When the sons of those who had once presided at the village darra now attended 
to villagers’ needs they did so at their own deras. Even then, however, their availability 
was limited since they were often away in Lahore where their children were being 
educated at prestigious English language schools and universities. Some of their 
children even ended up going to university in Canada and in the United Kingdom. As a 
result of their upward mobility the distance between leading landlords and their village 
had grown progressively over the generations. Thus whereas the landlords who were 
now over seventy had been to school in the village, their sons had gone away to school, 
and in some cases to university, in Sargodha while their grandchildren had been 
educated in Lahore. The proximity of Sargodha to the village, and its role as the 
principal administrative and commercial centre for villagers, meant that the middle 
generation had been able to maintain regular contact with the village. They had returned 
to the village on weekends and had frequently met villagers in Sargodha when they 
went there for shopping or for administrative purposes. In Sargodha they were able to 
forge friendships as well as enmities with the young members of the district’s future 
political elite. Later on in life when they entered politics, these ties and enmities would 
play an important role in the formation of local political coalitions (see chapter two).
As members of this middle generation rose to power at district, provincial and 
national levels they were able to amass large fortunes and to engage in a process of 
upward social mobility. Members of all leading Gondal families either bought or rented 
property in Lahore where the provincial and much of the national elite resided. Here 
they were able to rub shoulders with senior civil servants, judges, politicians, rural 
magnates and industrialists. Members of the old aristocratic landlord families, such as
46 The college was founded in 1886 by the then governor of the Punjab Sir Charles Umpherston 
Aitchison. Its establishment coincided with the beginning of canal colonisation and served to educate the 
scions of the leading landed families of the Punjab. Over the years the college produced a large number of 
prime ministers, chief ministers, senators and judges and continues to do so.
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the Noons who lived in Lahore and who no longer wanted to be involved in politics, 
regarded them as upstarts. Nevertheless, because the Gondals were able to get some of 
their children into elite schools (such as Aitchison College),46 they started associating 
and making friends with the sons of the wealthiest and most powerful people in the 
country and shedding the more rustic social veneer of their parents in the process. 
Whereas the middle generation had rubbed shoulders with the district and provincial 
elite, the third generation did so with the provincial and national elite. The result was 
that this third generation harboured far greater ambitions than their parents had. They 
hoped to gain high ranking political office or jobs in multinational companies, banks 
and law firms, and they saw the village as a backward and violent place that they 
preferred to avoid. When they went there they felt out of place. They only came to the 
village three or four times a year and on these occasions they often remained inside 
playing computer games, watching television and smoking marijuana or drinking 
alcohol, which had been secretly provided by their servants. I soon realised that after 
having spent only a couple of months there I knew more of its inhabitants by name than 
they did. Like the Makhdooms before them, this third generation of Gondals was losing 
touch with the village and its ways.
Besides the most prominent Gondal households, the other eight Gondal 
households of the village generally owned between five and twenty acres of land and 
remained more rooted in the village than the leading families. There were a number of 
such Gondal landlords who also lived in deras not far from the village. These deras 
were smaller than those of the leading Gondals and generally had no more than two or 
three mud houses for kammis and servants attached to the main house. Villagers often 
referred to them as ‘motorcycle-riding chowdris’ (motorcycle wale chowdri) because 
unlike the wealthier Gondals who drove around in cars and pickup trucks, they drove
back and forth to Sargodha and around the village on motorcycles. Moreover unlike the 
leading Gondals who employed people to help manage their farms, most of these 
Gondals were directly involved in the management of their farms. They were also more 
involved in everyday village life than members of the leading families who operated at 
higher levels of politics. When villagers needed to resolve a dispute or required 
patronage with a government institution, these Gondals were more readily accessible 
than were the members of the leading families. As will be shown in chapter five, during 
elections they played an important role as brokers between the more powerful Gondals 
and poorer villagers.
Within this category of Gondals some of the more hard working and
academically gifted youths were studying in Sargodha and some were preparing for
provincial and national civil service exams. Others studied law and one, who was
middle aged, had become a doctor. In other cases they had acquired civil service jobs
through patronage or, as locals put it, through the ‘recommendation’ (sifarish) of one of
the more influential village Gondals. Still others became involved in politics at the
union council level, the lowest tier of elected government, and acted as brokers for the
higher ranking Gondal politicians in the village. Pursuing such occupations was seen as
a necessity by those of them who realised that they would otherwise end their lives
poorer than when they had been bom, since the subdivision of land across generations
meant that they would inevitably have less land than their fathers. If they did nothing to
compensate for this then they and their children might in some cases end up
dangerously close to poverty. However, not all of them pursued further education, and
less academically gifted young men generally ended up taking care of their lands. Other
young men from within this category ended their studies at a young age and became
involved in crime. Such was the case with the young Gondals, referred to above, who
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had occupied the village darra. They adopted the swagger and the twirled moustache 
with the unshaven look that typified the village tough (badmash), and they spent their 
nights playing cards, drinking home brews and smoking hash. One notorious set of four 
brothers, whose rise and fall will be documented in chapter three, became involved in 
bootlegging, petty heroin trading and the smuggling of stolen cars. In the process, one 
of the four became a heroin addict himself. Young men such as these frequently 
attracted the attention of more powerful Gondals, who made good use of village toughs 
for political and economic ends. Powerful landlords offered them protection from the 
police in exchange for a share in their business. They also used them to fight opponents 
and to intimidate and harass unruly villagers, particularly during election times.
By virtue of the fact that these less prominent Gondals belonged to the dominant 
lineage and shared kinship ties with the most powerful Gondals, their power and status 
was superior to that of members of other landholding biraderis (such as Ranjha’s, 
Lurkas and Rajputs) who might own as much or even more land than they did. Their 
kinship ties with the powerful village Gondals made it easier for them to obtain the 
patronage necessary to gain certain government jobs and favourable outcomes in 
disputes that they might be involved in. The result was that even relatively poor 
Gondals had more influence in the village, and were more likely to have government 
jobs, than were members of relatively well off non-Gondal zamindar households. The 
latter had little influence in village matters or in local politics, and they dedicated 
themselves to running their farms and setting up small businesses. Some of them 
opened shops in the village or in the nearby market town of Chowki Bhagat, others 
worked as middlemen during the citrus harvest, and others were involved in the timber 
business. This suggests that membership of the dominant biraderi made a significant
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difference to class positioning because it placed people in a more advantageous position 
vis-a-vis the state.47
Fieldwork
My entry into Bek Sagrana was made possible through Pakistani contacts and 
friends at the London School of Economics. I sought their advice as to how I might be 
able to carry out research on what Pakistanis referred to as ‘feudalism’, and they put me 
in contact with the Gondals of Bek Sagrana whom they knew to be extensively involved 
in politics at the provincial and national levels. The man who first welcomed me to the 
village was Mahmood Abbas Gondal. He was the youngest son of the pious Sufi 
Ahmed Abbas Gondal, and a member of one of the wealthiest households in the village. 
Mahmood Abbas Gondal spent most of his time in Lahore where he had succeeded in 
securing places for his two sons at Aitchison College. He was a lawyer by training but 
had opted not to pursue a career in the legal profession and lived off a handsome yearly 
income of roughly £70,000 from his citrus orchards. Because he had time on his hands 
his uncle Chowdri Nawaz Ali, a several times member of the provincial assembly, 
appointed him to help me settle down in the village.
During my first week in the village Mahmood Abbas Gondal took me around the 
area of Bek Sagrana in his chauffeur-driven car, in the company of his childhood 
servant Bilal Mirasi. Bilal Mirasi no longer worked permanently for Mahmood Abbas 
but occasionally offered his services to him when needed. Mehmood often asked Bilal 
to accompany him when he went to visit friends and relatives both around Bek Sagrana 
and beyond. This not only provided him with company but also with the social status
47 This finding coincides with Chakravarti’s claim that membership of the dominant Bhumiar 
caste in a village in Bihar played a crucial role in “determining access to the means of production, control 
over the labour process, and forms of exploitation” (Chakravarti 2001: 106) and consolidated the class 
position of its members.
52
that landlords attributed to having servants. As I soon came to know, landlords rarely 
visited each other without bringing at least one servant with them. Those landlords who 
couldn’t afford a permanent servant would go to the extent of asking random villagers 
to accompany them when they visited friends in order to avoid appearing socially 
insignificant. Thus during these first few days Bilal accompanied us everywhere. While 
Mahmood was introducing me to his relatives, Bilal generally sat in the background in 
the company of other servants. In the mornings Mahmood would ask him to dust his 
shoes and then throughout the day he would be called upon to bring glasses of water, 
snacks, tea or to buy cigarettes in a nearby shop. In the evenings Bilal would often 
provide Mahmood and his relatives with a bit of entertainment by recounting some 
amusing local gossip or some unusual event that he had witnessed. He told stories about 
local cattle thieves, drug addicts, elopements and the Koreans who had come to build 
the motorway connecting Islamabad to Lahore in the 1990s, whom he claimed to have 
seen eating turtles and wild pigs.
The first people that Mahmood took me to visit were his maternal uncles 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his younger brother Chowdri Mazhar Ali. Chowdri Nawaz Ali 
had moved to a nearby village where he had more than half of his lands, and Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali had moved to a dera a mile to the east of the village. Chowdri Nawaz Ali 
Gondal was an influential member of the Pakistan Muslim League Noon (PML-N) and 
his younger brother, Chowdri Mazhar Ali, was the party president for the district of 
Sargodha. They were once the most powerful Gondals with links to Bek Sagrana, but 
since General Musharraf s military coup in 1999 they had been in the opposition. 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali had even been jailed for a year shortly after the coup, and Chowdri 
Nawaz Ali had had to cease his political activities and temporarily cut his ties with 
Nawaz Sharif s party (see chapter two). The result was that their local rivals had been
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able to gain power at their expense. Most notably, their cousin and fierce rival, Chowdri 
Abdullah Gondal,48 had gained considerable ground against them by aligning himself 
with the pro-government faction. As union council nazim and the local power broker for 
a larger pro-government coalition, he had become the most influential patron in the 
village of Bek Sagrana. However, Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Nawaz Ali were 
confident that the tide would turn, as it frequently did in Pakistani politics, and that they 
would sooner or later return to power and put Chowdri Abdullah back in his place.49
Like Mahmood Abbas, both of them thought it strange that a Westerner should 
want to research a rural backwater such as theirs. After all, they argued, Pakistanis all 
wanted to go to England and to America to study and do research and I was doing the 
opposite. When I explained that I was interested in researching feudalism for my PhD in 
social anthropology they proudly asserted that I had come to the right people, but they 
remained doubtful as to what I could possibly gain from it. Rather than reacting 
defensively to my mention of feudalism they proudly asserted that they were ‘feudals’50 
and, waving towards the horizon, told me that all of the land in sight belonged to them. 
They told me that as their guest no one in their area would touch me and that even the 
local police would salute me. Thus despite their doubts as to the purpose of my stay in 
the village, they offered me their hospitality and protection.51 Over the next few months 
it became clear to me that both Mahmood Abbas and his uncles believed that I was a 
spy, but this somehow never interfered with their hospitality towards me.
48 Chowdri Abdullah was also an affine of their by virtue of being married to Chowdri Nawaz 
Ali and Mazhar Ali’s half sister.
49 In 2008, two years after the end of my fieldwork, the tide did turn and they regained the upper 
hand over Chowdri Abdullah.
50 They used the word in English.
511 soon realised that such ‘protection’ was necessary in order to avoid harassment at the hands 
of the local police and local toughs. Whenever a police officer stopped me, the fact that I was with the 
Gondals meant that rather than harassing me they invited me to have cups of tea. Moreover local toughs 
who were initially hostile to my presence in the village accepted my presence there when it became clear 
to them that I was a guest of the Gondals.
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After several long days lounging on charpais, drinking tea, smoking hookahs 
and meeting a bewildering number of multi-related Gondals, I was eventually dropped 
off at the place where I would initially lodge in the area of Bek Sagrana. Mahmood 
Abbas offered to house me at his father’s dera, which was also a Sufi lodge built in the 
1980’s. This was a place where members of a particular branch of the Qadiri Sufi order 
(.silsilah) occasionally gathered to perform zikr52 and where Mahmood Abbas’s father, 
Sufi Ahmed Abbas, held the monthly celebrations of Gyarvi Sharif commemorating the 
date of Sheikh Abdul Qadir Gilani of Baghdad’s union with God. His father agreed to 
my staying there, and Mahmood Abbas appointed Bilal Mirasi to help me settle down in 
the village and also to bring me my three daily meals from Sufi Ahmed Abbas’s house.
I initially worried that this arrangement and my entry into the village through the 
Gondals might make it appear to villagers that I was on the side of the landlords. I 
thought that this might prevent me from winning the trust of kammis and poorer 
villagers. However, with time my worries on this matter began to subside for several 
reasons. To begin with, Mahmood Abbas Gondal and his elder brother lived in Lahore 
and only came back to the village once every two weeks. Sufi Ahmed Abbas, Mahmood 
Abbas’s father, was a pious recluse who tolerated my presence at the lodge but who was 
suspicious of me and who therefore kept his distance. This all meant that as soon as 
Mahmood Abbas left the village I spent all of my time with members of the various 
dependant kammi households that clustered around Sufi Ahmed Abbas’s lodge. Bilal 
Mirasi kept up a degree of formality with me for the first few days but soon started to 
relax when he saw that I didn’t treat him the way that landlords usually treated their 
servants. Within a couple of days he started openly smoking marijuana in front of me, 
took me along to meet all of his friends, and freely spoke to me about the problems that
52 The word zikr literally refers to the act of remembering, and in a religious contexts it refers to 
the act of remembering God, usually through the recitation of his 99 names.
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he faced with his Gondal masters.53 Moreover because the Sufi lodge was a place where 
villagers from different social backgrounds gathered to worship, socialise, eat and rest, 
it was a good place to meet people.54 A few of Sufi Ahmed Abbas’s bonded labourers 
had breakfast and dinner at the lodge, and by eating with them on a regular basis I not 
only gained their trust but also their friendship. Living at the Sufi lodge also gave me a 
chance to closely observe the everyday interactions between Gondal landlords and their 
servants, labourers and clients. Sufi Ahmed Abbas and his sons would sometimes sit on 
charpais under a large rubber tree outside the lodge and direct farm operations, resolve 
people’s disputes and dispense patronage to clients.
The fact that the Sufi lodge was neutral territory and Sufi Ahmed Abbas didn’t 
take sides in the factional rivalries and conflicts that raged in the village was a further 
advantage, since it meant that I was able to meet and talk to the leaders of both village 
factions while I lived there. Because I was Sufi Ahmed Abbas’s guest I was able to 
meet Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s biggest local rival, his distant cousin Chowdri Abdullah 
Gondal, both at the Sufi lodge and at his dera on several occasions. When I later had to 
shift to the dera of Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s youngest brother, Chowdri Arif, I ceased to 
have the privilege of neutrality.55 Chowdri Arif was allergic to Chowdri Abdullah’s 
very name and made it clear to me that he wouldn’t tolerate me socialising with him 
regardless of my research interests. Nevertheless, during the initial months at Sufi 
Ahmed Abbas’s dera I was able to visit Chowdri Abdullah at his dera on several 
occasions and observe how he dealt with village affairs. Subsequently, even though I 
could no longer visit him I was able to gather a great deal of information about him and
53 After about ten days he asked me whether he could take leave in order to work in the citrus 
harvest, and assigned one of Sufi Muhammad Hayat’s child servants to bring me my meals. Since he 
lived at Sufi Muhammad Hayat’s dera I continued to see him frequently after he left.
54 The correlative disadvantage was that the place afforded me no privacy, but I eventually got 
used to this.
55 Eventually Sufi Muhammad Hayat decided that I should live elsewhere. Friends in the village 
told me that he had become uncomfortable about lodging a non-Muslim in a place of Islamic worship.
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his brothers through his allies and servants as well as through villagers, for whom 
Chowdri Abdullah’s character and activities provided an inexhaustible topic of 
conversation.
Like Mahmood Abbas, Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s younger brother lived off the 
income from his citrus orchards and spent most of his time in Lahore. This meant that, 
as had been the case at the Sufi lodge, I spent most of my evenings in the company of 
his servants. During the day I would either visit the labourers who lived at Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas’s dera to chat with them or to accompany them to the fields and citrus orchards, 
or I would cycle to the village where I had established a close friendship with the two 
nephews of the village Imam shortly after my initial arrival. Members of the village 
Imam’s extended family were respected for their learning and piety. They were also 
respected for the fact that they were charitable towards the poor and that they strove to 
maintain harmony and peace in the village. My association with them helped me to 
become accepted by many villagers who were initially wary about the presence of a 
non-Muslim in their village, especially one who according to rumours might also be a 
spy.56 Their interest in and intimate knowledge of village affairs also meant that they 
were invaluable informants who took an active interest in my research. Their scrupulous 
commitment to telling the truth (haqiqat) and to speaking out against immorality, fraud 
and injustice meant that they were often willing to provide me with information about 
which others were more secretive. Thus I quickly came to learn details about the local
56 The fact that they became friends with me immediately made me more acceptable to many 
people. During my initial days in the village several villagers were uncertain about whether it was all 
right for them to eat with me, or even to become friends with me, as I was possibly impure (napak) by 
virtue of my dietary and moral habits. People’s doubts were largely cleared when on the first Friday after 
my arrival in the village the nephews asked me to attend the friday (juma) prayers. The prayer leader 
(imam) told me to sit at the far back of the mosque so as not to interfere with people’s prayers. After his 
sermon he told the assembled villagers that Christians such as me were people of the Book (ahl-e kitaab) 
and that as such it was possible for Muslims to eat with me and be friends with me. After this he told the 
assembled villagers to persuade me to convert to Islam by showing me the superiority of the Islamic faith 
through their acts.
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drug trade, bootlegging, buffalo theft, electricity theft and the various forms of 
embezzlement of government funds and appropriation of public office for personal use 
that took place in the village. Moreover whenever I needed to confirm certain facts they 
were often willing to introduce me to concerned parties who might be ready to impart 
information to me. They also helped me carry out minor surveys which would have 
been difficult for me to do without their support.
When my Gondal hosts, Chowdri Mahmood Abbas and later Chowdri Nawaz 
Ali’s younger brother, came to the village (roughly every fortnight) I abandoned my 
daily routine to spend time with them. This was not only necessary because, as my 
hosts, they expected me to spend time with them when they came to the village, but also 
because it served my research interests. By spending time with them I was able to gain 
insights into the political intrigues, rivalries and enmities which often dominated their 
conversations. My good relations with them meant that they introduced me to their 
friends and political allies throughout the district. They also introduced me to lawyers, 
judges and police officers who were sometimes willing to discuss local politics with me. 
On a few occasions they also invited me to Lahore, where I was able to see how they 
and the servants that they took with them from the village lived while there. There were 
times when I also visited Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali to carry out 
informal interviews with them. Their sons were particularly eager to show me around 
and to discuss local, regional and international politics with me.
The people I had almost no access to were the women. The Gondals maintained 
strict purdah with outsiders and only close relatives and dependants from the village 
were allowed to see the women of their households. When I inquired about marriage 
alliances, they were willing to tell me about the men that their female relatives had 
married, but they never referred to the women by name and never spoke about them.
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The little information that I was able to gather about them came from servants who told 
me about which chowdranis51 they liked and disliked. Nor did I even have much access 
to kammi women who couldn’t afford to maintain such strict purdah. Although I often 
saw them when I visited kammi friends at their houses, it was exclusively the men with 
whom I spoke. My addressing kammi women when they were on their own, when for 
example they were out gathering fodder or wood for cooking, would have been 
considered highly improper and would have been likely to start rumours about my
CO
sexual morality.
Finally, although Bek Sagrana was my principal field-site, important aspects of 
my research were informed through meetings with politicians, judges, bureaucrats, 
politicians, journalists and NGO workers in both Lahore and Islamabad. My research 
was also informed by visits where I met people in other villages throughout the district 
and beyond. Although these people do not form part of the material presented in this 
thesis, my conversations with them helped me to formulate lines of inquiry and gain 
insights into the broader relevance of the material that I faced in the village. As Clifford 
Geertz argued “The locus of study is not the object of study. Anthropologists don’t 
study villages.. .they study in villages” (Geertz 1993 [1973]). The village therefore 
provided me with a place to explore broader political issues that are relevant to 
academics and policy makers working on Pakistan.
Starting in July 2001,1 spent a total of about twenty-five months in Pakistan 
over the course of several trips, and I spent twenty of those months in Bek Sagrana. I 
initially stayed in Bek Sagrana for six months between December 2004 and May 2005.
57 A term for chowdri women.
58 On one occasion, near the beginning of fieldwork, I briefly paused to talk to some women who 
greeted me on my way to the village and the next day there were already rumours about my trying to 
seduce village women. My friends promptly advised me not to speak to women unless their husbands 
happened to be around. The fact that I was a Westerner appears to have made this even more of an issue 
for me since people initially assumed that I would be sexually promiscuous.
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Due to visa problems I was forced to return to the UK and was only able to return to 
Ben Sagrana in Febuary 2005, after which I spent a further fourteen months there until 
the beginning of May 2006. During that time I spent periods of up to a week in either 
Islamabad or Lahore every two months. I spent my first three months in Pakistan 
(between July and September 2001) working in an NGO in the Hazara district of the 
North West Frontier Province. I then spent two months between December 2002 and 
January 2003 travelling around the Punjab looking for prospective field sites.
Overview of Chapters
Chapter two explores in some depth the historical grounds for the consolidation 
of parochial politics in the Pakistani Punjab, or what in the Indian context has been 
referred to as ‘banal’ (Kohli 1991) or ‘demand’ politics (Rudolph & Rudolph 1987). It 
also seeks to illustrate how colonialism first, and authoritarian rule in independent 
Pakistan subsequently, entrenched local landed elites into a political system where 
politics came to revolve almost exclusively around the exercise of brokerage and 
patronage. Further, it demonstrates how restrictions on political parties worked to 
prevent the emergence of popular parties representing the interests of disadvantaged 
sectors of society. Finally, chapter two also shows how the fact that legislators were 
often a facade for authoritarian governments reduced them to the role of political 
brokers with only a limited role to play in legislation and policy-making. The absence of 
parties that were truly representative of different sectors of society, together with the 
fact that politicians principally saw themselves as power brokers, meant that for Punjabi 
landlords different political parties were largely seen as interchangeable routes to 
power. Their notoriously fickle allegiance to political parties is shown to have been
exacerbated by the fact that loyalty to opposition parties was likely to result in 
harassment, imprisonment and deprivation of patronage, while joining the ruling 
coalition could result in significant rewards in terms of patronage. Patronage included 
not only the granting of funds and building contracts but also help from above in 
gaining control over the local police and judiciary. This together with the flow of 
weapons and drugs from Afghanistan into Pakistan gave politicians ample opportunity 
to enrich themselves and engage in criminal activities.
Having established the changeability of politicians’ allegiance to political 
parties, chapter three sets out to determine what the basis for their political allegiances 
actually was. More specifically, the chapter addresses the issue of whether the 
entrenchment of parochial politics by authoritarian regimes meant that biraderis had 
become the central building block of politics in the Pakistani Punjab, as certain 
commentators, including Waseem (1994), Rais 1985, and Ayesha Jalal (1995), have 
argued. Although the chapter illustrates that extended households whose members have 
multiple overlapping kinship ties with each other are often the focus of influential 
landlords’ political loyalties, it shows that the extended biraderi is not. I show that a 
segmentary model along the lines traced by Gellner (1969), whereby feuding 
individuals at lower levels of segmentation unite at higher levels of segmentation when 
faced with an external enemy, is not applicable to the Pakistani Punjab. Instead the 
evidence seems to confirm Barth’s (1981) argument that self-interest and agnatic rivalry 
rather than extended blood ties often structure regional political alliances. Thus the 
evidence presented illustrates the fact that politicians often make instrumental alliances 
with non-kinsmen or with distantly related kinsmen against their closer kinsmen and 
agnates with whom they compete for dominance in their home villages and regions. 
Following Barth I argue that powerful landlord politicians can rely on the support of
their clients and armed retainers, and that they therefore do not need to unite with 
members of their extended biraderi in order to have the force of numbers. Following 
Alavi (1972) I show how on the other hand middle ranking, independent, landlords 
depend more on their extended biraderis since they don’t have enough dependants and 
clients to act independently in the political arena.
Chapter four seeks to establish the nature of the relationship between patrons 
and the clients that constitute their political support base. In line with Asad’s (1972) 
critique of Barth’s (1959) contractual analysis of Swat Pathan leadership, I argue that 
the relationship between clients and their landlords is best characterised as one of class 
domination. I show that the elite’s monopoly over landownership and its monopoly over 
the control and access to state institutions serve to reproduce the domination of 
landlords over the majority of the landless rural population. Members of the landed elite 
still wield considerable power over much of the rural population through tenancy 
relations, patronage and coercion. This enables them to gain votes during elections, to 
command corvee labour and to enforce debt-bondage. The thesis illustrates how this 
remains true despite the growing, although partial, proletarianization of former tenants 
and of members of menial and artisan occupational groups. One implication of this 
situation is that members of marginal landless groups, in addition to voting for landlords 
during elections, also frequently fight on their behalf rather than against them. Although 
villagers can increasingly earn their livelihoods independently of the landlords 
(predominantly through casual labour) they often have to turn to them for patronage in 
times of hardship. Patronage may include mediation with state institutions such as the 
police, hospitals and courts, as well as loans often needed by villagers to cover a family 
member’s medical or wedding expenses. In exchange for patronage, villagers are 
expected to provide the landlords with political support and labour. Landlords’
monopoly over access to the state, combined with their use of private armed militias, 
means that they can also use coercion and the threat of it to gain the labour and political 
allegiance of villagers. It is the threat—and use—of force that allows landlords to 
enforce debt-bondage in cases where villagers have taken loans from them. The main 
point to emerge from the chapter is that despite the increasing economic 
proletarianization of the labour force and widespread resentment towards the landlords 
labourers have not become politically assertive. Instead, political allegiances retain a 
vertical factional character, cutting through both ties of caste and class as described by 
Alavi (1971) in his paper entitled The Politics o f Dependence: a Village in West Punjab.
Chapter five explores some of the reasons that the electoral process in Pakistan 
has not allowed for the sort of empowerment of disenfranchised sectors of society that 
has been witnessed in parts of India. The chapter shows how, on the contrary, elections 
under authoritarian regimes have actually served to entrench local elites and perpetuate 
an elitist, factional form of politics. Focusing on General Musharraf s local government 
scheme (funded by a variety of international donors) I show how elections that allegedly 
aimed to empower large swathes of the population failed to do so. I argue that the local 
influence of the landed elite played a significant role in subverting the central 
government’s alleged goal of popular empowerment, and succeeded in capturing the 
entire local government structure through the exercise of its muscle power and 
influence. However, I argue that the central government is equally responsible for this 
failure. Evidence suggests that the devolution programme was in fact an attempt to 
fragment the political opposition and to create a loyal pro-government constituency. The 
fact that candidates were banned from running under the banner of political parties 
ensured that only wealthy and influential candidates were able to gain seats. In order to 
obtain a loyal pro-govemment constituency, the central government resorted to
widespread pre-poll and poll day rigging. Therefore, although rigging was carried out 
by pro-govemment as well as by opposition politicians, the overwhelming majority of 
rigging was in favour of pro-govemment candidates. The chapter concludes with the 
argument that apolitical programmes such as Musharraf s devolution programme have 
contributed to preventing the emergence of political movements that represent the 
interests of disenfranchised sectors of society.
Finally, chapter Six addresses the possibility that the political quiescence of the 
disenfranchised might be related to their internalisation of their own subordination. This 
is done by addressing Abdellah Hammoudi’s (1997) argument that authoritarianism in 
Morrocco and the Middle East is rooted in a deeply ingrained respect for authority 
which derives from the personalised and highly authoritarian relationship between Sufi 
masters and their disciples. This chapter suggests that, contrary to Hammoudi, it is not 
the social order that is the reflection of a culturally ingrained model of religious values 
but rather that the opposite is closer to the truth. The material does not demonstrate, as 
classical Durkheimian sociology argues,60 that people’s religious categories are the 
reflection of the social order as a whole, but it does illustrate that the emphasis that 
individuals place on aspects of the vast Islamic tradition that they can draw upon 
reflects, or at least relates to, their own position within the social order. I argue that this 
is because individuals emphasise aspects of Islam that help them understand as well as 
justify and give value to life experiences which are shaped by their position within the 
political and economic order to an important degree. Thus I show that the local form of 
Islam espoused by dominant groups within the village reflects aspects of the existing 
personalised and hierarchical social and political order, not only because it legitimises 
their dominance within it but also because it helps them to make sense of their
60 See Durkheim and Mauss (1963 [1903])
experiences. On the other, the form of Islam espoused by poor kammis inverts that of 
members of the dominant class and turns it against them through accusations of 
hypocrisy and the claim that true Islam is about inner feelings and sincerity rather than 
about formal ritual and ideology emphasising hierarchy. To them the exoteric Islam of 
the religious and political elites is the Islam of power; it isn’t the true Islam of love and 
devotion exemplified by the great figures of the faith who, according to them, were 
often persecuted and oppressed by the powerful.
Finally I briefly explore the broader implications of this research for 
understanding political instability in Pakistan. There I explore whether militant Islamic 
movements represent a viable opportunity for expressing of the class grievances of the 
rural poor.
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Chapter Two: The Politics of Power and Enmity
Overview
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the political history of Pakistan, 
and of the Punjab in particular. This will provide a background against which to situate 
and understand the nature of the political careers of two influential Gondal landlord 
politicians from the village of Bek Sagrana. While the historical section of the chapter 
seeks to account for the consolidation of parochial, landlord-dominated politics in the 
rural Punjab, the remainder seeks to illustrate some of its consequences on the ground. 
What the consolidation of parochial politics entailed is examined through the political 
careers of two influential Gondal siblings. Their cases are instructive, illustrating what 
parochial politics entailed for political party affiliation, the delivery of public 
infrastructure and services, and the criminalisation of politics.
Another concern of this chapter is to analyse the way that authoritarian 
governments contributed to the personalisation of political office, and how in the 
process the political clout of landed elites was entrenched in the face of popular 
resentment against them. It also explores how, by rewarding supporters with patronage 
and by punishing opponents (either by withholding patronage from them or harassing 
them), authoritarian governments exacerbated rural politicians’ notoriously fickle 
loyalty towards political parties. This was so much the case that, in Pakistan’s 
parliamentary system, floor-crossing came to take place on such a large scale that the 
political system came to be popularly seen as afflicted with ‘lotaism.’61
61 Wilder (1999) writes:
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Through the cases of the two Gondal politicians I illustrate how politicians often 
shifted their political allegiances in order to join the ruling coalition to gain access to the 
spoils of power and to avoid harassment at the hands of both the central government and 
of their local rivals and enemies. These cases also illustrate that when landlord 
politicians didn’t shift their allegiance to the ruling coalition it was rarely due to a 
commitment to the ideology of their party or to a commitment to particular social 
agendas. Instead I show that the limits to lotaism are principally the result of three 
factors: (a) that there is only a limited number of people that the ruling coalition can 
accommodate, (b) that loyalty to the party leader can result in significant rewards upon 
the latter’s return to power, and (c) the fact that personal enmities with members of the 
ruling coalition often prevent the possibility of floor-crossing.
Finally, the chapter explores what the significance of the landed elites’ 
entrenchment in politics meant for the delivery of public services and for the 
criminalisation of politics. In their role as local, provincial and national level politicians, 
landlords generally served as a democratic facade for authoritarian regimes. Policy 
making and legislation were often decided by presidents, often military ones, who ruled 
through ordinances rather than by consulting the legislative assemblies. The role of 
legislators and other politicians was thereby largely reduced to that of consolidating 
central power through their capacity to mobilise votes. In exchange for votes, landlords 
were the recipients of central government patronage in the form of development funds
On several occasions MNA’s and MPA’s have had to virtually be put under lock and 
key to prevent them from being lured by lucrative promises into crossing the aisle. In 
the spring of 1993, for example, a situation arose that reached farcical proportions.
After the National Assembly was dissolved and Nawaz Sharif s government was 
dismissed from office, he was forced to sequester his party’s Punjab MPAs in 
Islamabad’s luxurious Mariott Hotel for nearly a month for fear that with their patron 
no longer in office, they would look for a new patron. (Wilder 1999: 204-205).
The lota is most commonly a metal jar with a curved spout that is used for ablutions and for cleaning 
oneself after going to the toilet. A single lota is generally used by several people. I was told that the 
reason why politicians were like lotas was that they were constantly switching hands.
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as well as through the politicisation on their behalf of the police, the judiciary and 
almost every other branch of government. So long as politicians mobilised support on 
behalf of the ruling coalition and its president, they were effectively given carte blanche 
to do as they wished in their dominions. This together with the inflow of weapons and 
drugs from Afghanistan and from Pakistan’s tribal areas in the 1980s allowed 
politicians to enrich themselves, and thereby further increase their local political clout, 
through a wide array of criminal activities. The result was that politicians increasingly 
became “lawbreakers, rather than lawmakers” (Wilder 1999: 204).
Parochial Politics and Military Rule
In modem day Punjab the importance of factional politics, characterised by elite- 
led coalitions whose membership cuts across ties of caste and class, is in part a colonial 
legacy that has been sustained by successive authoritarian governments. Imperial mle in 
the Punjab was premised upon the idea that political stability was best ensured by 
securing the support of rural notables.62 To this end the British went about co-opting 
rural elites by establishing a “loyal class of ‘hereditary landed gentry’ by awarding 
pensions, titles, and land grants in the developing canal colonies, and by confirming 
ownership of large semi-feudal estates in Western Punjab” (Wilder 1999: 69). Selected 
notables from within the rural elites were entrusted with key aspects of the delivery of 
public services within their villages and areas of influence, including administration, 
revenue collection, policing, dispute resolution and intermediation with the state. The 
position of these rural notables as intermediaries with the Imperial authorities 
entrenched them within the administrative and political structure of the Punjab both at
62 The bias towards rural notables by Imperial authorities is clearly illustrated by the passing of 
the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900, which prevented the transfer of land from indebted members of 
‘agricultural tribes’ to money lending members of the ‘trading classes.’ Because of the importance of land 
in determining social and political status Imperial authorities wished to ensure that it would not be 
transferred to the ‘trading classes’, whose loyalty to British rule was in doubt. See Van den Dungen 
(1972).
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the expense of urban constituents as well at the expense of their subordinate clients, 
who became dependent upon them for all forms of mediation involving state 
institutions.
Under late Imperial rule the urban constituencies in the Punjab were composed 
predominantly of Hindu traders and a Muslim middle class that was becoming 
increasingly involved with the expanding colonial government as lawyers, physicians, 
engineers and teachers. As urban Muslims became increasingly involved in government 
their expectations for greater political influence started to grow, leading many of them 
to join the All-India Muslim League founded in 1906. However, in the politically 
dominant rural Punjab, where the majority of the population still lived, the Muslim 
League largely failed to establish a popular base of support. Rural notables joined forces 
on a non-communal basis under the banner of the Punjab Unionist Party largely in order 
to protect their landed interests which they perceived to be threatened by the political 
agendas of both the Muslim League and the Congress Party (see Jalal 1995). As a result, 
the overall support for the Muslim League in the Punjab was insignificant until 1946, 
when Jinnah obtained the support of opportunistic rural notables who perceived that 
independence was imminent, and that it was therefore in their best interests to join the 
League.63
The fact that the rural notables of the Punjab took over the local leadership of 
the Muslim League on the eve of independence meant that the party was unable to 
establish a rival structure of power that bypassed the rural elite. Thus, Punjabi rural 
notables remained in their position as local intermediaries and patrons, and the Muslim 
League never established itself as a disciplined political party with a direct base of
63 Ayesha Jalal notes that desertions from the Unionist camp “had little to do with the Punjab 
League and its invisible organisation, and more to do with men anxious to win tickets...‘Sensational 
stories of conversion to the League’ took the provincial League leaders by surprise since their workers 
had ‘not yet reached the village in adequate numbers” (Jalal 1995: 145).
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popular support.64 Moreover, the fact that the national leadership of the Muslim League 
had no base of support in the national territory (because it hailed predominantly from 
within the territory that became independent India) further hampered the party’s efforts 
to establish itself. The Muslim League leadership’s lack of popular support meant that it 
became increasingly reliant upon the civil-military bureaucracy to retain its hold on 
power, and it succeeded “in maintaining the facade of parliamentary democracy without 
holding national elections from 1947 to 1958” (Wilder 1999: 18).
This facade of parliamentary democracy gave way to martial law in October 
1958 shortly before the nation’s first parliamentary elections were scheduled to take 
place. Lacking popular support the ruling Muslim League feared defeat at the hands of 
political parties demanding greater regional autonomy in both West and East Pakistan.
In 1954 the Muslim League had already suffered a humiliating defeat in East Pakistan 
as a result of its failure to consolidate democracy and adopt a political formula 
representative of the Bengali majority. Fearing that the Bengali majority would rise to 
power the Muslim League, backed by the West Pakistan dominated civil and military 
bureaucracies, nullified the results and imposed central rule on East Pakistan, 
suspending all political activity there. By 1958, when national elections were scheduled 
to take place, demands articulated by the National Awami Party for greater democracy 
and provincial autonomy were also growing in West Pakistan. This time the Muslim 
League and its allies within the civil and military bureaucracies thwarted democratic 
forces through the imposition of Martial Law by President Iskander Mirza, which 
shortly lead to a takeover by Army commander General Ayub Khan.
In a pattern that was to be replicated by future Military rulers in Pakistan, Ayub 
Khan banned political parties, passed legislation that was selectively used against
64 See A.H.Syed (1989) for an account of how factionalism amongst powerful landlords in the 
Muslim League created a great deal of political instability between 1947 and 1955.
70
political opponents, and erected a local government scheme that was to serve as a 
democratic facade for his rule and an easily controlled electoral college for the 
presidency. He also modified the constitution in order to replace Pakistan’s 
parliamentary system with a strong presidential one that severely curtailed the powers of 
elected assembly members. Furthermore, Ayub Khan tried to ensure strong economic 
growth and rapid industrialisation by adopting neo-liberal economic ideologies 
according to which the key to rapid industrialisation was cheap rural migrant labour. 
This meant that restrictions already in place against labour unions were strengthened. 
According to this model of economic growth significant land reforms would keep the 
rural population on the land and therefore restrict the flow of migrant labour into the 
cities (see Candland 2007: 48). Thus, the ceiling that General Ayub Khan imposed upon 
landownership was aimed at breaking the power of the minority of extremely powerful 
aristocratic (ashrafi) landlords rather than towards a significant redistribution of the 
land. It was also designed to encourage commercial agriculture by forcing large 
landholders to increase their productivity as a result of reduced landholdings. The 
political clout of the large ashrafi landlords, and their ownership of land, were 
disproportionate to their total numbers, and General Ayub Khan sought to curb their 
influence in order to enhance state power (see Nasr 2001). To this end he sought to 
create a rural constituency from amidst the ranks of the middle and gentry landholders 
who constituted the majority of landowners in the Punjab.
As noted in chapter one, it is from among these ranks that the Gondals of the
district of Sargodha emerged to political prominence. Under Ayub Khan the
representation of this class of landholders in the national assembly “went from 9.5 per
cent in 1955, up to 44.7 per cent in 1962, and then back down to 29.8 per cent in 1965”
(Wilder 1999: 74). Both the entry of this class into formal politics under Ayub’s regime
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as well as the substantial economic gains that they made as a result of Pakistan’s first 
green revolution during this period turned them into a significant force in Punjabi 
politics.
Over the decade during which General Ayub Khan was in power, Pakistan 
witnessed rapid industrialisation and economic growth. The rewards of this growth, 
however, were highly unevenly distributed. According to one estimate from 1968 
“industrial ownership was concentrated in twenty-two families” (Jones 2003: 145). For 
the masses that had moved to the cities as a result of the rapid mechanisation of 
agriculture during Pakistan’s green revolution, and from the eviction of tenants that this 
entailed, the rewards of growth were far less tangible. Moreover, General Ayub Khan’s 
decade in power had failed to provide sufficient resources for the country’s human 
development. As a result, when the Ayub era came to a close only fifteen per cent of the 
population could be classified as literate. The country also had one of the lowest ratios 
of doctors per rural inhabitant in the world with one doctor for every 24,200 people 
(Burki 1980: 47). The failure of such growth to benefit the masses, together with the 
severe restrictions on political freedoms, eventually resulted in widespread agitations. In 
East Pakistan it resulted in the rise of Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League demanding 
provincial autonomy and democracy, while in West Pakistan it resulted in the rise of 
Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) advocating a socialist revolution with a 
programme for the nationalisation of industry and major land reforms.
The principal support for Bhutto initially came from urban left groups such as 
organised labour, and students but also from middle class professionals and the 
intelligentsia. The promise of land reforms together with the promise of homestead 
reforms65 and the abolition of corvee labour (begaar) also enlisted the support of
65 Homestead reforms were aimed at ensuring that house tenants could no longer be arbitrarily
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tenants, landless labourers and village artisans (kammis). Furthermore, the poor rural 
voter hoped that the PPP would pursue its interests against “the classes and institutions 
that had weighed upon him so heavily and for so long—the zamindariat, the police, the 
bureaucracy and the courts” (Jones 2003: 362). As Jones {ibid) has convincingly shown, 
the 1970 elections—the first national elections based on universal adult franchise, 
which saw Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rise to power—were the first time in the country’s 
history where the have-nots erupted onto the political scene. According to Jones these 
elections not only saw the emergence of horizontal, class-based ties of allegiance among 
urban voters but also among rural voters, where historically the masses had “been 
politically quiescent, conditioned by tradition and the local structure of power to follow 
their customary leaders—ashrafi-gentry zamindars, pirs, and clan biraderi heads” (Jones 
2003: 356). Because of the importance given to land and homestead reform in the PPP’s 
electoral campaign, party support patterns during the elections were often divided 
horizontally along class lines between those who owned land and those who did not.
In one case study, Jones examines voting patterns in a village in the Punjabi 
district of Gujranwala that was divided into two factions of Tarar Jats whose leaders had 
chosen to support opposing candidates from two different parties that were running 
against the PPP. He shows that while one of the factions successfully delivered votes to 
their candidate, the other faction split into two with tenants, kammis and middling 
zamindars opting out of the faction and giving their vote to the PPP. Jones shows that 
even though many of the tenants in the village belonged to the dominant Tarar Jat 
biraderi their voting behaviour was determined by the prospect of political and 
economic empowerment at the expense of ascribed biraderi-based loyalty. Moreover, 
landless labourers and kammis of this faction also broke off their traditional ties of
evicted from their homes in the villages that belonged to landlords.
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allegiance with their factional leaders. Although one of the factions remained intact, the 
fact that one of them became horizontally divided was itself a significant development 
that was repeated throughout the Punjab. In other instances Jones reports that the PPP 
encouraged significant numbers of rural tenants “to form their own organisation to 
support the PPP, despite threats and economic pressure from landed interests” (Jones 
2003: 365). Thus, for example, Jones recounts that in one instance in a village 15 
kilometres southwest of Lahore tenants under the leadership of a man called Sandhu Jat 
secretly and by consensus decided to vote for the PPP. Furthermore, although several 
elite landlords—including a branch of the influential Noon family in Sargodha—voted 
for the PPP, several others forgot their differences and allied in a horizontal elite pattern 
against the threat presented to their landed interests by the PPP. Jones relates another 
instance, once again in the district of Gujranwala, where the two biraderis united against 
the threat of the PPP.66 Such patterns apparently became very common during the 
National Assembly elections “when parochial elite candidates made desperate (and 
occasionally successful) horizontal alliances in order to defeat the unexpectedly strong 
pro-PPP vote produced in the NA election” (Jones 2003: 366).
Despite a start that promised political empowerment for the masses, Bhutto’s 
regime soon revealed itself to be just as authoritarian as its predecessors. Many of his 
policies, including his reform of the civil services and his nationalisation of large and 
middle sized industries, served to extend his personal powers and his capacity for 
patronage. Rather than strengthen the PPP into a coherent party organisation with 
established internal rules and procedures Bhutto increasingly concentrated power in his 
own hands. His regime created a paramilitary force known as the Federal Security 
Force, which Bhutto used to openly intimidate, harass and even allegedly to murder
66 This was a significant departure in Gujranwala, where Awans and Chatham had consistently 
supported opposing candidates as a result of a longstanding enmity,
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regime opponents. Bhutto’s violent suppression of political opponents, including his 
violent military intervention against Baluch insurgents demanding greater provincial 
autonomy, galvanised his opponents and led to the creation of the Pakistan National 
Alliance. Also, Bhutto’s policy of nationalisation had alienated influential industrialists 
as well as sectors of the middle class that had initially supported him, and as a result 
Bhutto increasingly sought support from the landed elites that he had once so 
vehemently denounced in his public speeches. When elections took place in 1977, 
leading to a victory for the PPP, there were widespread reports of rigging which resulted 
in large-scale popular discontent. This eventually led to the military coup by the Chief 
of Army Staff, General Zia-ul Haq.
Despite the Bhutto regime’s serious flaws it did manage to further the interests 
of the poorer segments of rural society somewhat, through tenancy, land and homestead 
reforms. The effectiveness of some of these reforms is contested, however. For 
example, during his time in power reports suggest that landlords found that the judiciary 
had become very receptive to suits brought by tenants seeking redress for eviction.
Thus, Herring reports that in seventy per cent of all cases of eviction, judgements 
ordered the restoration of tenants (Herring 1983: 117). With respect to land reforms it 
appears that landlords found loopholes in the new legislation, which set the land ceiling 
for irrigated land at 150 acres and that for rain-fed land (barani) at 300 acres. Chief 
among these loopholes was the fact that the ceilings were set for individual holdings 
rather than family holdings, allowing many landlords simply to transfer their lands to 
close family members. As a result the impact of the land reforms remains unclear to this 
day although it appears that some of the largest estates were affected. For example, I 
was told by a prominent member of the Noon family that he had lost a significant
67 Under General Zia-ul Haq’s regime it was one of these murders allegedly carried out by the 
Federal Security Force that led to Bhutto being given the death sentence and to his eventual execution.
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amount of land to tenants but that despite this he still controlled more than a thousand 
acres. Similarly the Makhdoom lineage of pirs, who were once the most prominent 
ashrafi family in the area where I conducted my fieldwork, also lost land to their tenants 
and several kammi families, who now possessed legal title to it. Nevertheless, the 
Makhdooms still possessed land far above the ceiling imposed under Bhutto’s 
reforms.68
Another set of reforms implemented during the Bhutto era whose impact is 
contested (see Rouse 1983) was that of homestead reform. In rural areas villagers 
usually lived in houses and on land that belonged to a local landlord. In exchange for a 
place to live, house tenants were expected to provide corvee labour (begaar) and 
political support to their landlord. Bhutto’s reforms aimed to free house tenants of such 
ties of dependence by granting them legal titles of ownership over their houses. Another 
related programme was one where colonies were created on state-owned land, and five 
maria59 plots of land were granted to people who had previously lived on land that 
belonged to a landlord. With respect to the first programme Rouse has noted that “legal 
titles do not seem to guarantee ownership by the resident” (Rouse 1983: 323), which she 
goes on to illustrate with a case from 1979 in which a domestic employee in the village 
of Sahiwal who had quarrelled with her mistress was summarily ordered to vacate her 
house. More than twenty-five years later most kammis in Bek Sagrana believed that the 
Gondal chowdris could still arbitrarily evict them from the houses they occupied in the 
village. In the case of housing colonies it appears that house tenants did manage to 
obtain a certain degree of independence from the landlords. During local body elections 
in 2005 I was told by chowdri politicians that colony residents didn’t simply follow
68 On the other hand, the Gondal landlords whom I studied, and who possessed several hundred 
acres of land, had not been similarly affected by some loss of land under the reforms.
69A maria is a traditional unit of land measurement in South Asia. One Marla is equal to 25.3 
square metres.
their dictates as to whom they should vote for, but had to be wooed through patronage 
and cash. Moreover, colony residents were freed from having to carry out begaar for 
any landlord. Nevertheless, in 2005 in a colony named Sikander Colony after the 
Gondal chowdri who owned most of the land adjacent to it, people still gave their vote 
to the faction supported by Chowdri Sikander for fear that he might evict them.
Despite the highly imperfect legacy of Bhutto that persists to this day, most 
landless villagers in the Punjab and elsewhere consider the PPP to be ‘their’ party, and 
those who lived through Bhutto’s time in power recall it as an era of hope and 
empowerment. Nowadays however the PPP is largely known to be the party of large 
landlords who control blocks of voters through their local power and landholdings, and 
who sometimes still deploy its populist rhetoric to swing votes their preferred ways. 
Despite this both kammis and former tenants told me that if they could freely choose 
they would vote for the PPP (which at the time was still headed by Benazir Bhutto) 
because of what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had done for the poor.
Although land, tenancy and homestead reforms were never perfectly 
implemented under Bhutto’s regime, much of what had had been achieved was reversed 
by General Zia-ul Haq. The need for a constituency meant that Zia-ul Haq, like his 
British and Pakistani predecessors, reached out to the rural notables whose property he 
pledged to protect from a second round of land reforms that had been planned by the 
Bhutto government. Landlords were given the green light to add to their existing 
holdings and even to recover some of the land lost under Bhutto. Moreover, the 
judiciary ceased to be sympathetic to the claims and issues of tenants and their cases 
were ignored by the courts, who once again sided with the rural elites. Ever since 
Bhutto the issue of land reform has never resurfaced and Musharraf s government 
actively encouraged the consolidation of large landholdings by incentivising the
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corporatisation of agriculture.
On the political front General Zia-ul Haq’s regime ensured that the sort of mass 
mobilisation which had occurred in Bhutto’s time could not take place. He did this 
through the large scale repression of the political opposition spearheaded by the PPP 
and by holding non-party local body elections. Like his predecessor General Ayub Khan 
and like his successor General Pervez Musharraf, Zia encouraged candidate-based as 
opposed to party-based electoral campaigns. According to Muhammad Waseem,
Zia attempted to revert to the early colonial mode of district politics in which local influentials 
got elected into the legislatures on the strength of their respective support bases in the locality 
characterized by the ties of tribe, caste, faction or tenurial relations. The obvious target of this 
policy was the PPP which had continued to enjoy mass popularity.. .The 1985 non-party 
elections localized politics, reinvigorated biradri, cut across the potential—though non-active— 
lines of party support and decisively shifted political initiative towards electoral candidates” 
(Waseem 1994: 15).
In this manner the parochial political issues and factions that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had 
temporarily succeeded in overcoming returned to dominate Pakistani politics.
Zia-ul Haq’s regime did not simply return things to the status quo however, and 
various new features drastically altered the nature of politics and resulted in 
unprecedented levels of violence. Among these new features were drugs (mainly heroin) 
and cheap weapons. General Zia-ul Haq played a major role in the cold war by 
supporting the Afghan Mujahideen’s resistance against the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and Pakistan received substantial amounts of aid from the United States 
for this participation. As a result of this policy three million Afghan refugees entered 
Pakistan (Jalal 1995: 108) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
emerged as a major hub for the production of weapons to supply the deadly commerce 
of the Afghan war. Weapons including cheap Kalashnikovs became widely available
throughout the country. In 2005 a Kalashnikov could easily be purchased on the open 
market for as little as ifa.3000. Moreover, a parallel drugs economy based 
predominantly upon the traffic of heroin, widely believed to be linked with the army’s 
notorious Inter-Services Intelligence wing (ISI), emerged. Thus while heroin addiction 
was negligible before 1979, estimates suggest that by the year 2000 there were between
7 01.5 million and four million heroin addicts in Pakistan. As will be shown later, both 
the arms and the drug trades made for increasing levels of violence and the widespread 
seepage of crime into politics when politicians, in collusion with the police, became 
involved in these lucrative trades not only in the cities but also throughout areas of the 
rural Punjab. Furthermore, even though control over local toughs (goondas) was already 
an integral part of politics prior to Zia’s time, as Hamza Alavi (1971) has shown, 
evidence seems to suggest that it came to play an even more central role during and 
after the Zia years. During fieldwork, politicians openly told me that in order to control 
their locality and to win elections it was imperative for them to have strong ties with 
local goondas. These goondas constituted heavily armed groups who were frequently 
involved in various forms of trafficking and who could be called upon to intimidate 
opponents and voters as well as to occupy land illegally.
General Zia’s period in power is also widely recalled for the ‘Islamisation’ of 
Pakistan’s laws and the implementation of the Hudood Ordinances, which have been 
widely condemned by human rights groups for causing increased violence towards 
women, minorities and other powerless groups. Under these laws the relatives of a 
murdered person were entitled to settle their case with the offending party through the 
payment of blood money (diyat). This resulted in an increase in ‘honour killings’
70 See New York Times article by Bearak (2000) who reports the difficulty of obtaining accurate 
figures on the number of heroin addicts due to the low priority given to social science research in 
Pakistan.
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whereby wives, daughters or sisters who were suspected of tarnishing the honour 
(izzat/ghairat) of their families were put to death by relatives. Under these laws a 
woman’s legal guardian, usually her father or husband, was entitled to forgive that 
woman’s murderer. What often happened as a result was that husbands who suspected a 
slight to their honour could get a relative to kill their wife and then forgive them. 
Moreover, although less has been written on this issue, the possibility of settling murder 
cases through the payment of blood money meant that powerless individuals could be 
pressured into forgiving a murder with minimal compensation. Thus, for example, a 
landlord might kill a tenant or a servant and then pressure his family through threats of 
eviction or even violence into agreeing to a settlement.
General Zia’s rule came to an abrupt end on the seventeenth of August 1988
shortly before the non-party elections scheduled for November of that same year, when
he died in a mysterious plane crash along with several of Pakistan’s top generals and the
United States Ambassador. The Supreme Court subsequently declared that General
Zia’s stipulation that elections should be held on a non-party basis was unconstitutional,
and elections were held with the full participation of political parties. The 1988 election
was essentially a contest between the supporters of General Zia, who united in a
coalition under the banner of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (UI), and the PPP. Although
the PPP under the leadership of Benazir Bhutto won the elections with 38.5 per cent of
the national vote, it won only 93 seats in the Punjab Provincial Assembly against the
UI’s 108 (Wilder 1999: 31). In the Punjab the UI obtained much of its support from the
conservative urban middle classes, urban traders and industrialists, who had been
alienated by the PPP and had greatly benefitted from state patronage and from economic
liberalisation under General Zia. Following the death of General Zia the man at the head
of this constituency was Mian Nawaz Sharif, who had held various influential positions
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in the Punjab government including that of Finance Minister from 1981 to 1985 and 
Chief Minister from 1985 until 1990, when he became Pakistan’s Prime Minister. 
Nawaz Sharif s rise to power was significant because he represented the growing 
political clout of the Punjabi urban middle classes to which he personally belonged. His 
time as Finance Minister and Chief Minister had allowed him to develop strong ties 
with the provincial bureaucracy, which he had succeeded in making subservient. He 
achieved this by filling thousands of government jobs with his supporters and by 
transferring officers who showed excessive independence. As a result, Nawaz Sharif put 
himself in a position to dole out patronage on a “scale never before witnessed in Punjab 
politics” (Wilder 1999: 138) thereby firmly entrenching his power at the expense of the 
PPP. Consequently, when Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister in 1988 her 
government was essentially powerless in the country’s most powerful province. This 
situation resulted in a great deal of political acrimony and instability, the eventual 
premature dismissal of Benazir Bhutto’s government twenty months later and in the 
eventual rise to power of Nawaz Sharif in 1990.
Over the next nine years leading to the military takeover by General Pervez 
Musharraf in 1999, power went back and forth between the PPP and the Pakistan 
Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) without any government ever completing its complete 
term in office and with no government lasting for more than three years. After 
BenazirBhutto’s fall in 1990, Nawaz Sharif held the reins of power for only three years 
before being himself unseated by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on charges of 
mismanagement and corruption. In 1993 Benazir Bhutto returned to power, only to be 
unseated again in 1996 by President Farooq Leghari, once again on charges of 
corruption and mismanagement. In February 1997 Nawaz Sharif returned to power and
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was superseded two years later by General Pervez Musharraf who broke the pattern of 
his civilian counterparts and held on to power for approximately nine years.
Wilder has attributed the political instability of this decade of civilian rule to 
patronage politics, arguing that the “problem with patronage politics is that there is 
never enough patronage to keep the majority of voters happy” (Wilder 1999: 235). In a 
system of factional patronage politics where winners take all, political opponents are 
denied access to patronage and are often victimised. As a result, they resort to agitation 
and other techniques in order to overthrow the incumbent government. At the level of 
the Punjab province as a whole this is reflected in the fact that, for example, Nawaz 
Sharif provided particularly generous levels of patronage (principally in the form of 
licences and tax breaks) to traders and industrialists in the central Punjab largely at the 
expense of the southern Punjab.71 While the central Punjab is the most densely 
populated, industrialised and agriculturally productive area of the Punjab, the southern 
Punjab has little industry, low overall levels of literacy and a largely agricultural 
economy that is predominantly dependent upon the production of cotton. Nawaz 
Sharif s pro-industry policy of setting artificially low ceilings on the price of cotton and 
other crops contributed to a central-versus-southem political rivalry in the Punjab and 
consolidated the PPP’s hold among the ashrafi notable families of the Southern Punjab. 
In this manner the PPP increasingly became the party of large landlords, who resented 
the fact that industrialists and politicians in the central Punjab, whom they considered to 
be upstarts, were obtaining coveted government positions at their expense.
71 As will be discussed, many of his supporters amongst the landed elites of the central Punjab 
also received substantial amounts of patronage from him.
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Following this decade of unstable civilian rule, General Pervez Musharraf 
imposed military rule once again in October 1999.72 General Musharraf s policies and 
his stance towards political parties were similar to those of his military predecessors, 
Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul Haq. Like them he attacked political parties and 
implemented a devolution programme that once again localised politics and reduced it 
to the dispensation of patronage at the expense of policy making and implementation. 
Under Musharraf many of the leaders of the PML-N and the PPP were exiled, 
imprisoned and disqualified from elections. He created a parliamentary facade to his 
rule through the establishment of the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q), 
which was forged principally through defections from Nawaz Sharif s PML-N and to a 
lesser extent from the PPP. Although in many cases these defections simply reflected 
the time-honoured opportunism of political leaders, they also reflected an active policy 
on the part of Musharraf s government whereby political leaders were both cajoled and 
coerced into defecting. Political leaders were cajoled through promises of lucrative 
positions in government and coerced by threats of prosecution on the basis of both real 
and fabricated charges. In order to weaken political opponents and rig elections, the 
judiciary was widely manipulated through the posting of pliable judges and the transfer 
and dismissal of judges who showed excessive independence. In addition, the National 
Accountability Bureau, though ostensibly created as anti-corruption watchdog, was in 
practice selectively used to prosecute political opponents. Although in all likelihood a 
great number of politicians could have been liable to prosecution on real corruption 
charges, only those who were in the opposition were prosecuted and those who decided
72 It is widely perceived among the general public that meddling by the military and the 
intelligence services also played a role in destabilising civilian governments during this period.
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n*\ •to defect to the ruling coalition were exonerated of all charges. Other tactics used in 
order to encourage defections included harassment and physical intimidation by the 
police and by the intelligence services (ISI). Finally, as will be shown in a later chapter, 
through his devolution programme General Musharraf was able to create a constituency 
that allowed him to bypass opposition provincial politicians and mobilise support for a 
rigged referendum, extending his term for five years based upon a 95 per cent approval 
rating
In 2008, at the time of writing, General Musharraf was forced to resign as a 
result of growing agitation by members of the judiciary and by the Alliance for the 
Restoration of Democracy, which included both the PML-N and the PPP, and as a result 
of the growing Taliban insurgency in the North West Frontier Province. The PPP 
eventually took power nationally and the PML-N regained power in the Punjab, thereby 
placing the PPP in a similar situation to the one it faced in 1988 when Benazir Bhutto 
was prime minister of Pakistan and Nawaz Sharif was the Punjab’s Chief Minister. The 
results of this situation are still unfolding, but a continued emphasis on narrow factional 
interests and patronage politics is likely to plunge the country once again into the 
instability that was witnessed from 1988 through 1999.
What this brief overview of the political history of Pakistan and of the Punjab in 
particular has attempted to show is that authoritarian rule has strongly contributed to 
turning politics into an arena where politicians compete on the basis of factional 
interests. It was argued that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s democratic rise to power in 1970 
briefly succeeded in overcoming parochial biraderi and factional political allegiances
73 Faisal Saleh Hayat, for example, an influential landlord in the central Punjabi district of Jhang, 
had been a major defaulter on bank loans and General Musharraf s National Accountability Bureau 
prosecuted him until all charges were dropped when he accepted to join the government in order to be 
made interior minister. See the International Crisis Group (2004a) report on Pakistan’s judiciary for an 
account of this case and of how the judiciary has been used by successive governments in Pakistan to 
prosecute political opponents.
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through his appeal to national issues that were significant to the masses. However, the 
military takeover by General Zia-ul Haq, by banning political parties and by once again 
diverting the attention of politicians away from national policy issues to local issues of 
patronage, reversed whatever progress had been achieved towards popular 
empowerment. As a result, the vital issues of land and homestead reform—as well as 
the reform of local governance structures, including the police and the judiciary—were 
never seriously addressed. As chapter five will demonstrate, contrary to its stated goals 
of reforming local governance structures and empowering the masses, General 
Musharraf s devolution programme was in fact an attempt to maintain the status quo by 
once again localising politics and preventing the consolidation of large scale political 
opposition, in the same manner that General Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul Haq had 
done in the past. This meant that rural notables, including ashrafi, middle, and gentry 
landlords, were able to extend their stranglehold over rural areas. Moreover, the politics 
of patronage, where winners take all, arguably condemned Pakistan to perpetual 
instability leading to the repeated intervention of the military in politics. In this manner 
a self-perpetuating cycle was generated whereby civilian governments characterised by 
the factional politics of patronage alternated with military governments who further 
entrenched factional politics by stunting political development.
The Chowdris
Before situating the Gondal chowdris against the national background described 
above, it will be helpful to sketch a general picture of the chowdris’ power and their use 
of it a little further. At the local level, the chowdris maintained and benefited 
enormously from what was effectively a monopoly of influence. This monopoly ran 
precisely on the rails laid down by the winner-takes-all politics of patronage. Here 
influence consisted in the effective brokering of benefits of a variety of sorts, both
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economic and political. The ‘commerce’ of this brokerage directly determined the most 
fundamental realities of the labouring classes already most poorly served by Pakistan’s 
political and economic realities in ways that were both exploitative and demoralising.
As such, it entrenched more deeply a combination of economic deprivation and 
sustained political impotence that further enhanced its own durability.
The chowdris’ monopoly of influence touched almost every aspect of kammis’ 
lives, but one of the most critical was that of the relationship that ordinary people had 
with the police. As such, it makes an excellent place to begin looking at the practical 
aspects of chowdri influence, and for the same reason it will recur as a focus of 
discussion throughout this thesis.
It was noted in the preceding chapter that the chowdris ran what was effectively 
a protection racket from the feared and predatory Punjabi police inasmuch as the 
chowdris offered protection to villagers from a force over which they themselves 
exercised a certain amount of control. That the generally justified fear of the police 
allowed chowdris and others to extract resources from people can be illustrated by the 
following case: On one occasion a fraudster from Sargodha playing on people’s fear of 
the police had driven around various villages announcing through a loudspeaker that the 
police were going to come around and confiscate all copper vessels in people’s homes.74 
He claimed that General Musharraf had decreed that the copper vessels were needed by 
the government in order to mint new copper coins. As an alternative to this 
uncompensated confiscation, the fraudster was offering to buy the copper vessels 
instead. Taking the fraudster’s word for the situation several villagers in Bek Sagrana, 
fearing that the police would imminently turn up and confiscate the things from them,
74 People frequently owned a large number of copper and brass plates and pots that they received 
as a part of wedding dowries.
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decided to sell their copper pots to the fraudster. Put under pressure they sold the copper 
ware below its actual value and the fraudster amassed a small fortune from his scheme.
The chowdris’ leverage was not limited to relations with the police, however, 
but extended to other state institutions as well. For example, villagers knew that they 
were unlikely to win court cases unless a powerful patron could influence the judiciary 
on their behalf. The patronage of chowdris was also necessary for managing a wide 
variety of situations such as obtaining an identity card, a school certificate, or in order to 
get treatment in a hospital. With regard to hospitals patronage was necessary because 
many doctors in rural areas claimed their monthly wages but didn’t actually attend to 
their duties (this will be seen in Bek Sagrana below). This was also the case in the big 
hospitals in town where many doctors who were meant to be working for the state spent 
most of their time in private clinics of their own where they could charge for their 
services while they continued receiving a state salary. This meant that many poor people 
who couldn’t afford private fees didn’t have access to basic healthcare and had to rely 
instead on local healers who practiced Islamic medicine (,hikmat), and local doctors who 
allegedly practiced allopathic medicine but whose qualifications were often dubious. 
Additionally people often relied solely on local pirs who had acquired a reputation for 
producing effective amulets to protect and cure them from various ailments, some 
serious. The result was that people frequently died from ailments that were otherwise 
preventable or curable.75 If, however, people decided that they needed treatment in a 
hospital often the only way to obtain it was through a chowdri. In Bek Sagrana the 
chowdris would direct people to Chowdri Muzaffar Abbas who was the absentee doctor 
at the village Basic Health Unit (BHU. See below). Whenever he was actually there he
75 For example, throughout my stay in Bek Sagrana two people in the area died of rabies. 
Following dog bites they went to a local pir for an amulet instead of going to a local hospital for an 
injection.
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would write chits for clients to present to his friends who were doctors in town. These 
chits greatly increased people’s chances of obtaining treatment either in public or
n(\private hospitals.
The perception, and the realities on which it fed, that the chowdris basically 
were the State meant that villagers were largely at the mercy of the chowdris when it 
came to getting anything done that involved public institutions. Consequently most 
villagers were aware of the need to retain the favour of the chowdris should they have to 
approach them for patronage in the future. Thus most villagers, and kammis in 
particular, at least played lip service to the public norms of deference and 
obsequiousness required when dealing with the chowdris. If an influential chowdri was 
known to be in the village people who knew that they might need his help in the future, 
or who had received a favour from him in the past, would go to his dera and sit with 
him for a couple of hours as a sign of their loyalty. Sometimes showing loyalty involved 
no more than this, but other times it could involve performing labour services or being 
sent off on errands. Furthermore it was not uncommon for the chowdris to demand that 
villagers seeking their favour accompany them on trips to visit friends, which could last 
for several days. In this manner the chowdris could temporarily—sometimes 
permanently—acquire a new servant to show off their influence and wealth to their 
friends. Clients in this situation frequently complained that they had to spend many idle 
days hanging around with a chowdri simply because the chowdri wanted to show off 
that he was a man of importance. Certain chowdris even demanded that random clients 
who approached them act as their gunmen for a few days. As a result it was not 
uncommon for people with little experience with weapons, and who had no particular
76 Politicians often used their influence and contacts with doctors to enlarge their client base. In 
Sargodha one doctor with political ambitions had set up a private practice and began treating many of his 
poorer clients for free when he saw that this would provide him with a chance to gain votes.
desire to possess any, nevertheless to end up carrying weapons for a chowdri. This led 
many villagers to claim that the chowdris wanted them to remain dependent upon them 
so that they could ask them to take up arms and fight for them when necessary. They 
argued that the possibility of their getting well paid jobs posed a threat to the chowdris 
because it meant that they would become independent from them. They also claimed 
that it was because of this that the chowdris only helped a small number of people 
obtain government jobs even though they had the power to get such jobs for many more 
people if they wished to.
Both the perception and the reality of the chowdris’ privileged access to the state 
also meant that they could largely get away with a wide range of coercive practices 
towards servants and kammis. Kammis and servants were often subjected to both 
humiliating verbal and physical abuse. The sexual abuse of Mussalli women and female 
servants by young Gondal men was widely known to take place. The notorious four 
siblings discussed in the next chapter were, for example, known to have taken Mussalli 
women by force at night when the women went out into the fields to go to the toilet. 
Other chowdris were widely rumoured to have sexually assaulted their female servants. 
Less brazen chowdris were more discrete and obtained sexual favours from female 
kammis and servants through a mixture of cajolements and partially veiled threats. They 
cajoled kammi and servant women by offering gifts of money but these very gifts were 
threatening because refusal to satisfy the chowdris desires could result in eviction and 
the loss of employment. It was in fact quite common for such chowdris to boast about
7 7their sexual exploits with their female servants and other village kammi women.
It must be said that not all chowdris were involved in this type of behaviour and
77 Ahmed Salim (2004) reports from a village close to Bek Sagrana that chowdri elders who 
knew that their children were having sex with female Mussalli servants didn’t condemn them for it. Salim 
reports that they believed that only marriage would put a break to their sons’ sexual urges.
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many of those who were pious Muslims severely frowned upon it. Nevertheless, as will 
be illustrated in the discussion on pirs of chapter six, even pious chowdris found ways 
to be exploitative and abusive towards servants and kammis. They beat their servants, 
arbitrarily deducted money from their wages and sometimes even refrained from paying 
them altogether. It was also common for chowdris to make random kammis who 
happened to cross their path perform all sorts of odd jobs and errands free of charge, 
despite not being their paid servants. Refusal by a kammi to perform a task was likely to 
incur the anger of the chowdri. As a consequence, rather than face a chowdri’s anger 
and be subjected to various forms of humiliation, kammis tried their best to avoid places 
where chowdris might be assembled unless they needed something from them.
Additionally chowdris had the power to forcefully evict labourers or servants 
from their homes, to confiscate livestock or impose fines on the basis of offences real or 
perceived. Although Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s reforms in the 1970s had granted villagers 
the right to legal ownership over their homesteads, landlords around the Punjab
no
nevertheless continued to evict house tenants arbitrarily. House tenants were still 
expected to support their landlords during elections as well as to provide them with 
occasional labour services. In Bek Sagrana a Gondal chowdri evicted a servant and his 
family from his dera after the servant decided to take up more profitable employment as 
a driver in Sargodha. While the servant was away in Sargodha the chowdri cut off the 
servant’s family’s electricity supply and forced it to vacate the house. The family was 
only allowed back into the house after the servant returned to work for the chowdri. 
Subsequently the same servant faced the threat of eviction for seeking patronage from 
the factional rival of his master in a case involving the police. Additionally, house 
tenants who weren’t permanent servants of the chowdri upon whose land they lived
78 See Rouse (1983:323) for an account of the impact of homestead reforms in another village in 
the district of Sargodha.
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knew that refusing to carry out certain tasks for their chowdris could result in eviction. 
For example, a family of carpenters (Tarkhans) told me that they had to do electrical 
work for which they would normally have received up to ifo.5000 free of charge for 
their chowdri who was organising an urs19 to commemorate the death of his pir. They 
told me that if they hadn’t done it he would probably have threatened to evict them from 
their house.
Chowdris also had the de facto power to evict people from houses that weren’t 
technically on their land. Since Bhutto village land had been designated property of the 
state, assuring that villagers could no longer legally be evicted from their houses. 
Although I heard of now specific instances of its happening in the recent past, people 
widely believed that the chowdris could still kick them out of the village if they chose to 
despite the law. Even the village Imam, who had relatively high status in the community 
and owned several acres of land, told me that his family’s stay in the village depended 
upon the goodwill of the chowdris. Although he was aware of the law he said that the 
law was irrelevant to the Gondals.80
Despite the law the chowdris could also evict people from the housing colonies 
built during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reign, and from the land that bordered both sides of 
government-built metalled roads. Although people who lived in these locations 
possessed a greater degree of independence from the chowdris than others, they weren’t 
totally exempt from having to provide occasional services to the chowdris in their 
neighbourhood. This was the case despite the fact that inhabitants of the housing 
colonies possessed legal titles over the five maria plots of land on which their houses
79 An urs is a religious festival held annually to commemorate the unification with God of a 
Muslim saint upon his death.
80 The one event that I recorded which illustrated that eviction from the village by the chowdris 
was a real possibility involved a certain chowdri who threatened to evict some the Rajputs, who were 
descendants of immigrants from India at partition (Mohajirs), from their communal hall during the local 
council elections of August 2005. This is related fully in Chapter Five.
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were built. As chapter five will show they too could be pressured to vote for the 
candidate that the dominant chowdri in their neighbourhood was supporting. The same 
situation held for people settled on government land around main country roads. Even 
here people often had to ask for permission to settle there from the neighbourhood 
chowdris, who had no legal claim to or control over it whatsoever. It was frequently the 
case that chowdris used this land themselves in order to plant the tobacco used in 
hookahs, which sometimes made them reluctant to have people to settle on it. Although 
those who were allowed to settle on it weren’t generally expected to provide labour 
services for the neighbourhood chowdris they were often expected to align themselves 
politically with them.
Finally chowdris also had the power to impose fines upon kammis and other 
villagers. One elderly Gondal chowdri was known to frequently impose fines of up to 
ifa.500 if he saw a kammi’s cattle (mavaishi) trampling or feeding upon his fields. The 
same chowdri once imposed a fine of ifo.30,000 on three young carpenters and
O 1
humiliatingly beat them with the soles of his shoes for stealing large quantities of 
citrus during the night to sell in the local market town.
From the above accounts it emerges that—unlike in the case of Gujarat where 
according to Breman (1993) the Anavil Brahmins landlords only retained the coercive 
power inherent in wage relations—in Bek Sagrana the Gondal chowdris retained both 
significant private coercive power and significant political power as patrons through 
their privileged access to state resources. Their virtual monopoly over access to state 
institutions meant that they continued to play an indispensable role as local patrons for 
the inhabitants of the area such that their relationship with labourers and tenants 
retained strong political element to it. Additionally the chowdris could still publicly
81 In South Asia beating someone with a shoe was considered particularly humiliating.
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justify their social prominence through a paternalistic ideology of protection and 
patronage that often made reference to their higher moral and social status as Muslims.
The Gondal Politicians of Bek Sagrana
The political history of a set of influential Gondal siblings from Bek Sagrana 
broadly illustrates some of the trends in national and Punjabi politics that were 
discussed in the opening section of this chapter. It also illustrates how the Gondals came 
to wield the power that they do. This section’s principal focus is upon the political and 
economic fortunes of two brothers belonging to a sibling set of five. The sibling set in 
question can be broadly characterised as belonging to the class of wealthy Jat landlords 
whose rise to prominence in Punjabi politics began during General Ayub Khan’s 
regime. The father of the five siblings, Chowdri Muhammad Ali, had been one of the 
four most influential chowdris in the village of Bek Sagrana and had owned 
approximately 350 acres of prime canal-irrigated land distributed between the villages 
of Bek Sagrana and Kot Gondal. Because Muhammad Ali held a bachelor’s degree in 
Law, he was one of the most educated Chowdris in the area of Bek Sagrana. 
Nevertheless, his political influence did not extend very far beyond the locality. Until 
the 1970s it was the ashrafi Makhdoom lineage of pirs in the neighbouring village of 
Nawabpur that had dominated the local political scene by producing members of both 
the provincial and the national assemblies. They are known to have possessed above a 
thousand acres of land and to have lived the lordly lifestyle typical of their class. I was 
told by elderly villagers that they had owned many horses for the sports of tent pegging 
and pig sticking, and that European guests had frequently joined their hunting parties. 
Prior to their political and economic decline the Makhdooms had been the principal 
political rivals of the Gondals.
82 See Chapter Six.
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The political decline of the Makdooms roughly coincided with Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto’s rise to power. This period also marked the rise to political prominence of 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali Gondal who was the eldest of the five sons of Muhammad Ali.
Prior to entering politics in the early 1960s, Chowdri Nawaz Ali had obtained a law 
degree from the University of Sargodha sometime during the 1950s, which he had 
completed in jail as a result of his involvement in the killing of a fellow student. 
According to one version of this incident the student in question had been taunting 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali by calling him Gondali instead of Gondal thereby feminising his 
name. According to another version the student had actually been taunting one of 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s best friends. In any case the result was that Chowdri Nawaz Ali 
lost his temper and started beating the student with the help of some of his friends and a 
servant. One of the attackers was armed with a cricket bat, which dealt a fatal blow to 
the skull of the young man. According to some versions of the story Chowdri Nawaz 
Ali struck the fatal blow with the cricket bat, while according to others it was his 
servant. The student in question was the brother of Zahid Iqbal Awan who, like 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his younger brother, would one day also become a powerful 
regional politician. As will be shown below, both the killing and the fact that Zahid 
Iqbal Awan eventually rose to political prominence later played a role in determining 
the political allegiances of both Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his younger brother Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali. The murder also played an important part in establishing Chowdri Nawaz 
Ali as a forceful and hot tempered person. Later both of these character traits would 
contribute to the muscular style of politics that Chowdri Nawaz Ali practiced. This 
muscular style became the hallmark of the successful and effective Jat political leaders 
that began to enter high level political office during General Ayub Khan’s era.83
83 For an account of muscular politics in a different setting see Michelutti’s (2008) study of
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Chowdri Nawaz Ali only spent one year in jail before launching on his legal and 
political career. He and his relatives explained that the reason he got such a light 
sentence was because of his father’s contacts in the judiciary and the police. An 
alternative explanation offered by villagers suggests that his sentence was light because 
his servant, who had been present during the attack, bore the full weight of punishment 
in his place. The servant, whose father was Muhammad Ali’s tenant, was eventually 
sentenced to death for murder.84 After having completed his law degree, which he 
managed to study for while in jail, Chowdri Nawaz Ali began to work in the legal 
profession upon his release. Law was an ideal entry route into politics in a situation 
where voters and clients most commonly approach their leaders to help them with cases 
involving the local police station (thana) and the local courts with their associated 
lawyers’ offices (kacheri). Individuals who have experience working with these 
institutions, as well as contacts within them, are in a strong position to help their clients 
and thereby to win their votes. It is therefore very common for leaders wishing to 
maintain or strengthen their local position to obtain some sort of experience in the legal 
profession. Having such experience, and having acquired a reputation for being 
effective, forceful and astute in his handling of cases, Chowdri Nawaz Ali was 
eventually noticed by local PPP leaders. A member of the influential Noon family 
(mentioned in the introduction), who at the time was still a kingmaker in the district, 
offered Chowdri Nawaz Ali a party ticket to run for a provincial assembly seat.
Although during my interviews with him Chowdri Nawaz Ali claimed to have
Yadav politicians of Western Uttar Pradesh who take pride in their forcefulness and physical strength. 
They display the latter through wrestling competitions and their politics is often marked by violence. The 
Yadav’s described in her work are somewhat like the Gondals described in this thesis in that they too 
have relatively recently risen to political prominence.
84 It was frequent for servants and gunmen to end up in jail for their masters. Several months 
after my departure from the village I learnt that a young Gondal had run over someone in his car and that 
his driver is the one who ended up going to jail.
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been a socialist and still to be one,85 various factors seem to indicate that his 
commitment to the PPP, and to its ostensibly socialist programme, hadn’t been purely 
ideological. In addition to any ideological commitment he may have had to the PPP, his 
rivalry with the Makhdooms and an opportunity to gain power seem to have played an 
equally important role in his joining the ranks of the party. As will be illustrated in this 
and the next chapter, local rivalries and personal feuds played important roles in 
determining which party people decided to join. It was usually the case that if a person 
obtained a ticket from one party his rival sought to obtain a ticket from the opposing 
party. In this instance the Makhdooms joined the coalition of parties that was opposing 
the PPP because land and tenancy reforms threatened their landholdings. Since Chowdri 
Nawaz Ali and the Gondals of Bek Sagrana were the rivals of the Makhdooms they 
joined the PPP, whose programme of land reform didn’t pose a significant threat to their 
landholdings.86 Most individual Gondal zamindars in Bek Sagrana owned land below 
the ceiling that was being proposed by Bhutto. Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his five 
siblings, for example, had each inherited 70 acres of canal-irrigated land, far below the 
ceiling of 150 acres.
In 1970 Chowdri Nawaz Ali won the provincial assembly seat in his 
constituency and the Makhdooms faced the prospect of losing much of their land. Both 
close relatives of Chowdri Nawaz Ali and villagers attributed his victory to his closer 
ties with the common folk (who were inclined to vote for the PPP in any case) and with 
the middle sized Jat zamindars that constituted the majority of landholders in the area. I 
was told that the
85 His understanding of socialism appeared to be one revolving around the dispensation of 
patronage rather than around the building of equitable and accountable institutions.
86 In the history section above I showed that the 1970 elections witnessed several instances of 
rivals uniting in face of the threat to their landholdings posed by the PPP. In this instance there was no 
need for the Gondals to unite with their Makhdoom rivals since they weren’t particularly threatened by 
the possibility of land reform.
Makhdooms, who spent most of their time in leisurely pursuits and in Lahore, 
lacked such ties. Moreover, I was told that their leisurely lifestyles meant that, despite 
their great wealth, they lacked the muscle power and the will to be constantly involved 
in the thana and kacheri issues that concerned the vast majority of the electorate. Their 
eventual loss of land to tenants and kammis during land reforms, as well as to Gondals 
who forcefully captured some of it (kabza) over the decades that followed, was also 
attributed to their lack of muscle power. Many villagers argued that if the Gondals had 
been in the position of the Makhdooms they wouldn’t have ceded any of their land 
because they were hard (sakht) and would have fought to retain every inch of it. Several 
kammis and tenants in Nawabpur, as well as others who lived very close to Bek 
Sagrana, were granted land that had formerly belonged to the Makhdooms. What’s 
more, over the decades that followed Bhutto’s rise and fall from power several members 
of the Gondal biraderi encroached upon their land and cultivated it without legal title. 
Thus, although during fieldwork between 2004 and 2007 the Makhdooms were still the 
largest landholders in the area, it appears that they had lost significant amounts of land. 
They had also largely ceased to play a role in politics, opting instead for a more urban 
and even cosmopolitan lifestyle, with some of their younger members going to 
university abroad and then proceeding on to business and finance. Their lack of interest 
in the care and cultivation of their lands was further evidenced by the fact, frequently 
commented upon by villagers, that their land was carelessly cultivated and that their 
servants and managers stole from them. Many kammis from Bek Sagrana also stole 
citrus from their orchards at night and sold it in the nearby market town of 
Bhagtanwala. Villagers told me that thieves had little to fear from the Makhdooms.
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Chowdri Nawaz Ali Gondal’s term in power concluded abruptly in 1977 with
O H
General Zia-ul Haq’s military takeover. In the aftermath of the coup Chowdri Nawaz 
Ali was among the many PPP supporters who were harassed and persecuted by General 
Zia’s military government. He was sent to the infamous jail at Attock without trial and 
spent six months there. Twenty-eight years later he would recall the intense hardships 
he had suffered during that time. In the long run General Zia’s takeover meant that the 
Gondals had to reconsider their political allegiances if they were to maintain their power 
and continue to benefit from political office. After repeatedly delaying elections General 
Zia finally decided to hold non-party provincial elections in 1985. General Zia’s 
principal motivation for holding elections on a non-party basis was to prevent 
candidates from the PPP from regaining office. This meant that Chowdri Nawaz Ali, 
who had played a significant role in the PPP locally and who had ended up in jail as a 
result, was effectively barred from standing in the 1985 elections. In order to 
circumvent this it was decided that Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s younger brother, Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali, would contest the provincial assembly elections in his place. In this manner 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali obtained a seat in the provincial assembly under the very 
government that had not only ousted and jailed his brother, but whose ideology was 
diametrically opposed to the PPP’s. General Zia-ul Haq reversed land legislation, re­
privatised many industries and eradicated left wing movements from the political scene. 
Furthermore, as indicated above, General Zia also succeeded in orienting politics to 
local issues of patronage at the cost of the national issues that had initially been at the 
forefront of the PPP movement. Retrospectively, the fact that Chowdri Nawaz Ali 
supported his brother’s entry into a government whose ideals were strongly opposed to 
those of the PPP is further evidence that ideological commitment may not have been at
871 was unable to collect much information about Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s term in office but many 
villagers claimed that during the early years of his political career he had been very popular.
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the forefront of Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s decision to join the PPP initially.
Over the years that followed this shift in political allegiance proved highly 
beneficial to the political and economic fortunes of leading Gondals including both 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali. From 1985 onwards both Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Nawaz Ali were to benefit greatly from the unprecedented
o o
levels of patronage that characterised Nawaz Sharif s several terms in power. Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali first became a provincial minister in 1985 when General Zia was still in 
power and when Nawaz Sharif was Chief Minister of the Punjab. Following the death of 
General Zia, and after a two year period with Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister,
Chowdri Mazhar Ali became a Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) during 
Nawaz Sharif s two terms as Prime Minister, from 1990 to 1993 and 1997 to 1999. In 
the meantime, Chowdri Nawaz Ali also joined Nawaz Sharif s PML-N and came to 
play a prominent role in its district organisation.
Over almost fourteen years the Gondals intermittently benefitted from 
substantial amounts of patronage when Nawaz Sharif was in power, either as Chief 
Minister of the Punjab or as Prime Minister of Pakistan. This provided the Gondals with 
a wide variety of opportunities to further their personal economic and political standing. 
This is most dramatically illustrated by the fact that by 1999 Chowdri Mazhar Ali 
owned almost 400 acres of land and several Pakistan State Oil (PSO) petrol stations 
throughout Sargodha district, whereas when he began his political career in 1985 he had 
owned no more than 70 acres of land. Patronage included a variety of lucrative contracts 
(thekas) and a steady flow of development funds. It also included help with maintaining
88 Wilder (1999) reports that during his time in power Nawaz Sharif was able to fill thousands of 
government jobs with his supporters: “..he appointed hundreds of loyalist police officers, particularly into 
the lucrative positions of Assistant Sub-Inspectors and Station Head Officers. This was especially 
significant as the police play a central political role in Pakistan because of their ability to selectively apply 
laws in order to harass opponents or to turn a blind eye to the misdeeds of political allies” (Wilder 1999: 
139).
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crucial control over local police stations through the transfer of uncooperative officers
Q Q
and their replacement with more malleable ones. Such control over the police was 
crucial for politicians, whose supporters expected them to solve their problems with the 
police. Supporters frequently approached politicians for help in withdrawing a 
complaint (parcha) lodged against them with the police90 or, conversely, for help in 
making the police lodge a complaint, either real or fabricated, against an opponent. 
Various informants explained that this style of politics strongly contributed to its 
susceptibility to crime, because politicians frequently helped supporters to get away 
with a wide range of criminal activity including murder, drug trafficking and cattle 
rustling. Finally, as in North India (Brass 1997) control over a reputedly predatory 
police force is considered crucial by voters who expect their politicians to protect them 
from police harassment.
Together the combination of development funds and contracts, coupled with the 
politicisation of the police and of the judiciary on their behalf, provided a spectrum of 
opportunities for the Gondals to enrich themselves and to consolidate their political grip 
over their constituencies. It must be noted here that personal enrichment itself often 
played a role in consolidating a politician’s political power. Wealth in the form of land 
and businesses, which might include citrus polishing plants and petrol stations, were 
seen as a way for politicians to enlarge their client base. Wealth and cash were also 
necessary during election times when politicians often had to finance their own 
campaigns because of the poor finances of political parties. Among other things, 
election campaigns involved expenditure in the following among others: fuel for the 
transport of politicians during their campaign, and of voters on the day when elections
89 Although rules for the transfer of Station House Officers (SHOs) at local police stations
(ithana) change now and then it was usually the Chief Minister who ordered transfers. Good relations with 
the Chief Minister of the Province were therefore important for politicians.
90 The term parcha is used to refer to a First Instance Report (FIR).
were held; food for visiting clients; and the buying of votes with cash and small scale 
infrastructure projects.91 As a result it was not uncommon for politicians to have to sell 
land in order to finance their campaigns. It was therefore in the interest of politicians to 
obtain wealth themselves and also to improve the economic standing of close relatives 
and faithful clients. In this way they strengthened not only their own client base but that 
of their close supporters and relatives.
During his three terms in office Mazhar Ali Gondal obtained a variety of 
lucrative contracts and a steady flow of development funds for his factional 
constituency and for his home village. For example, during his latest term in office, 
from 1997 to 1999, Chowdri Mazhar Ali obtained several lucrative contracts relating to 
the construction of stretches of the motorway from Lahore to Islamabad that was being 
engineered by the South Korean Daewoo Company. He appears to have not only 
personally taken advantage of these contracts but to have granted contracts to his 
relatives including his younger brother, who became extensively involved in the project, 
and other factional supporters. His younger brother was even somehow able to place 
one of his domestic servants onto the payroll of Daewoo without the servant ever 
having actually to work for them. According to the servant in question this arrangement 
basically allowed his master to have a servant for free. Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s younger 
brother, as well as other relatives and supporters, were also granted several local road 
construction projects. Additionally, Chowdri Mazhar Ali was granted several
91 This might include a small bridge over an irrigation canal, a small stretch of road or a small
mosque.
92 The servant even told me that because the Daewoo salary was quite high, his master kept part 
of it for himself.
93 The state of many of these local roads only a few years after completion suggests that the 
contractors in charge of their construction spent far below what they had invoiced. The metal road 
running alongside the canal from which the village of Bek Sagrana could be accessed had only been built 
seven earlier, but in 2004 it was already badly pockmarked with potholes and large parts of it had 
collapsed into the canal.
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franchises to build Pakistan State Oil petrol stations along the main roads leading into 
Sargodha.
During Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s time in office the village of Bek Sagrana also 
received a large number of development projects. The village gained a post office, a 
water tower, a basic health unit, a new school and a community centre for the Mohajir 
section of the village. Of these, neither the water tower nor the post office were ever 
used and the basic health unit was barely operating. The water tower was part of a 
scheme originally destined to connect households to a water-supply system in areas 
where there were problems with water scarcity and salinity. Bek Sagrana suffered from 
neither of those problems, and most people obtained fresh water by the means of a hand 
pump (nalka) located in the courtyard of their house. In the whole village, there was no 
one who opted to get connected to the new water system. The main reason cited for 
declining was the fact that they currently obtained water for free and that it would be 
foolish to exchange that for a system whereby they would have to pay monthly bills.
The post office was never operational and was used as the house of one of Mazhar Ali’s 
ex-employees.
The basic health unit was a similar case. Like many other health units that I 
visited throughout the district, it wasn’t properly operational. The unit included a 
hospital building with two operating rooms for minor operations such as appendicitis 
and childbirth, and a medical dispensary. It also had housing for hospital staff and a 
large two-storied residence for the doctor. The doctor, a wealthy Gondal chowdri who 
had managed to get a position in the basic health unit of his own village thanks to the 
patronage of Chowdri Mazhar Ali, never attended to his duties there and only 
occasionally went to enter false entries into the attendance register. The residence of the 
basic health unit was occupied by his maternal cousin who was also the head of the
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village Ghulam Baksh Ke faction. A few of the rooms meant for hospital staff were 
occupied by the former’s servants, one of whom used another of the rooms to keep 
broiler chickens which he sold in the village. The clerk in charge of the medical 
dispensary allegedly made money selling off the basic health unit’s medical supplies.
As a result villagers continued to rely almost exclusively on local healers (hakeems) and 
on others with highly dubious qualifications as practitioners of allopathic medicine.94
To make sense of the fact that so many unnecessary and poorly built projects 
were implemented by politicians it is necessary to understand that in the patronage 
politics of the Pakistani Punjab the winning faction appropriates all of the spoils of 
power and uses them to strengthen its local political and economic position at the 
expense of its opponents. Consequently, office-holding politicians grant development 
funds and contracts not only to themselves but to their supporters as well, regardless of 
whether the projects are actually necessary or whether they will be properly 
implemented by the contractor. At the same time, factional opponents who have failed 
to get the sufficient number of votes necessary in order to obtain political office are 
largely deprived of patronage and of development funds by the winners, even though 
their areas may be in greater need of certain projects. Hence a widespread saying asserts 
that in order to know whether a local landlord politician is in power a person need only 
look at the state of the roads in and around his home village. Apart from contracts and 
development funds, Chowdri Mazhar Ali also obtained coveted positions in government 
and in elite schools for his relatives, supporters and faithful clients and servants. During 
his first term in office Nawaz Sharif, who was then the Chief Minister of the Punjab 
under General Zia’s government, personally ensured that Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s son
94 This sort of thing was very common in the public health sector. Most Basic Health Units that I 
visited in rural areas weren’t fully operational and doctors meant to work in them only came to collect 
their pay once a month. See Asian Development Bank (2005) for an account of poorly motivated and 
absent staff in hospitals as well as in schools.
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gained entry into Aitcheson College. A place at Aitcheson College was, and remains, 
highly coveted and represents the best way for a son to establish contacts with members 
of the wealthiest and most powerful families of Pakistan. Chowdri Mazhar Ali was also 
able to obtain several low ranking yet secure and well paid government jobs for his 
servants. He obtained jobs for both his driver and for his agricultural manager (munshi) 
in the Ministry of Agriculture. Neither of them ever attended their government job and 
both continued working for Chowdri Mazhar Ali who, through this arrangement, was 
spared the expense of having to pay their monthly wages out of his own pocket. In 
addition, three more village kammis were granted coveted government jobs as cleaners 
and guards in the newly built village school and the basic health unit.
Political office and influence over the local police also allowed the Gondals of 
Bek Sagrana to enrich themselves through a variety of other means that were blatantly 
criminal. Some villagers that I spoke to claimed that Chowdri Mazhar Ali himself had 
made much of his money in the heroin trade although this was not the consensus view. 
On the other hand, it was absolutely clear that many of his close relatives in the village 
were involved not only in the heroin trade but in bootlegging, cattle theft and even in 
the trafficking of stolen cars. Chowdri Rafiq Gondal, the younger brother of the head of 
the Lambar Ke faction in the village of Bek Sagrana,95 was singled out as the man who 
introduced heroin into the area in the 1980s, when the drug started flowing copiously 
into Pakistan from Afghanistan. Later, two more Gondal families in the village became 
involved in the trade. As a result Bek Sagrana soon became a major converging point 
for the numerous heroin addicts in the area, and Bek Sagrana itself came to have a 
significant number of addicts both among chowdris and kammis. Although for obvious 
reasons it was difficult to investigate how this trade worked, several conversations that I
95 The next chapter will deal more specifically with factionalism at the village level.
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had both with Gondals and ex-retainers of the chowdris involved in the trade indicated 
that the individuals involved received ‘protection’ from politicians, who ensured that 
the police would turn a blind eye to their activities. I was told that in exchange for such 
protection, politicians and policemen received a share of the profits. Politicians also 
thereby obtained the muscle power of the local toughs, whom they often used to weaken 
opponents and keep unruly villagers in their place. During fieldwork it became apparent 
to me that at least two of the families involved in the trade were, or had formerly been, 
closely aligned with Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s political faction. One of these families in 
particular had received active support from Chowdri Mazhar Ali in an attempt to 
weaken the faction that opposed him. I will return to this case in chapter three, but for 
now it is sufficient to note that Chowdri Mazhar Ali provided not only political support 
for them in their fight against the increasingly powerful opposing village faction, but 
also weapons bought from contacts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
bordering Afghanistan.
Finally, political office and the patronage of heavily armed criminal elements 
also allowed several Gondals to take by force land that belonged to the Makhdooms as 
well as other land belonging to politically powerless smallholders. With respect to the 
Makhdooms it appears that some Gondals simply occupied their land and cultivated it 
without legal title. The moral justification that the Gondals offered for this was that the 
land had once been donated to one of the Makhdoom saints (pirs) more than a hundred 
years ago but that because the latest pir had no legitimate offspring the land thereby 
reverted to them. The Gondals proudly explained to me that the Makhdooms could do 
nothing about it because the Gondals had greater power (takat)96 than they did. It 
appears that Chowdri Abdullah Gondal, the head of the faction opposing Chowdri
96 The word takat was used to refer to a combination of forcefulness and political influence.
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Mazhar Ali, even succeeded in having some of the Makhdooms’ best land transferred to 
his name. The Makhdooms had apparently decided to sell some of their poor quality 
rain-fed land and Chowdri Abdullah had taken up the offer. The way he had ended up 
with some of their best land was that the agreement had apparently involved the sale of 
a share in the Makhdooms total estate without specifying the actual plot of land 
involved. So even though the agreement was about a plot of poor quality land, Chowdri 
Abdullah Gondal took over a piece of prime land covered with citrus orchards. In the 
case of politically weak smallholders it was much simpler to obtain legal title to their 
land. The simplest way was to use a small quarrel as a pretext to send gunmen over and 
threaten a farmer into selling his land at a price below going market rates. Alternatively 
contacts with the police and the judiciary could be used to lodge a fabricated complaint 
against a landowner and thereby entangle him in a court case. Because court cases could 
be ruinously expensive and drag on for decades, the defendant could be offered out of
07court settlement in exchange for selling his land at a price far below its market value.
During their time in office Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his younger sibling also 
personally took over government property. Both Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his youngest 
brother occupied wedding halls that had been built for the poor during Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto’s time in power. The wedding halls had been built to provide a place where poor 
people could celebrate their weddings. In Bek Sagrana the wedding hall ended up as the 
weekend bungalow of Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s younger brother, and in the village of Kot 
Gondal the wedding hall became Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s guest house.
97 The method of entangling an opponent in a court case is widely reported to be used against 
people belonging to religious minorities through the use of the blasphemy laws put in place by General 
Zia-ul Haq. According to this law a person accused of blasphemy could be sentenced to death. Therefore 
a person with an eye to obtain a plot of land belonging to his Christian neighbour could accuse him of 
blasphemy and thereby force him into ceding his land.
When Nawaz Sharif was overthrown by General Pervez Musharraf in 1999 this 
situation would be used by General Musharraf s government and his local supporters to 
prosecute Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his siblings on corruption charges. Thus, the military 
takeover brought a significant, albeit temporary, reversal in the political and economic 
fortunes of Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his siblings and close supporters, a reversal that 
clearly illustrates the costs that finding oneself in the opposition could entail, and also 
the reason that political leaders often shifted their allegiances when governments 
changed. Once Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali were removed from power 
when General Musharraf dissolved the national assembly in 1999, they not only ceased 
to receive government funds and patronage but were even actively persecuted. In 1999 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali ended up in jail as his elder brother had twenty years earlier. 
Although he was ostensibly jailed on corruption charges, evidence suggests that, like his 
elder brother, he was actually jailed for being an active supporter of the defeated former 
government.
The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) prosecuted Chowdri Mazhar Ali 
Gondal on the grounds that he had occupied government property and that he had 
embezzled hundreds of thousands of rupees that had been destined for several local 
infrastructural projects. After Musharraf s takeover, the NAB was established as a 
parallel set of courts free from superior court oversight, and judges were appointed by 
the president himself. The NAB’s declared objective was to fight corruption, but in 
practice it worked as a prosecutorial apparatus to harass and intimidate political 
opponents in much the same manner that Nawaz Sharif s anti-corruption watchdog had
Q Q
worked. Chowdri Mazhar Ali was jailed and then put under house arrest over the 
course of a year. Although no one in the village, including the Gondals themselves,
98 This was known as the Accountability (Ehtesab) Bureau.
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doubted or even denied these charges, everyone believed that the actual reason that he 
was jailed was because he was in the opposition. It was taken for granted that while in 
office Chowdri Mazhar Ali Gondal, like most other politicians, had taken a share of the 
spoils of power for himself and his supporters, but this also meant that there were any 
number of examples of politicians who had done exactly the same thing and against 
whom no corruption charges had been brought. As in the case of Faisal Saleh Hayat, 
some of them had even joined General Musharraf s government. Although Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali was released after a year, he and his siblings were forced to pay the 
government for the full cost of the land and of the buildings that they had occupied. 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali Gondal, who had been the president of the Pakistan Muslim 
League for the district of Sargodha while his brother was a member of the provincial 
assembly, faced even more serious corruption charges and was accused of embezzling 
millions of rupees in addition to having taken over government property. In order to 
escape charges Chowdri Nawaz Ali temporarily defected from Nawaz Sharif s PML-N 
and joined a minor party known as the Millat Party headed by Farooq Leghari, which 
was aligned with General Musharraf s PML-Q. Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s nephew 
explained that his uncle had not sought to gain office in Musharraf s government with 
this shift, but had simply wanted to place himself under the protection of Farooq 
Leghari, a powerful landowner who had been president of Pakistan from 1993 to 1997. 
The reason Farooq Leghari consented to this favour for Chowdri Nawaz Ali was related 
to the fact that they had worked together in the PPP during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s time in 
power and had both been jailed when General Zia-ul Haq had taken over.
Mian Nawaz Sharif s PML-N was the party which was most severely affected 
by defections to General Musharraf s ruling PML-Q coalition, a fact that provides 
further illustration of the vicissitudes of both circumstance and strategy at the local
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political level. Prior to his arrest Chowdri Mazhar Ali Gondal had been a member of the 
provincial assembly in alliance with Khuda Baksh Mekan, who was a member of the 
national assembly for the same constituency. When General Musharraf took over,
Khuda Baksh Mekan defected from the PML-N and joined General Musharraf s PML- 
Q fearing the costs of being in opposition to a powerful military government and 
foreseeing the benefits of remaining in power. In contrast, Chowdri Mazhar Ali 
remained faithful to the PML-N. Given the widespread practice of defecting in order to 
follow power, as well as the Gondals’ reputation for cunning pragmatism, it is 
surprising that he did not seek to obtain a position in General Musharraf s ruling party 
in the same way that Chowdri Nawaz Ali had done when General Zia-ul Haq had 
overthrown Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. A possible explanation for the fact that he did not is the 
one Chowdri Mazhar Ali himself put forward. He claimed that a sense of personal 
loyalty to his leader Mian Nawaz Sharif had precluded his defection, and indeed this 
cannot be ruled out because there was a long history of cooperation between himself 
and Nawaz Sharif." But while retrospectively Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s claim of loyalty to 
explain why he didn’t defect from the PML-N can appear plausible enough, alternative 
explanations given by relatives and villagers may also contain elements of truth.100 Most 
prominent among the explanations is that it was the enmity between him and Chowdri 
Zahid Iqbal Awan that prevented him from shifting to the PML-Q. Zahid Iqbal Awan
99 Nevertheless, his decision appears to evince a canny strategic instinct as well. Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali’s son had considered the possibility of shifting sides and discussed it with his father, but 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali had told him that he believed that in the long term loyalty would pay its dividends. 
His father believed that it was likely that Nawaz Sharif would one day return to power and that they 
would be rewarded for their loyalty. This strategy worked: Nawaz Sharif returned to Pakistan in 2008 
after almost ten years of exile in Saudi Arabia and London, and he proceeded to become Chief Minister of 
the Punjab in a power sharing deal with the PPP at the centre. In the elections preceding Nawaz Sharif s 
return to power in the Punjab, Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s son ran in the provincial assembly elections and was 
defeated. Nevertheless, despite losing the election Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s son was granted a powerful 
position in the Punjab Ministry of Agriculture as a reward for his father’s loyalty.
100 In any case, even if some of these explanations are incomplete or even false, the fact that they
are put forward is likely to reveal some of the factors determining political allegiances in the present-day 
Pakistani Punjab.
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was the elder brother of the man killed by the group that included Chowdri Nawaz Ali 
in the 1960s. Zahid Iqbal Awan was therefore a personal rival and enemy (<dushman) of 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his siblings. The Gondals explained that at the time of the 
murder the Awans had been unable to take revenge (badla) because they were weak 
(ikamzor) by virtue of their political and economic positions as well as because of their 
personal lack of courage. One Gondal rather grandly claimed that the Awans knew that 
if they lifted a single finger against a Gondal that their entire household would be 
exterminated. Most of my informants claimed that before entering politics the Awans 
had owned less than a square of land (25 acres) and that their political influence was 
limited. However, by 2005 Zahid Iqbal Awan had been a member of the national 
assembly on five occasions and had become one of the wealthiest and powerful 
politicians in the district.
According to most accounts Zahid Iqbal Awan began his ascent to riches and 
power as an assistant revenue collector at tehsil level {naib tehsildar). It was widely 
known that in his position as naib tehsildar Zahid Iqbal Awan had been able to make 
significant amounts of money. This had eventually resulted in his dismissal on 
corruption charges. Much like Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s initial career as a lawyer Zahid 
Iqbal Awan’s initial career as naib tehsildar had allowed him to establish contacts with 
officials who played a crucial role in the lives of zamindars. Having contacts with land 
revenue and land record administration officials was just as valuable to politicians as 
having contacts with the police and the courts. Among other things, a politician could 
help his clients in the frequent land disputes that arose between zamindars if he had
1021 was emphatically told by patwaris that it was not in their power to alter land records, and 
smallholders confirmed this by telling me that if that was possible then smallholders would soon be 
eliminated at the hands of the influential landlords. Nevertheless, they could make life very difficult for 
people by a variety of means, including being uncooperative and unavailable.
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100influence over a local land record officer (patwari). He could also help zamindars
avoid having to register tenants on their land so as to forestall any possible occupancy 
right claims. Zahid Iqbal Awan’s contacts and knowledge of the system coupled with 
his widely recognised astuteness eventually allowed him to run in elections and become 
a member of the national assembly under General Zia-ul Haq’s government at the same 
time that Chowdri Mazhar Ali became a member of the provincial assembly in a 
neighbouring constituency. Like Chowdri Mazhar Ali he greatly benefitted from the 
patronage of Nawaz Sharif in the Zia era and subsequently joined Nawaz Sharif s PML- 
N. During his political career Zahid Iqbal Awan amassed an even greater fortune than 
the Gondals, and by 2005 he not only possessed large amounts of land and petrol 
stations but also several bungalows and buildings in Sargodha and a sugar mill 
employing thousands of people. The story that was widely circulated with respect to the 
sugar mill was that it had been owned by a bank that went bankrupt and had defaulted 
on its obligations. Zahid Iqbal Awan had organised all of those who had lost their 
money in the bank default and claimed the sugar mill as compensation for them. He 
then somehow succeeded in getting the majority of the shares of the mill under his own 
name, while a large number of the bank’s customers never received their money back. 
The mill not only provided significant income to him but also gave him a significant 
number of guaranteed votes.103
Because Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali were elected from a 
constituency different to Zahid Iqbal Awan’s their enmity didn’t get in the way of their 
being affiliated with the same political party during their several terms in office. 
However, this changed in 1997 when General Pervez Musharraf came to power. At this
103 A member of the Noon family told me that their sugar mill basically guaranteed them around 
ten thousand votes from the mill workers. Although I never confirmed that this was the case for Zahid 
Iqbal Awan, it is plausible to assume that roughly the same thing was true with respect to his sugar mill.
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point Zahid Iqbal Awan shifted his allegiance to General Musharraf s PML-Q and came 
closer than ever to the centre of power through the fact that his daughter was married to 
the son of the man who became Chief Minister of the Punjab. Both Gondals and 
villagers believed that this played a role in the fact that Chowdri Mazhar Ali didn’t join 
the PML-Q. Close relatives of Chowdri Mazhar Ali told me that he hadn’t joined the 
government because he refused to work under his family’s lifelong enemy. What they 
failed to mention, most probably out of pride, was that the Awans, who were now more 
powerful than ever, were in all likelihood unlikely to accept him into the ruling coalition 
even if Chowdri Mazhar Ali had wanted to join it. Whatever the case may actually have 
been, the fact that people mentioned the enmity between Awans and Gondals as a 
reason that Chowdri Mazhar Ali Gondal didn’t shift parties indicates that personal 
enmity often had a determining effect on the political party allegiances. This will be 
further illustrated in the next chapter.
Conclusions
The first section of this chapter provided an outline of the history of Pakistani 
politics and argued that the absence of a popular political party at national 
independence, and repeated military takeovers, stunted the political and social 
development of the country and of the Punjab province. Except for a brief period of 
time when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto initially rose to power, politics in the Pakistani Punjab 
has been dominated by parochial interests. Three military regimes, each of them lasting 
approximately ten years, ensured that politics would remain parochial by banning 
political parties and implementing devolution programmes. By doing this the military 
succeeded in diverting people’s attention away from national issues to local ones, and 
thereby forestalled, albeit temporarily, the emergence of nationwide social movements
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that might challenge its authority. Wilder has noted that during General Zia-ul Haq’s 
regime,
.. .student politics were reduced from demonstrating over national and even international issues 
to fighting over campus dorms. The labour movement was reduced from a powerful political 
force to a weak and divided movement with little political importance. The political role of 
biradaris, which had been virtually eliminated in the 1970 elections, again increased in Pakistani 
politics. And MNA’s were converted into glorified councillors, whose days were spent not 
dealing with national issues, but with writing chits to get their constituents a job, or into a 
hospital, or out of a thana [police station].” (Wilder 1999: 133).
As a result of the turn towards local issues, politicians continued to focus their attention 
on control over the means of local patronage at the expense of their role as policy 
makers and legislators.104 In line with this development political parties came to 
resemble large factions principally concerned with the appropriation of the spoils of 
power instead of being political entities with distinct political and social programmes. 
This meant that rural politicians could regard ideological differences between the parties 
as incidental, and consider them simply as alternative routes to power that were largely 
interchangeable.
This chapter then went on to look more closely at the sort of power that the 
chowdris wielded, and began particularly to explore the key position they occupied 
between people on the ground and state institutions, including the police, as well as 
some of the dynamics of their behaviour. It also illustrated some of the developments of 
the ethos and practice of the politics of patronage through the case of two Gondal 
politicians. The politics of patronage was illustrated by the economic and political rise 
of Chowdri Nawaz Ali Gondal and his younger brother Chowdri Mazhar Ali Gondal. 
Where politics took shape around patronage, politicians sought to consolidate and
104 Additional support for this conclusion comes from national assembly web page itself where 
under the heading entitled ‘area of legislative interest’ the most common entry is ‘not available.’
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increase their power through the appropriation of public goods and funds. It was shown 
that through the appropriation of public goods politicians could strengthen their political 
position by increasing their client base at the expense of their rivals. The fact that 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali greatly extended his landholdings, and that Zahid Iqbal Awan 
obtained a sugar mill, not only increased their personal wealth but also increased their 
political power by increasing their client base. One consequence of this style of politics 
was that the main reason for obtaining development funds was to consolidate political 
power rather than to develop a solid public infrastructure. Accordingly, projects such as 
the large water tower in Bek Sagrana, which was intended to serve an area suffering 
with water shortages, were undertaken where there was no need for them. Moreover, 
even where there was a need for certain a project such as the Basic Health Unit in Bek 
Sagrana, the project was used for the short term goal of benefitting clients rather than 
for the sake of the public infrastructure. Rather than medical care as such, the Basic 
Health Unit provided some faithful supporters with government jobs, and the bungalow 
meant for the doctor in charge became the residence of a close relative.
Another significant consequence was the entrance of crime into politics. Not 
only did Gondal politicians and their clients become involved in lucrative forms of 
trafficking, but the role of politicians also came to revolve increasingly around 
protecting clients involved in criminal activities from the police and the courts. The 
following passage quoted in Wilder’s book, where an influential member of the national 
assembly responds to criticism that members of the national assembly were failing to 
pass legislation, clearly illustrates this trend and is worth reproducing here:
Look, we get elected because we are ba asr log [effective people] in our area. People vote for me
because they perceive me as someone who can help them. And what help do they seek from me?
Somebody’s brother has committed a murder and he comes to me and I protect him from the
authorities. Somebody’s son is a matric fail and I get him a job as a teacher or a government
servant. Somebody’s nephew had been caught thieving and I protect him. This sort of thing. That
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is my power. This is what they perceive as power. You know, somebody has not paid up their 
loan and I try to have the payment delayed, etc. That means that I get elected because I am doing 
all the wrong things... My skill is that laws don’t mean anything to me, and that I can cut right 
across them and help people whether they are in the right or in the wrong. If somebody’s son is 
first class, he’s not coming to me to get him a job. If somebody has merit they very rarely come 
to me—occasionally they come to me. But it’s the real wrongdoers who come to me. (Wilder 
1999: 204).
It was further argued that in the village of Bek Sagrana the association of politicians 
with wrongdoers also allowed them to flex their muscles more and more through their 
use of local toughs to intimidate opponents and harass unruly villagers.105
Finally, the case of the Gondal politicians discussed in this section illustrates 
that the emphasis on patronage at the expense of policy making and legislation meant 
that political parties were largely regarded as interchangeable by rural politicians. 
Consequently, they often shifted their allegiances when a new government came to 
power. It was argued that the need to shift allegiances in order to continue benefitting 
from government patronage was compounded by the fact that politicians who remained 
in the opposition frequently faced government prosecution and harassment. Both 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali ended up in jail following military 
takeovers. As the following chapter will demonstrate, being out of power also meant 
that their local opponents could consolidate power at their expense. In light of this the 
question of why politicians sometimes didn’t shift parties was raised. Two answers were 
given: first, that loyalty would result in future rewards whenever the leader of the party 
returned to power; second, that personal enmities and rivalries could interfere with 
politicians’ joining the ruling coalition. Yet another reason, which wasn’t extensively 
explored above but that probably also played a role, was an obvious one: there was a 
limit to the number of politicians that the ruling coalition could admit.
105 This tendency will be illustrated in the following chapter.
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The next chapter will focus specifically on the issue of enmity-structured 
political allegiances. Given that political parties were not the main focus of people’s 
political loyalties, as this chapter has demonstrated, the next chapter will attempt to 
unravel what the main focuses of people’s loyalties actually were. More specifically, the 
chapter addresses the issue of whether parochial politics meant the extended lineage 
(biraderi) had become the central building block of politics in the Pakistani Punjab as 
certain commentators, including Jalal (1995), have claimed.
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Chapter Three: Factionalism and Kinship
In the previous chapter I argued that the lack of a popular national political party 
at independence, coupled with repeated military interventions in politics, played a 
significant role in perpetuating a parochial form of politics in which landlord politicians, 
along with their factional allies and followers, competed to appropriate the spoils of 
office. By localising politics, military governments were able to consolidate their power 
and fragment political opposition. This meant that local ties of allegiance remained 
more important than allegiances to national political parties. Thus Ayesha Jalal (1995), 
and others (see Rais 1985, Burki 1980, Waseem 1994) have argued that kinship ties, in 
the form of the extended lineage (biraderi), regained their political force during the Zia 
regime. Ayesha Jalal writes that in a “country where parties had never managed to strike 
roots, the Zia regime’s systematic campaign to discredit politicians and politics gave 
renewed significance to the old personalized networks of biraderi or clan-based ties” 
(Jalal 1995: 105). In this chapter I seek to address the widespread perception that the 
biraderi has remained a powerful force in Punjabi politics and to determine the extent to 
which this is actually the case.
In Pakistan both academic and popular discourses tend to emphasise the idea 
that primordial loyalties override ideological and party allegiances. Thus it is frequently 
argued that the assumption behind a democratic system, whereby individuals freely 
make their own choices in all spheres of life including politics, does not apply in a 
context where primordial loyalties give precedence to the group over the individual. 
Ullah, for example, made the following claim:
The first important fact about the village life is that it is an aggregate of individuals. In fact, the 
real individual in the sense of Western Urban society does not exist in the village. He is an 
inalienable part of multiple groups which completely overshadow his individuality...The first
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and most important group for the individual is the family which makes for him the major 
decisions of life...Next to the family comes the ‘BaradarV [sic] group. (Ullah 1963: 50-51).106
If this is true—if it is the case that the strongest ties of allegiance of individuals pertain 
to their family and their extended biraderi—then one might expect extended biraderi 
members to vote as a block and to place their interests above those of outsiders.
The widespread violence within biraderis, which is generally associated with 
agnates competing for land and power, need not undermine this view if a segmentary 
social structure can be established. In the classical segmentary model (most commonly
1 (VIused by scholars to analyse Middle Eastern tribal society) the presence of shared 
interests in a joint estate, together with a sense of honour attached to the tribe, cause 
opposed segments at one level of segmentation to unite at a higher level of 
segmentation when faced with an external threat. In such a scenario it might be 
expected that, despite their internal quarrels, Gondals would always support a Gondal 
politician over and above a politician belonging to another biraderi since to support an 
outsider would undermine the interests of the biraderi as a whole.
The empirical evidence presented in this chapter does not support the view that 
the extended biraderi is the principal building block of political activity in the Punjab. 
Instead it will be argued that factions characterised by “a vertical structure of power 
which cross cuts caste and class divisions” (Brass 1965: 236), and which are based upon 
a loose coalition of individuals structured around a closely knit kinship based core, are 
the principal building blocks of political activity and allegiance. Following Barth in 
‘Segmentary Opposition and the Theory of Games’ (1982), this chapter presents the 
argument that, even if it is possible to talk of members of an extended biraderi sharing
106 See also Ullah (1958).
107 See Gellner (1969) for a classical account of a segmentary social system in the Atlas 
Mountains of Morrocco.
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in a joint estate, this possibility “need not imply a community of interests, and may in 
fact imply an overriding opposition of interests which inhibits the emergence of 
corporate unity” (Barth 1981: 81). Barth argues that amongst the Swat Pathans it is the 
overriding opposition between patrilateral cousins (tarbur), who almost invariably 
compete over the possession of land and the control of client groups implied by it, 
which inhibits the emergence of the corporate unity of the Yusufzai Pathans. According 
to Barth’s model, a Pakhtun’s “political activities are directed at gaining an advantage 
over his agnatic rivals, as only through their defeat can he achieve his own 
aggrandizement” (Barth 1981: 67). To this end agnates make political alliances with 
distant collaterals against each other and follow the principle that the enemy of their 
enemy is their friend. Barth argues that the principal reason that Pakhtuns can afford to 
oppose their agnates is that, unlike in other lineage systems, their agnates do not form 
the bulk of their supporters. Instead the bulk of a Pakhtun’s supporters are gained from 
within the ranks of dependent client groups, including artisans and tenants, whose 
loyalties Pakhtun patrons win through the distribution of largesse made possible by their 
ownership of the land. The overriding importance of the rivalry between agnates, and 
the fact that leaders make alliances with the enemies of their enemies, encourage the 
regional formation of a two-block system cutting across extended biraderi ties.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that Barth’s model is applicable to the 
political coalitions made by the chowdris of the Punjab, where agnatic rivalry often 
obliterates the unity of the blood group. Contrary to Lindholm (1989: 80) I argue that 
the unity of the blood group is not necessarily activated in cases of revenge, and that 
factional leaders do in fact frequently support the enemies and killers of their close 
agnates. By demonstrating that chowdris, particularly powerful ones, often do align 
themselves politically with distant kinsmen and non-kinsmen against more closely
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related kin, I also challenge Alavi’s view that “it is only rarely that a household finds 
itself with no option but to align itself with more distant kinsmen and pitted against 
closer relatives” (Alavi 1972: 18). I illustrate that the political alliances of chowdris are 
not structured by mechanical lineage solidarity but by both the largely strategic choices 
of leaders and followers and by the rivalry and enmity between agnates, who compete 
over land and political resources.
However, the analysis presented differs from Barth’s in that the role of kinship 
is not merely a negative one (in the sense that it structures enmity rather than creating 
lineage solidarity) but that the individuals who comprise the core of factions are often 
held together by multiple, overlapping kinship ties. Because kinship amongst West
1 nfiPunjabi Muslims is structured around preferential cousin marriage this results in 
“compact, tightly organised and self contained but, at the same time, small and localized 
biraderi groups” (Alavi 1972:26). The material illustrates that it is such ‘tightly 
organised and self-contained’ kinship groups, united by affinal ties, which form the core 
of political factions amongst chowdris.109 Additionally, the chapter shows that agnatic 
rivalry does not stem only from competition over the possession of land. Whereas Barth 
characterises Swat as having an acephalous political system, the political system of the 
Pakistani Punjab is clearly not acephalous, and the Pakistani state plays an important
108 According to Hamza Alavi (1972) the Punjabi Muslim kinship system is structured on the 
principle of preferential patrilateral parallel cousin marriage. I have gathered insufficient evidence to 
confirm this but it appears that cousin marriage is the norm and that a great deal of prestige and honour 
(izzat) is attached to endogamy. Prestige is particularly attached to keeping daughters within the biraderi, 
and wealthy peasants and landlords often boast about how they take girls but do not give them (see Alavi 
1972: 6).
109 Alavi (1972) and Eglar (1960) both describe the institution of vartan bhanji, referring to the 
exchange of gifts and favours, particularly at times of marriage, which serves to integrate households. I do 
not explore these in this chapter because they are not strictly central to the discussion and also because 
most of these exchanges centre on women to whom I had no access. Also See Mundy (1995) where the 
author similarly argues that Yemeni households are the core of political organisation and not the tribe.
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role in structuring political competition and conflict.110 Thus in the present day Punjab, 
although land does play a very important role in the maintenance of control over client 
groups, control over patronage and access to the state is equally significant for 
leadership. Furthermore, a leader’s capacity to retain control over his land, as well as his 
capacity to acquire more land, partly hinges upon his capacity to mobilise both the 
police and the courts in case of a land dispute. Political office and positions in the state 
bureaucracy are also well known for facilitating the acquisition of land through the 
multiple possibilities for enrichment that they offer. This means that conflict between 
agnates often results from competition for votes during elections for various tiers of 
government, as well as from competition over control of state institutions such as the 
police and the judiciary.
Factional Leadership in Bek Sagrana
During General Musharraf s nine years in power Chowdri Nawaz Ali and 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali were compelled to keep a low profile in order to avoid any trouble 
with newly empowered rivals in the military government. This was particularly the case 
at the beginning of the Musharraf administration, when the possibility of both Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Nawaz Ali being sent back to jail remained a distinct 
possibility. Chowdri Mazhar Ali claimed that he and his family were under close 
surveillance by the secret services, and that the local police had not only ceased to be 
cooperative but were actively opposing their interests. Deprived of both political power 
and state patronage, Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Nawaz Ali, together with their 
close supporters, experienced a significant fall in their political and economic fortunes. 
On the other hand their political opponents, who lost no time in joining forces with
110 Barth’s characterisation of the Swat political structure as acephalous is in any case 
problematic, as Ahmed (1976) argues, since it failed to take into account the colonial administration’s 
crucial role in propping up local leaders.
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Musharraf s government, experienced a rise in theirs. Standing out amongst their 
opponents in this ascendency was Chowdri Abdullah Gondal in their home village of 
Bek Sagrana.
Chowdri Abdullah Gondal and Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his siblings shared a 
great-great-grandfather known as Kala Gondal. Chowdri Abdullah’s father, Ahmed 
Rasool, had been the local tax collector (lambardar) and principal rival of Ghulam 
Baksh. The latter was the paternal uncle of Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his siblings. 
Following Ahmed Rasool’s death, his son Abdullah Gondal took over as head of what 
came to be known as the Lambar Ke faction. On the other side, Ghulam Baksh’s son, 
Hajji Muhammad Hayat, and later his grandson Haq Nawaz Gondal, successively took 
over as heads of what came to be known as the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction.111 Ultimately 
however, Chowdri Haq Nawaz was the local representative of Chowdri Nawaz Ali and 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali, who were the most powerful politicians in the family but who 
now lived outside the village, Nawaz Ali where they had the most of their land.
Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali were paternal first cousins, as well 
as close affines, of Hajji Muhammad Hayat. Hajji Muhammad Hayat had married one 
of Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s sisters and Chowdri Nawaz Ali had married one of 
Muhammad Hayat’s sisters. In the next generation Hajji Muhammad Hayat’s eldest 
daughter had married Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s only son. Hajji Muhammad Hayat’s various 
kinship ties with Chowdri Nawaz Ali meant that they formed what they referred to as an 
extended household (ghar).112 Although they didn’t live in a single house they and
111 Chowdri Abdullah inherited the position of lambardar but passed it on to a minor zamindar 
who was a client of his in the village.
112 The term ghar was generally used to denote the close family unit wherein purdah was largely 
not observed. The term therefore referred to close kinship ties rather than to the actual physical house in 
which people lived and which was generally referred to as makan. Members of a ghar in the sense above 
made up what Alavi (1972) referred to as the biraderi of participation. They partake in a variety of 
prestations and counter-prestations known as vartan bhanji (literally ‘dealings in sweets’) whereby people 
exchange gifts on ritual occasions such as circumcisions, weddings and deaths.
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theirfamilies spent a great deal of time visiting each other, taking care of each other’s
children, attending and helping out in each other’s life cycle rituals and exchanging
gifts. As a result Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali had always supported
Hajji Muhammad Hayat and his son Chowdri Haq Nawaz more than they did Chowdri
Ahmed Rasool and his son Chowdri Abdullah, with whom they didn’t share as many 
11^
kinship ties.
According to villagers, although the rivalry between the two factions dated back 
to the time of Ahmed Rasool and Ghulam Baksh it had intensified in the generation that 
succeeded them. While the rivalry between Ahmed Rasool and Ghulam Baksh had been 
tempered by their joint rivalry against the Makhdooms, there was no longer a common 
external enemy to unite the two factions in the generation that followed. Moreover the 
fact that Chowdri Abdullah’s fortune soared dramatically, for various reasons to be 
discussed below, had reduced his reliance on fellow Gondals for political support. The 
eventual consequence of this was that the unity of the Gondal biraderi in Bek Sagrana 
was obliterated. Elderly villagers fondly recalled a time when, despite rivalries and 
occasional land disputes, all of the Gondal village elders had sat together in the village 
men’s house (darra) in the evenings in order to address village problems and disputes 
jointly. Four of the influential village chowdris at the time, including Ahmed Rasool
113 See kinship diagram on page 123.
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and Ghulam Baksh, had shared a monthly rotation for covering the expenses of feeding 
guests and providing a hookah115 at the village darra
Even following the deaths of Ghulam Baksh and Ahmed Rasool both factions 
had cooperated as the Gondals challenged Makhdoom dominance in the area. During 
the 1970s and 80s, Ahmed Rasool and his son had even supported Chowdri Nawaz Ali 
and his brother when they had first run in elections. Subsequently, while Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali was in power he had provided various forms of patronage to Ahmed Rasool 
and later to his son Chowdri Abdullah. Most widely recalled was the occasion when 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali had managed to obtain Ahmed Rasool’s release from jail. Ahmed 
Rasool, like many of his cousins, had been extensively involved in protecting buffalo
I I O
thieves, an activity known as rassa-giri, and had been jailed as a result of it during 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s second term in power. It was said that without Chowdri Nawaz 
Ali’s intervention to obtain his release Ahmed Rasool would have been blinded as a 
result of police torture.119 In the years that followed, Chowdri Mazhar Ali had also 
granted Chowdri Abdullah various contracts and had provided him with cover from the 
police for him to pursue various criminal activities with impunity. Chowdri Mazhar Ali 
told me personally that it was he who had granted Chowdri Abdullah his government 
licence for the extraction of sand for the entire district of Sargodha, and that it was in
115 The hookah is a water pipe for smoking tobacco and is the first thing that a guest was
provided with upon entering a person’s guest house.
118 The term rassa-gir refers to those landowners who act as protectors for gangs, thugs and
thieves. The term literally translates as ‘he who holds the rope’ and refers to the fact that landlords 
metaphorically extend a rope to those they protect, to pull them out of trouble.
119 Apparently the police officers had applied intense pressure to his eyes with their thumbs. 
Ahmed Rasool had been jailed during the time that Mustapha Khar, also known as the lion of the Punjab 
(Sher-e Punjab) and the subject of Tehmina Durrani’s (1994) book My Feudal Lord, was Chief Minister 
of the province and had decided to crack down on buffalo theft.
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part thanks to this contract that Chowdri Abdullah’s economic fortunes had soared. 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali also claimed to have given considerable support to Chowdri 
Abdullah in his land disputes with the Makhdooms.
However, as the influence and wealth of Chowdri Abdullah and his three 
siblings grew they became increasingly assertive, and they started to challenge Chowdri 
Nawaz Ali and the leaders of the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction in the village. Over the 
years Chowdri Abdullah Gondal and his three younger siblings aggressively expanded 
their local political and economic influence through a variety of forceful, sometimes 
criminal, methods. This led them to acquire a well deserved reputation for being 
enterprising as well as belligerent and violent, to a degree that surpassed nearly all other 
Gondals in the region. Like his father Ahmed Rasool, Chowdri Abdullah spent a great 
deal of his time cultivating contacts amongst influential local, regional, and national- 
level officials in order to consolidate his political and economic position. His ceaseless 
networking, coupled with his ambitious and domineering personality, eventually turned 
Chowdri Abdullah into a highly effective local political figure. Thus, although Chowdri 
Abdullah (unlike Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali) never achieved 
political office above the lowest administrative unit, his wide-ranging personal contacts 
and friendships allowed him to provide patronage to clients in the village. The force of 
his personality, the awe in which he and his siblings were locally held, and his many 
gunmen meant that he was greatly feared, but this also meant that most villagers 
believed him to be the local leader most likely to intervene effectively on their behalf in 
a dispute. If, for example, a smallholder who had good relations with Chowdri Abdullah 
had a land dispute with a neighbour, the mere fact that Chowdri Abdullah supported 
him was usually enough to make his opponent withdraw. Chowdri Abdullah was 
reputed to have an uncontrollable temper and anyone who angered him was likely to
suffer severe consequences. Villagers told me that if he caught a servant stealing from 
him, or a villager stealing from his citrus orchards, he would go into violent fits of rage 
and would exact violent revenge on the offender personally. As a result villagers who 
often freely picked citrus in other chowdris’ orchards didn’t dare do so in Chowdri 
Abdullah’s orchards.120
Although Chowdri Abdullah was known for his temper and violent acts, it was 
Chowdri Rafiq, his youngest brother killed in a police encounter, who was the most 
notorious of the four male siblings. At the time of fieldwork in 2004 he had been lying 
dead for over seven years in a large domed tomb (mazaar) next to his family’s 
farmhouse (dera). It was Rafiq Gondal who was credited with the introduction of heroin 
into the area of Bek Sagrana in the eighties, when the drug started to flow copiously into 
Pakistan from Afghanistan. Some of his relatives even claimed that he had extended this 
business to Lahore. Villagers remembered Rafiq Gondal with awe, and stories about his 
reckless bravado, and his equally reckless generosity, abounded in the village. His 
personal gunmen recalled how, unlike most other chowdris, he had personally 
accompanied them to fight against his rivals and occupy their land. One gunman 
recalled how on one occasion Chowdri Rafiq personally set off in the middle of the 
night to find one of his client’s stolen buffalos. When Chowdri Rafiq found the thief 
swimming across the irrigation canal with the buffalos, he jumped in and caught the
120 Villagers also recounted an occasion when he ran a rickshaw into an irrigation canal because 
it had failed to give way to him quickly enough as he sped along the road in his large pickup truck. One 
villager who had been given accommodation by Chowdri Abdullah in an outbuilding next to his 
townhouse in Sargodha told me that Chowdri Abdullah had once rammed into the gates of the compound 
with his pickup because the chowdkidar had been too slow in opening them. Yet another story related an 
occasion when Chowdri Abdullah had slapped his son in the face in front of a large assembly of villagers 
because the fact of his son’s being taller than he was annoyed him. However, the most violent act 
committed by Chowdri Abdullah was described to me by his nephew. His nephew claimed that, following 
his younger brother’s death in a police encounter in 1999, Chowdri Abdullah had taken revenge by going 
to the house of one of the police officers involved, shooting him, and burning down the house. In short, 
few people, other than the leaders of the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction, would dare to provoke the wrath of 
Chowdri Abdullah.
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thief with his own hands. The same gunman recalled how Chowdri Rafiq had once 
caught one of his local enemies, tied him down to a charpai, and broken both of his legs 
with a brick. He also recalled how, when Chowdri Rafiq was feeling generous and 
pious, he would give out thousand rupee notes to his gunmen and tell them to take a few 
weeks off work. Another man recalled how on one occasion, when Chowdri Rafiq had 
been listening to loud music in his car in the nearby market town, he had violently 
slapped a policeman who had ordered him to lower the volume. Faced with a heavily 
armed group of men the policeman had apparently meekly turned around and returned 
to his post.121
In the rural Pakistani Punjab forceful behaviour, and a reputation for it, were 
assets for local politicians. In a political context where violence was rife and villagers 
often needed to obtain protection from predatory enemies including the police, 
powerful, well-connected politicians were the people best placed to offer protection. 
Thus the aggressive behaviour of Chowdri Abdullah and his siblings established them 
as effective patrons and over the years people increasingly approached them to settle 
their disputes. A reputation for this sort of forcefulness was also an asset for the simple 
reason that it instilled fear in the majority of the inhabitants of the area who were 
powerless and poor. As the following chapters will illustrate a reputation for 
forcefulness could induce people to vote for one candidate over another because of fear 
of retribution if they voted the wrong way. Additionally politicians could increase their 
land and wealth and thereby increase their client base through forceful acts behaviour. 
Chowdri Abdullah and his siblings made a great deal of money through the violent 
heroin trade and greatly increased their landholdings by occupying by force some of the
121 On yet another occasion, during a wedding in Lahore, Chowdri Rafiq had driven off in the 
brand new car of an army colonel, whom he didn’t even know. When the furious colonel came to the 
village to reclaim his car Chowdri Rafiq returned it, allegedly simply saying that he had taken the car for 
the fun of it.
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best land that belonged to the Makhdooms, as well as significant areas of land 
belonging to smallholders in the area. Much of this land was planted with citrus 
orchards, which also gave Chowdri Abdullah a handsome yearly income. In 2004 
Chowdri Abdullah was said to have made a thousand lakh rupees from his citrus 
harvest. The increased number of clients that resulted from his growing wealth meant 
that Chowdri Abdullah gained a significant vote-bank that he could mobilise during 
provincial and national elections, either for himself or for whichever regional politician 
with whom he happened to align himself.
By 2006 Chowdri Abdullah had become the wealthiest and most influential 
chowdri in the village of Bek Sagrana. Given that politics was a zero sum game where 
one person’s gain was another’s loss, Chowdri Abdullah’s upward mobility had set him 
on a collision course with both his cousin Haq Nawaz Gondal and Haq Nawaz 
Gondal’s patrons and close kin, Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali. Thus as 
Chowdri Abdullah grew wealthier he gained more clients at Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s and 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s expense. Moveover the more clients he had the more 
independently he could act from his fellow Gondals in Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s faction. In 
addition to taking significant amounts of land from the Makhdooms and others, he also 
purchased large plots of land. His purchase of eighty acres in the lowlands adjacent to 
the village of Bek Sagrana in 2004 was a particularly sore point for Chowdri Haq 
Nawaz and Chowdri Nawaz Ali, and it had almost resulted again in the eruption of
1 90armed conflict between the two factions.
122Chowdri Haq Nawaz and his close supporters worried that Chowdri Abdullah’s purchase of
the land would make him more powerful than he already was, and they were set on preventing the 
purchase from taking place. The owner of the land in question was a zamindar who lived in another
village and belonged to another biraderi. He wished to sell the land in order to buy some closer to his
home village. As soon as he learned that a deal was underway Chowdri Nawaz Ali, who was a friend of
the seller, fried to get him to withdraw from his deal with Chowdri Abdullah and to sell it instead to a
close relative of Chowdri Haq Nawaz. When the seller did try to withdraw, Chowdri Abdullah sent his
gunmen to occupy the land and thereby prevent Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s faction from appropriating it. In
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1 ^By 2006, Chowdri Abdullah had purchased a petrol station on the road 
between Sargodha and Lahore and he also ran the only bus service to Sargodha that 
passed by the village. He had also purchased property in Sargodha as well a new house 
in Lahore’s Model Town. It even appeared that following a trip to Dubai, where the 
glitter had dazzled Chowdri Abdullah, he had decided to invest in real estate there. In 
2005 Chowdri Abdullah caused a great stir by spending eighty lakh rupees on a Toyota 
Lexus Land Cruiser that he personally imported from Japan. Upon its arrival a large 
number of villagers assembled at his dera to watch Chowdri Abdullah proudly 
displaying his new vehicle. Additionally, While Chowdri Abdullah hadn’t even 
completed secondary school, his eldest son was now attending the Lahore University of 
Management Studies (LUMS), one of the costliest and most prestigious higher 
education institutions in Pakistan.124 On the political front Chowdri Abdullah became 
Union Council Nazim in General Musharraf s devolved government scheme. Every 
day dozens of people from Bek Sagrana and surrounding villages gathered at his farm 
house to seek help with some problem or other. Others simply came to pay their 
respects and to thereby assure Chowdri Abdullah of their continued loyalty. Chowdri 
Abdullah presided over them with absolute authority from a heavy golden sofa that 
looked like a throne. From there he attended and made phone calls and heard people’s 
problems. He would occasionally interrupt the assembly by publicly performing his 
prayers or by vigorously performing his morning exercise in the courtyard where clients
the end armed conflict did not occur because the seller was forced to sell the land to Chowdri Abdullah 
since the latter had already put a down payment on the land of twenty three million rupees. Several 
months later Chowdri Abdullah proudly looked on as hired machinery began developing his newly 
purchased land. Villagers commented on how much Chowdri Abdullah’s fortunes had soared, and 
rumours emerged that his new political allies in power, the Awans and the Melas, were planning to seek 
funds to build a minor distributor canal (mogga) that would irrigate Chowdri Abdullah’s newly purchased 
plot.
123 One of his employees at the petrol station told me that Chowdri Abdullah meticulously kept 
track of the accounts and called him no less than twice a day in order to do so.
124 Chowdri Abdullah told me that when his son had completed his studies at LUMS he hoped to 
send him abroad to the London School of Economics to study law.
125 He was succeeded in the post by his younger brother in 2006.
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and servants could admire his physical strength. Other times he would interrupt the 
assembly in order to speed away to the local thana in his Land Cruiser.
Chowdri Haq Nawaz proved unable to rise to the challenge posed by Chowdri 
Abdullah. There were several reasons for this. One was that he belonged to a smaller 
and less aggressive sibling set. Chowdri Haq Nawaz once had three brothers but the 
youngest died before reaching the age of twenty, and his elder sibling was known as a 
somewhat miserly recluse who from his mid-forties showed much more interest in piety 
than in politics. Thus although Chowdri Haq Nawaz had several supporters both in and 
out of the village, his village faction lacked the unity of purpose and core strength that 
the Lambar Ke faction enjoyed. What’s more, most villagers, including close relatives 
who supported him, believed that Chowdri Haq Nawaz lacked the charisma, force, 
courage and even the intelligence of Chowdri Abdullah and his siblings.
Despite the fact that villagers were highly critical of Chowdri Abdullah because 
of his occasional cruelty and criminal activities, most of them believed that he and his 
siblings had several important qualities that were not in equal evidence in Chowdri Haq 
Nawaz. As mentioned above, the forcefulness and energy of Chowdri Abdullah and his 
brothers meant that, whatever else, villagers believed them to be effective as patrons. In 
addition most villagers believed that despite their hardness (,sakhti) there was some 
evidence that they also had a compassionate and generous side to them. While he 
lived Chowdri Rafiq had demanded absolute loyalty from servants and gunmen but in 
exchange he had often been lavishly generous. Two of his ex-gunmen told me that 
although he had been highly exacting and at times unpredictable, he had also rewarded 
loyalty and obedience through patronage and gifts of money. They told me that unlike 
other chowdris, including Chowdri Haq Nawaz, he never let any of them rot in jail
126 People often told me that although they were hard on the outside that they were soft on the 
inside (bahar se sakht lekin andhar se naram).
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when they had been caught by the police in a gunfight or while carrying out criminal 
activities on their master’s behalf. Similarly, even though Chowdri Abdullah was also 
highly demanding of servants and clients, he too was known to be very generous. 
Villagers often illustrated this with the fact that he had gifted four acres of fertile canal- 
irrigated land to an ageing gunman who had served both him and his father before him 
with absolute loyalty. He was also known to be generous when he felt repentant for 
having been too harsh towards a client or a servant. For example, on one occasion he 
repented for having beaten and verbally abused a servant for a minor offence by making 
him a gift of several thousand rupees and by even publicly asking him for
t onforgiveness. This side of his personality helped increase Chowdri Abdullah’s stature, 
as did the fact that he had a sense of humour. When he wasn’t angry about something, 
he often cracked jokes with his clients when they assembled at his dera.
On the other hand Chowdri Haq Nawaz possessed few such admired qualities. 
Like Chowdri Abdullah he also wished to be the most influential man in the area of Bek 
Sagrana. He too was involved in a variety of criminal activities, and like Chowdri 
Abdullah he was also reputed for being harsh and at times cruel. The similarities ended 
there, however. In the first place, Chowdri Haq Nawaz was not as brave as his rivals 
and many villagers went so far as to claim that he was a coward. One event that was 
often invoked to illustrate this related to an episode that took place years before I carried 
out my fieldwork. At that time, Chowdri Haq Nawaz had been in the business of 
organising cockfighting and gambling events in the village. Because gambling was 
illegal no such event took place unless the person organising it could assure participants 
that the police would not turn up and arrest them. The organiser generally did this by
127 Asking for forgiveness was generally seen as somewhat demeaning, and it was generally only 
the defeated and the socially subordinate to whom it was thought appropriate. However, on this occasion 
Chowdri Abdullah showed that he was above pride and capable of the humility that was characteristic of 
God-fearing men.
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paying a low-ranking police officer to warn him if the police were intending to patrol 
the area. For arranging this sort of insurance for the participants the organiser of the 
event received ten per cent of the proceeds from the gambling on the cockfights and a 
third of the profits from the dice games. The policeman involved would also receive a 
share of the profits from the cockfights and another third of the profits from the other 
gambling activities. During one such event the police turned up despite Chowdri Haq 
Nawaz having obtained assurances from his police contact that they would not. Instead 
of facing the police and protecting those attending the event from arrests and police 
brutality, Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s immediate reaction had been to flee. As a result 
several villagers had been badly beaten and a few arrested by the police. The villagers 
who recounted this event claimed that if Chowdri Abdullah had been the one 
responsible for the event the police wouldn’t have turned up in the first place but that, 
even if they had, Chowdri Abdullah would never have run away from them.
To the villagers who related this episode, it clearly illustrated that Chowdri Haq 
Nawaz was not the sort of person who could protect his clients from the authorities, 
including the police. It was also representative of other failings that undermined the 
public perception of him. While some of his rivals, notably Chowdri Rafiq, fought 
alongside their gunmen, Chowdri Haq Nawaz preferred to stay behind and direct 
operations from a distance. Like his rivals Chowdri Haq Nawaz also demanded absolute 
loyalty and dedication from gunmen as well as other servants and clients, but unlike his 
rivals he often failed to reward those who served him with generosity and patronage. It 
was virtually a matter of routine for gunmen, who after all did much of the dirty work of 
the landlords they served, to find themselves in jail sometimes. When this happened, it 
was expected that their patron would do what was within his power to secure their 
release, and meantime that he would supply them with cigarettes and even food while
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they were there.128 Although Chowdri Abdullah didn’t always look after the welfare of 
his gunmen Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s track record on this score was far worse. Many of 
Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s gunmen complained that he did little to help them when they 
were in trouble.
Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s ineffectiveness as a patron was generally attributed to the 
fact that he was more concerned with his own pleasure than with care for his clients. 
This tendency had been established early on in his life when he had attempted to 
establish himself as an actor. Amongst the conservative landed elites of the Punjab, as 
well as throughout much of the rest of Pakistan, acting was considered to be a highly 
disreputable profession. It was held to be the preserve of prostitutes and other similarly
1^ 1
disreputable characters. Later on in life Chowdri Haq Nawaz was well known for 
being a heavy drinker and frequenting prostitutes, whom he sometimes brought back to 
his bungalow in the village. On one occasion his activities had even been exposed in the 
press after he was caught in a brothel by the police. Although Chowdri Haq Nawaz 
denied the reports and claimed that Chowdri Abdullah had paid the press to print 
defamatory reports about him to discredit him and his faction in upcoming elections, 
few people believed him.
128 If a certain landlord managed to obtain the release of his men before his rival was able to
secure the release of his, and if the former’s were better cared for while in jail than the latter’s were, this 
would serve as evidence that the latter either lacked influence or was careless, or perhaps even that he was 
miserly. A reputation for lack of influence and miserliness could badly damage the political influence of a
landlord. To avoid this, rival landlords often competed to show off how efficiently they could get their 
gunmen out of jail, and how they supplied their gunmen with better food and cigarettes while they were 
incarcerated.
131 According to villagers this was precisely what attracted Chowdri Haq Nawaz to acting. 
Unbeknown to his father Chowdri Haq Nawaz had taken up an acting role in a film, rather aptly playing a 
cruel British soldier who oppressed Punjabi villagers. In the film, villagers eventually led an uprising 
against him and decapitated him. His head was then impaled on the tip of a spear. The inhabitants of Bek 
Sagrana found the ending to the film very suitable. For his part, Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s father was 
furious. He severely chastised Chowdri Haq Nawaz and forbade him from pursuing his acting career 
further.
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The combination of the fact that he wasn’t part of a large and cohesive sibling 
set, coupled with what was perceived to be a pleasure-seeking personality lacking in 
force, courage and generosity, made Chowdri Haq Nawaz a relatively unpopular and 
unsuccessful factional leader. Unlike his opponents Chowdri Haq Nawaz neither 
acquired new land nor set up any new business ventures. While by 2006 Chowdri 
Abdullah had acquired significant new landholdings and established various businesses, 
Chowdri Haq Nawaz possessed little more than what his father had passed on to him. 
This consisted of approximately seventy acres of land and a few buildings that he leased 
out for commercial activities in a nearby market town. People often noted that while 
Chowdri Abdullah cruised around in his brand new Lexus Land Cruiser, Chowdri Haq 
Nawaz continued to drive around in an old Toyota pickup truck, though even more 
commented upon was the fact that Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s father continued to travel 
around in a battered old Hyundai that broke down regularly. In addition to these things, 
unlike Chowdri Abdullah Chowdri Haq Nawaz was never able to obtain any form of 
political office. He rarely came to the village and even when he did few clients 
assembled at his farmhouse.
The fact that despite all of this Chowdri Haq Nawaz continued to have
supporters is largely attributable to Chowdri Nawaz Ali and to Chowdri Mazhar Ali.
Many of the supporters of the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction supported Chowdri Haq Nawaz
because by doing so they also supported Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Nawaz Ali
who were both demonstrably powerful politicians capable of wielding significant
influence with the authorities. Moreover, it was largely thanks to Chowdri Nawaz Ali
and to Chowdri Mazhar Ali that Chowdri Haq Nawaz was able to provide patronage to
his clients. This was particularly the case when either Chowdri Nawaz Ali or Chowdri
Mazhar Ali had been in power and had been able to pull strings on his behalf. This had
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allowed Chowdri Haq Nawaz to help clients resolve court cases and even to obtain 
coveted government jobs for faithful supporters of their shared faction. Nevertheless, 
even his patrons were aware of that Chowdri Haq Nawaz had become a liability to the 
faction. They complained that his lack of popularity cost them votes, and as will be 
shown in chapter five it even led them to seek another candidate from the Ghulam 
Baksh Ke faction of Bek Sagrana to contest the union council elections in 2005. 
However, because of their close kinship ties to him they continued to support Chowdri 
Haq Nawaz as the faction’s de facto leader. Furthermore, even though they were aware 
of his shortcomings, they continued to support him because he was the person most 
committed to fighting the growing influence of Chowdri Abdullah, whom he regarded 
as a personal enemy.
The Enemy of My Enemy is My Friend
The conflict between the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction of Chowdri Haq Nawaz and 
the Lambar Ke faction of Chowdri Abdullah began to rage in the early 1990s, when 
Chowdri Abdullah’s growing influence became a serious threat to Chowdri Haq 
Nawaz’s local leadership and therefore, indirectly, to Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s influence in 
Bek Sagrana. By this time the Makhdooms had long ceased to be an external force that 
united the Gondals against a common enemy. Moreover Chowdri Abdullah’s growing 
influence meant that he could now rely on an increased number of clients for political 
support instead of on his fellow Gondals. The intensity of the personalities involved in 
this conflict, combined with the influx of both drugs and weapons that began during the 
Zia era, were ingredients for a particularly explosive situation. At the time when the 
conflict began the leaders of both factions still lived in two large fortress-like houses 
adjacent to each other in the centre of the village. Villagers recalled a not so remote 
time when not a week passed without a shootout taking place between the houses of
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Chowdri Haq Nawaz and Chowdri Abdullah. Bullet marks were still visible on the 
walls of both houses in 2004 after the conflict had subsided and both Chowdri Haq 
Nawaz and Chowdri Asghar (Chowdri Abdullah’s youngest brother) were rendered 
lame by bullet wounds suffered during these exchanges of fire. Villagers told me that 
during these shootouts at least three gunmen belonging to both parties were killed and 
several others imprisoned. The leaders of both factions and their close followers fought 
each other mainly over land, elections and control of the local drug trade. These 
disputes were often complicated by the fact that both sides tried to entangle each other 
in cases, some real and some fabricated, with the police and the judiciary. The causes 
of these weekly gun battles were often real and perceived personal slights by an 
opponent and his men. The fact that a gunman didn’t like the way a rival gunman had 
looked at him was enough to result in an exchange of insults, which could in turn
1 ^ 9escalate into a full blown shootout where the landlords themselves became involved.
These battles made life difficult not only for the landlords and their men but for 
villagers as a whole. Not only did villagers have to put up with the dangers of stray 
bullets, they also had to put up with gunmen who began abusing their power. Villagers 
told me that some of the younger gunmen had started behaving as if they were landlords 
by bossing people around, sending them off on errands, simply taking supplies from 
shops and stealing people’s poultry and livestock. Either out of indifference or because 
they were too busy fighting each other, neither Chowdri Haq Nawaz nor Chowdri 
Abdullah appear to have done anything to discipline their men. Poorer villagers simply 
had to put up with this state of affairs.
132 See chapter five for examples of this during the 2005 local body elections.
133 According to the village mullah at least ninety per cent of the shootouts at the time had begun 
because of quarrels amongst gunmen. Although I do not necessarily accept this statistic at face value it 
does suggest that gunmen played an important role in instigating the fighting.
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Some of the wealthier landlords in the village, including Chowdri Abdullah 
himself, were able to relocate their compounds outside the village in an effort to gain 
some respite from the flare-ups in fighting. Chowdri Abdullah and his brothers built 
their new headquarters amidst citrus orchards about half a mile away from the village, 
where their family and dependants could spend their days in peace without having to 
fear stray bullets. Similarly Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s reclusive elder brother moved to a 
peaceful location half a mile south of the village. These moves, however, did not signal 
the end of the conflict, which continued to rage for several years after and which 
subsided only following the death of Chowdri Rafiq Gondal. For the villagers 
themselves even worse times still lay ahead.
The leaders of both factions continued to fight each other both overtly as well as
covertly through a wide variety of intricately Machiavellian schemes. In order to
combat the growing influence of Chowdri Abdullah and his fearless sibling Chowdri
Rafiq, Chowdri Mazhar Ali decided to use his influence to help Chowdri Haq Nawaz.
He did this by providing both logistical and political support to four young and
notorious Gondal siblings who lived in Bek Sagrana. Given that the genealogical
distance between Chowdri Mazhar Ali and these four siblings was greater than that
between Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Abdullah (who also happened to be affines)
this was a case of making an alliance with more distantly related kin against more
closely related kin.134 The four siblings in question each owned approximately fifteen
acres of land and had become involved in several criminal ventures including
bootlegging, gambling and, to a lesser extent, drug dealing. Chowdri Mazhar Ali
essentially offered the four siblings political support in exchange for them to unite with
Chowdri Haq Nawaz and take up arms against Chowdri Abdullah. Chowdri Mazhar Ali
134 Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s half sister was married to Chowdri Abdullah. See 
kinship diagram on page 124.
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even sent several of his men to purchase weapons for them from a contact in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering on Afghanistan.
Initially the four siblings fought fiercely against Chowdri Abdullah. In one of 
the various shootouts Chowdri Abdullah’s youngest sibling, Chowdri Asghar, was shot 
in the leg causing him, like Chowdri Haq Nawaz, to limp for the rest of his life. Over 
time, however, the four siblings grew increasingly assertive and independent from both 
Chowdri Haq Nawaz and Chowdri Mazhar Ali. Since most of the influential Gondal 
landlords had by then moved out of the village the four brothers began what was 
effectively a reign of terror within it. On several occasions the four brothers sexually 
assaulted Mussalli women during the night. They also wandered around the village 
carrying weapons and bullied anyone who crossed their path. One torrid summer day 
they came upon a carpenter (Tarkhan) who was walking towards them and who 
inadvertently failed to give way to them. Because of this the four brothers abused him 
verbally and then made him take off all of his clothes and lie down on the burning hot 
tarmac. Villagers told me that during this time even some of the wealthiest and most 
influential chowdris in the village feared the four siblings and avoided the village if they 
could.
As discontent amongst Gondals and other inhabitants of Bek Sagrana grew 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Haq Nawaz tried to reign in the four siblings whom 
they had initially abetted, but failed to do so. In the end the alliance not only came to an 
end but the four siblings joined the Lambar Ke faction of Chowdri Abdullah against 
whose members they had only recently been fighting. However, this new alliance 
proved to be equally short-lived as the four siblings continued making life unpleasant
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for everyone in Bek Sagrana. As discontent amongst villagers grew Chowdri Abdullah 
and Chowdri Shahawaz were compelled to get together for the first time in years in 
order to do something about the four brothers. In the end the two leaders managed to 
organise a police raid which landed all four siblings in jail. After a couple of months the 
mother of the four young men went to beg Chowdri Abdullah for their release and her 
request was eventually granted on the condition that the four young men ceased to cause 
trouble.136
Just as Chowdri Mazhar Ali had devised a plan involving the use distantly 
related kin to weaken and possibly eliminate more closely related kin, namely Chowdri 
Abdullah and his siblings, Chowdri Abdullah also concocted schemes to weaken and 
possibly eliminate the leaders of the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction with the help of 
outsiders. Prior to General Musharraf s takeover in 1999 Chowdri Abdullah had 
become expediently allied with the influential politician Chowdri Ghulam Ali 
Midhiana, who at the time was in the midst of a vicious feud with Chowdri Mazhar Ali 
and his siblings. Although Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana belonged to a branch of the 
extended Gondal biraderi known as the Midhianas,137 the genealogical distance between 
him and Chowdri Abdullah was far greater than that between Chowdri Abdullah and 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali. Like Chowdri Mazhar Ali, Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana first 
became a member of the national assembly in 1985 under General Zia-ul Haq and 
subsequently shifted his allegiance to the PPP where he still remains.140
136 Two of the four brothers died shortly after their release in any case, which seemed to diminish 
the potential trouble-making inclinations of the surviving two. Of the two who died, one died of a heroin 
overdose and the other in a firearms accident at a drinking party. This tragic end was welcomed by almost 
all of the villagers, who believed that God had punished them for their misdeeds.
137 Midhiana basically referred to the people from the town known as Mid or Mid Gondal.
140 Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana ate, dressed, and behaved like a Jat cultivator and took pride
in it. He signed documents with a thumbprint and attended sessions in the provincial assembly wearing
the traditional Punjabi clothes. One of his principal sources of revenue was widely known to be from 
buffalo theft. He was known to have not only sent thieves and retainers to carry out nightly raids but to 
have personally accompanied them as well. He possessed several trucks which he used to carry the
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Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana’s enmity with Chowdri Mazhar Ali began in the 
early 1990s and encompassed the rest of the period of civilian rule, which lasted from 
1988 to 1999 and saw power transferred back and forth between Nawaz Sharif and 
Benazir Bhutto. Following the end of General Zia-ul Haq’s regime Chowdri Ghulam 
Ali Midhiana joined Benazir Bhutto’s PPP while Chowdri Mazhar Ali joined Nawaz 
Sharif s PML-N. The feud between them allegedly began during an electoral campaign 
when Chowdri Mazhar Ali Gondal and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana were running 
for the same seat in the Punjab provincial legislature. Violent feuds between families of 
politicians frequently began during elections when candidates tried to entangle their 
opponents in court cases prior to election day and to take over polling stations on 
election day itself.141 In this case what appears to have sparked a feud—which lasted 
almost a decade and wound up costing several lives—was an otherwise incidental taunt. 
At the time seventeen year-old Asadullah, Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s youngest half-brother 
whose reckless bravado rivalled that of Chowdri Rafiq, was campaigning on behalf of 
his elder brother. At one stage during the campaign some of Chowdri Ghulam Ali 
Midhiana’s men encountered Asadullah and began to taunt him, telling him that his 
elder brother was about to lose the upcoming elections. The taunt led to an argument 
and eventually culminated in Asadullah shooting and killing three of Ghulam Ali 
Midhiana’s supporters. Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana started a court case against 
Asadullah over the incident, which eventually led to further fighting between his men 
and Asadullah. Two more of Midhiana’s men would be shot and killed in the course of 
it.
buffalos away to the Frontier Province, where their owners would be unable to trace them, and he was 
also widely rumoured to own a place where he could hide stolen buffalos in a sparsely populated area 
bordering the Jhelum River. His personal farm in Mid Gondal boasted several hundred buffalos that 
grazed on open pastures.
141 See Chapter Five.
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Thanks in part to his elder brother’s protection Chowdri Asadullah was able to 
spend almost seven years as a fugitive before he was caught and sentenced to death. 
Chowdri Asadullah’s nephews, who seem to have been fond of Western movies, told 
me that throughout this period Asadullah had lived like a ‘deperado’, spending his time 
in hideouts with his faithful retainers. In the meantime Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana 
and his men had been looking for opportunities to take revenge (ibadla), meaning that 
for about fifteen years Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali rarely travelled 
without a contingent of at least three gunmen. In his quest for revenge Chowdri Ghulam 
Ali Midhiana found an ally in Chowdri Abdullah.
In the early stages of their alliance Chowdri Abdullah had supported Chowdri 
Ghulam Ali Midhiana during elections by providing him and his allies with votes from 
amongst his numerous clients and dependants. Because it was shared enmity rather than 
kinship or friendship ties that united the two parties however, Chowdri Abdullah’s 
motivation for supporting Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana was not based on a desire to 
make him more powerful per se. His main motivation was simply to prevent Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali from winning elections as well as to obtain some degree of political 
patronage from a powerful politician. In fact according to many people it was actually 
against Chowdri Abdullah’s interests for Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana to become too 
powerful: people said that his ultimate goal was to eliminate both Ghulam Ali Midhiana 
and Chowdri Mazhar Ali from the political scene in order to emerge as the most 
powerful politician in the area himself.
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In this hothouse Chowdri Mazhar Ali claimed that in 1998 Chowdri Abdullah 
had managed to make him unwittingly grant protection to a group of wanted men who 
planned to launch an attack on Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana and murder him.
Chowdri Abdullah’s basic plan was to eliminate Ghulam Ali Midhiana and to entangle 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali in a court case for having harboured the men who killed him. In 
the event, Chowdri Abdullah managed to get a group of wanted men—who had their 
own grudge against Midhiana—to ask one of Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s clients for 
protection from the police. Chowdri Abdullah knew that this client would then ask 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali to provide them with a place to hide.145 Chowdri Mazhar Ali 
complied with his client’s request and allowed the wanted men to hide at his dera where 
it was assumed, because he was still a provincial minister at the time, the police would 
not intrude. In the end, however, Chowdri Abdullah’s plan failed when the police did in 
fact raid Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s dera and arrested the men before they could launch their 
attack on Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana. Nevertheless, Chowdri Abdullah appears to 
have been partially successful because the incident caused Chowdri Mazhar Ali to 
become temporarily embroiled in a police case.
It would take the military takeover by General Musharraf some months later to 
achieve, at least in part, what Chowdri Abdullah had been unable to accomplish through 
his own devices. Chowdri Mazhar Ali became entangled in a variety of NAB cases on 
several corruption charges (see Chapter Two) and remained out of office for the nine 
years that General Musharraf was in power. This situation provided Chowdri Abdullah 
with an invaluable opportunity to strengthen his own political clout further at the 
expense of Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Haq Nawaz. Shortly before that
145 The individual in question was a friend of both Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Abdullah. 
He was not as powerful as Chowdri Mazhar Ali and could not have personally granted the wanted men 
any significant form of protection.
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happened, however, Chowdri Abdullah’s brother Rafiq lost his life. Several Gondals 
believed that the encounter with the police which caused his death had been 
orchestrated by Chowdri Mazhar Ali, who was particularly keen to get rid of the 
intrepid young man and thereby weaken the Lambar Ke faction.
The political realignments that resulted from General Musharraf s takeover 
provided Chowdri Abdullah with an opportunity to move out of the opposition and to 
join forces with the newly formed ruling coalition, and he aligned himself with Chowdri 
Khuda Baksh Mekan who was now an opponent of Chowdri Mazhar Ali. Prior to 
General Musharraf s takeover Chowdri Khuda Baksh Mekan and Chowdri Mazhar Ali 
had been allies in the PML-N, and had supported each other in the 1997 elections. This 
alliance, like many others described in this chapter, had been based on a temporary 
coincidence of interests and wasn’t firmly rooted in either close kinship or friendship 
ties. As a result, when Chowdri Khuda Baksh Mekan shifted over to the PML-Q 
following General Musharraf s takeover, and Chowdri Mazhar Ali remained in 
opposition in the PML-N, they naturally and immediately became political opponents.
In addition to aligning himself with Chowdri Khuda Baksh Mekan Chowdri Abdullah 
also aligned himself with Chowdri Zahid Iqbal Awan, who had also joined the ruling 
coalition and who, as shown in chapter two, was a longstanding enemy of Chowdri 
Mazhar Ali. Chowdri Abdullah was once again making alliances with outsiders against 
kin. The fact that Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana didn’t join forces with the ruling 
coalition meant that Chowdri Abdullah ceased to support him politically. Moreoever the 
possibility of an alliance between Mazhar Ali was eventually made even more unlikely 
when Chowdri Nawaz Ali established a truce with Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana after
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agreeing to support him in the future elections and paying him blood-money (diyat) for 
the murders committed by Asadullah.146
The truce resulted in the release from jail of Asadullah, put an end to hostilities 
between Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana, and even resulted in 
an agreement to join forces against the ruling PML-Q with which Chowdri Abdullah 
was now aligned. Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana agreed to 
support each other in the local council elections of 2005 as well as in upcoming 
provincial and national assembly elections. At one stage there were even rumours that 
the alliance between the two would be consolidated through a marriage between 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s son and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana’s daughter. In this 
manner two longstanding enemies affiliated with traditionally opposed political parties 
(the PPP and the PML-N) joined forces against the PML-Q, thereby reducing the 
number of local political groupings from three to two.
The forging of the new political alliance between Chowdri Ghulam Ali 
Midhiana and Chowdri Mazhar Ali fit the model noted above of a temporary 
coincidence of interests resulting from shared opposition to a third party. Despite the 
fact that the leaders of the two factions began to assert that they were brothers by virtue 
of belonging to the same extended Gondal lineage, their long history of enmity and 
conflict meant that they continued to distrust each other intensely. Chowdri Asadullah, 
who had ignited the feud between his half-brother Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri 
Midhiana, couldn’t fully reconcile himself to the alliance and his elder siblings tried to 
keep him away from the negotiations with Midhiana in case old tensions were revived. 
For their parts Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Nawaz Ali didn’t fully trust Chowdri
146 Under this settlement Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana agreed to receive twenty-five acres of 
land from Ghulam Ali as compensation for the murders. Although many details of the agreement 
remained secret it appears to have been facilitated by another political figure in Sargodha who had an 
interest in uniting the two parties in order to defeat Khuda Baksh Mekan in upcoming elections.
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Ghulam Ali Midhiana either, whom they believed still harboured grudges against them. 
More than that perhaps, they were aware that the coincidence of interests that emerged 
from General Musharraf s military takeover might not last forever. Since both Chowdri 
Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana remained loyal to their respective 
political parties they recognised that they were likely to become opponents once 
Musharraf and the PML-Q were out of office and the PPP and the PML-N resumed 
hostilities in their bid to gain political power. A more immediate obstacle to their 
alliance related to whether they would be able to agree on what offices Chowdri Nawaz 
Ali and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana would run for. Although they cooperated during 
the local council elections of 2005 they feared that tensions might arise over who would 
run for the local provincial assembly seat in the upcoming elections. The concern arose 
from the fact that Musharraf s government ruled that members of legislative assemblies 
must hold bachelor’s degrees. As a result they had agreed that Chowdri Nawaz Ali, who 
had a degree in law, would run for the provincial assembly seat while Chowdri Ghulam 
Ali Midhiana, who was illiterate, would run for the seat of tehsil nazim for which no 
degree was required. However, it was expected that these educational requirements 
might soon be scrapped.147 This would present a problem for the alliance because it 
might cause Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana to want to run for the seat in the provincial 
legislature, creating a clash over it with Chowdri Nawaz Ali.
Conclusions
In line with Barth’s analysis of Swat Pathan society the principal conclusion to 
emerge from this chapter is that enmity could be a more powerful force in the creation 
of alliances between big landlord-politicians than extended kinship ties in the form of
147 The rule that only people with bachelor’s degrees could run in elections for the legislative 
assemblies was widely held to have been designed by Musharraf s government in order to selectively 
prevent certain candidates from running. Members of the opposition demanded that the rule be scrapped 
as it excluded the vast majority of Pakistanis.
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the biraderi. This was illustrated by demonstrating that what had historically held the 
Gondals of Bek Sagrana together was their opposition to the politically dominant 
Makhdooms rather than corporate unity arising from shared ties of descent. So long as 
the Makhdooms had been politically dominant it had been in the interest of the Gondals 
of Bek Sagrana to set aside their differences in order to overtake them politically. 
However, following the decline of the Makhdooms fault lines between the Gondals 
gradually became more distinct until eventually, in the early 1990s, internecine conflict 
erupted between the leading Gondal households of the two village factions. As in 
Barth’s analysis of the Swat Pathans the fault lines that emerged within the Gondal 
biraderi were the result of agnatic rivalry arising from competition for local dominance. 
However, in contrast to the situation in Barth’s analysis, the conflict in this case was not 
between paternal first cousins but rather between more distantly related agnates. Here 
there was no evidence to suggest that conflict between paternal first cousins fighting 
over land (as was the case in Swat) was a widespread structuring principle of rural 
Punjabi society. In fact there appears to have been a broad range of political 
configurations among different villages. While in villages dominated by a single 
biraderi, as in Bek Sagrana, conflict might take place between agnates with varying 
degrees of genealogical proximity between them, in other villages with two zamindar 
biraderis conflict might predominantly follow biraderi-based cleavages. Other villages 
might even possess more than two factions.
It was also shown that, as in Barth’s model, the control over land was an 
important source of conflict since a landlord’s power and client base partly depended 
upon land ownership. Unlike in Barth’s model, however, which assumes a stateless 
society, another important source of conflict in this case revolved around gaining 
control over access to the state through competition to gain the votes of villagers.
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Political office, like land, was an important source of power and could increase the 
client base of leaders by permitting them to dispense patronage and to acquire new 
clients accordingly. Nevertheless, in relation to this the description of village factional 
leadership also demonstrated that generosity and patronage were important factors in 
determining the following that a leader acquired, a situation which was paralleled by 
Barth’s Swat Pathans. Thus the fact that Chowdri Abdullah was a more generous and 
better patron than his village rival Chowdri Haq Nawaz made him the more popular 
factional leader in the village. Another important factor that strongly emerges from the 
description of leadership in Bek Sagrana, and which is also implicit in Barth’s analysis 
of the creation of a following, relates to the need for leaders to be forceful. Through 
their forcefulness leaders could increase their wealth and landholdings and thereby 
increase their capacity for patronage. They could also protect their interest and those of 
their clients against enemies, including in this case the often predatory Punjab police. 
Largely absent from Barth’s analysis, however, is the role of forcefulness in the 
coercion of clients and the creation of fear. For Barth clients in Swat were largely free 
to choose whom they followed, but as this chapter indicated and following chapters will 
demonstrate, forceful leaders could coerce followers through the threat of sanctions and 
violence. The following two chapters will demonstrate how the use and the threat of 
coercion and violence and were often employed by landlords to secure the votes and 
labour of landless clients.
The second section of this chapter sought to illustrate the role of enmity between
village factional leaders in determining their political alliances. It was shown that
factional leaders almost invariably became the allies of the enemies of their enemies.
Because the only thing that held many of these alliances together was a temporary
sharing of interests based on a shared enmity they were often short lived. For example,
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the alliance between Chowdri Abdullah and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana was 
instrumentally based on their joint enmity with Chowdri Mazhar Ali and not on a desire 
to see each other succeed; indeed, as was noted, according to many people Chowdri 
Abdullah secretly harboured a desire for and plotted the demise of Chowdri Ghulam Ali 
Midhiana. The temporarily instrumental nature of the alliance was further demonstrated 
when it fell apart shortly after General Musharraf took over in 1999. The alliance that 
then emerged between Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana was 
equally provisional as there was little love lost between both parties after a long history 
of enmity that had cost money and land as well as several lives. In this case their 
alliance was based on a common desire to counter the new government. Once that 
government fell, however, there was a distinct possibility that the alliance might fall 
apart.148
The highly instrumental nature of many political alliances raises the question of 
exactly what role kinship played in their creation in rural Punjabi politics. The chapter 
demonstrated that the extended biraderi was generally not the basis for political 
decision-making among powerful landlord politicians. Instead it was shown that close 
kinship ties, including those between male siblings and those between close relatives 
united by marriage ties, were often at the core of political factions. The political 
significance of cooperation between male siblings was clearly illustrated by the case of 
Chowdri Abdullah and his brothers. The fact that Chowdri Abdullah belonged to a set 
of four forceful brothers played a decisive role in the political success of his faction.
This gave him an advantage over Chowdri Haq Nawaz who, following the death of his 
younger brother, was left with only his older, who preferred to keep his distance from 
politics. Nevertheless, Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s close and variously intertwined kinship
148 The only thing that might have helped hold the political alliance together would have been the 
additional establishment of a marriage alliance.
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relations with Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his siblings permitted him to retain his influence 
in the village.149
Following Hamza Alavi (1972) the material presented can also be taken to 
indicate that the political role of the extended biraderi varied according to the socio­
economic rank of its members. Alavi argued that the least cohesive biraderis were those 
that were economically and politically dependent upon the landlords. Their dependency 
meant that they were unable to create horizontal ties of solidarity amongst themselves. 
Similarly he argued that biraderi solidarity tended to be weak amongst big landlords. 
The reason for this was that such landlords didn’t need to rely on their extended biraderi 
for political support but could instead rely upon their clients, retainers, and economic 
dependants for it. In contrast, the most cohesive biraderis were those of economically 
independent landholders. Their economic independence meant that they could unite and 
assert their interests against those of the bigger landlords. These biraderis often voted as 
a block, and powerful landlord-politicians spent a great deal of time trying to gain their 
votes during elections. In accordance with this analysis it is arguably the case that the 
Gondal biraderi of Bek Sagrana had been more cohesive before the political and 
economic fortunes of certain of its individual members began to soar. Earlier the 
Gondals of Bek Sagrana had depended upon each other in order to achieve political 
influence and combat the Makhdooms. This changed when people like Chowdri Nawaz 
Ali, Chowdri Mazhar Ali and Chowdri Abdullah acquired greater power and wealth, 
allowing them to consolidate their personal client bases and depend less upon other Bek 
Sagrana Gondals to assert their political power.
149 This having been said, it should be noted that there were cases in which brothers could be 
political rivals. One famous instance involved two Gondal politicians from the area who, because of a 
dispute over their inheritance, had become fierce political rivals. However, cases such as these appear to 
have been uncommon and were met with strong disapproval.
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The findings of this chapter are important for understanding the political 
sociology of the Pakistani Punjab because they shed light upon some of the reasons that 
so few candidates in the central and northern Punjab win decisive victories even when 
their biraderi is the numerically dominant one in the area. As Wilder puts it, “...because 
nearly every village is divided into factions, and these are often linked into larger 
factional groupings, their cumulative effect can be great. This poses a challenge to 
political parties seeking to increase their support in rural constituencies. No matter 
which candidate is selected, strong opposition is virtually guaranteed by rival factions” 
(Wilder 1999: 177). The localisation of politics has therefore not necessarily led to an 
increased importance of extended biraderi ties in politics. Instead it might be argued (as 
was done in chapter two) that the localisation of politics has consolidated the 
importance of personal local enmities in determining people’s political allegiances.
Thus the principal concerns that align rural politicians are not related to particular social 
and political agendas but rather their local enmities. If anything, the weakness of 
political parties and the localisation of politics described in the previous chapter has led 
to increasingly dynastic politics where wealthy extended households pool their various 
resources together in order to capture political office jointly.
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Chapter Four: Patronage and Coercion
The previous chapter focused on the issue of how factionalism divided dominant 
landowning biraderis and showed that political mobilisation didn’t necessarily follow 
extended biraderi lines. It was argued the that, following Barth and Alavi, what made it 
possible for agnates to oppose each other was the fact that the bulk of a patron’s 
supporters was gained from within the ranks of dependent client groups, including 
artisans and tenants. As a consequence, factions were never made up of a single biraderi 
but were instead a loose coalition of individuals belonging to different families. This 
chapter deals with the question of how the political allegiance of these subordinate 
social groups was established. More specifically, it analyses the elements of coercion 
and patronage involved in the creation of vertical ties of allegiance between these 
subordinate social groups and the landlords.
Whereas Barth argued that the allegiance of subordinate groups, including 
tenants and artisans, was gained by leaders through the dispensation of generosity and 
patronage, it will be shown here that coercion also played a significant role. In doing so 
this chapter addresses some of the omissions that result from Barth’s rational choice 
framework for the analysis of political coalitions in Swat. Asad (1972) famously 
critiqued Barth’s model of Swat society on the basis that it depicted subordinate clients 
as freely entering contractual alliances with leaders in order to obtain protection and 
patronage. Asad claimed that underlying this model was a Hobbesian view of society 
whereby individuals freely assent to the rule of a sovereign in order to escape the 
perpetual conflict and insecurity that would exist in the absence of a sovereign 
government. However, according to Asad Barth’s material indicates that the basis of 
leadership in Swat was in fact based not so much on individual choice as upon class
domination by the Pakhtun chiefs. Thus Asad argues that the horizontal cleavages 
dividing Swat society into landed and landless classes were in fact more important for 
an understanding of the Swat political system than were the vertical blocs described by 
Barth. Asad writes,
.. .this is not to say that vertical bonds between landlord and tenant are of no social consequence 
in Swat, but only that such bonds derive their special character from the horizontal class 
divisions—i.e. they are bonds of solidarity between members of exploiting and exploited classes, 
between those who are able to exercise significant political choice and those who are not (Asad 
1972: 85).
With this observation in mind, this chapter examines the nature of the relationship
between the exploited and the exploiting classes in the village of Bek Sagrana. It shows
that in order to understand the political system of rural central Punjab it is indeed crucial
to understand the horizontal class cleavages existing between landed and landless
segments of the population. The chapter therefore illustrates the various ways in which
the economic and political choices of subordinate social groups are circumscribed by
the economic and political power of the landlords.
However, in addition to recognising the importance of ‘horizontal’ class
cleavages this chapter also seeks to highlight the importance of the vertical ties between
the exploiting and the exploited classes and the way in which these ties consolidated the
dominance of the exploiting class. They did so by preventing the emergence of an
assertive proletarian class in a context where, as a result of changes in the local
economy, landless villagers and artisans were increasingly turning to wage labour to
sustain their livelihoods. In Barth’s account of Swat political mobilisation retained a
strong vertical, factional, character. In this chapter I argue that the same thing applied in
the village of Bek Sagrana despite the fact that an increasingly commercial society had
led many former artisans and sharecroppers to become wage labourers. The main
question that I address relates to why labourers in the area of Bek Sagrana continued to
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be attached to the landlords through relationships of patronage and coercion, with the 
result that they did not assert themselves as a class. In exploring the relationships of 
patronage and coercion between labourers and landlords the widespread existence of 
bonded labour in the Pakistani Punjab will be a particular focus.
Bonded Labour and Worker Assertiveness150
In its World Labour Report of 1993, the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) described the problem of bonded labour in Pakistan as among the worst of its 
kind in the world (ILO 1993). According to a 1994 estimate by the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan, around twenty million people worked as bonded labourers in 
agriculture, brick kilns, fisheries, construction and domestic service (HRCP 1995: 120). 
Reports suggest that bonded labour is most widespread in agriculture and most coercive 
in areas of southern Punjab and interior Sindh provinces where land distribution is 
particularly unequal.151 Landlords in these areas are known to have maintained private 
jails where labourers were kept locked up and guarded by armed men at night, and sent 
to labour in the fields by day. Female labourers were frequently sexually assaulted by 
landlords and their strongmen as well as by the police, who were complicit in the 
maintenance of these jails. In 1991, in a widely publicised case, the army raided the
1 ^9private jail of a major landlord in Sindh and released 295 labourers.
In the central Punjab district of Sargodha where I carried out my research, there 
were no private jails and I didn’t hear of anyone operating any in the recent past.
150 Similar issues to those covered in this chapter appear in a paper by the same author entitled 
‘The Political Economy of Bonded Labour in the Pakistani Punjab’ (Martin 2009).
151 See K. Lieten and J. Breman (2002) for an account of bonded labour in rural Sindh. Their 
work focuses principally on Hindu Hari sharecroppers in Sindh where sharecropping remains more 
widespread than in the Punjab.
152 See Human Rights Watch (1995) for an account of this event. The Human Rights Watch 
report quotes newspaper articles stating that this jail was one of twelve such jails in the Sanghar district of 
Sindh.
Nevertheless debt-bondage, whereby labourers could spend an entire lifetime working 
under abusive conditions in order to repay a landlord’s loan, was widespread. 
Furthermore my data largely confirm reports that the practice was often characterised by 
the threat and use of physical and other forms of coercion by landlords. Although debt- 
bondage was formally banned under Pakistani law, it operated with the tacit as well as 
active cooperation of the police and other authorities. In addition to exploring the 
element of coercion involved in debt-bondage, an aspect generally emphasised by the 
ILO and human rights groups, debt-bondage also relies on an element of patronage. 
However, contrary to what is argued in some of the literature on the topic, patronage 
doesn’t usually mitigate the exploitative aspects of debt-bondage, even though it does 
allow for acts of benevolence by landlords.
The landlords’ role as patrons in a village in the central Punjab stemmed from 
their monopoly over local state institutions, economic resources and the means of 
physical coercion. This monopoly worked to make the rest of the village population 
dependent upon them for their basic welfare and security as well as their livelihoods. 
Furthermore, the landlords’ exclusive control over resources enabled them to extend 
assistance strategically, deploying it in the idiom of generosity and patronage in order to 
obtain votes and labour and, in the process, further strengthen their stranglehold over 
villagers. Thus despite the paternalistic ideology of generous care and protection 
invoked by the landlords, the extension of patronage to labourers was frequently used as 
a means to secure cheap and permanent labour.
That having been said, it must also be recognised that there were villages in the 
central Punjab where both power and land were somewhat more equally distributed than 
in Bek Sagrana. This was the case, for example, in some canal colony settlements 
(chaks) of the Sargodha district, as well as in much of the more industrial northern
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Punjab where landholdings and political power were more fragmented. But the evidence
does suggest similarities between Sargodha and areas of southern and western Punjab
1where political power and landownership were more concentrated.
The widespread existence of debt-bondage in certain areas of the Pakistani 
Punjab where labour relations are characterised by economic and extra-economic forms 
of compulsion together with vertical ties of patronage raises a conceptual as well as 
political question: In this context, is it meaningful to talk about the emergence of a 
proletarian class, a social group characterised by two kinds of freedom—freedom from 
the ownership of private property and freedom to sell its labour power in exchange for 
wages? In the literature on debt-bondage, the question of class formation assumes 
political significance because, by virtue of being free from personalised ties of 
dependence, proletarians are supposed to be able to develop horizontal ties of allegiance 
and unite in order to overthrow their oppressors.154
While the decline of sharecropping consequent upon the introduction of citrus 
orchards in the 1970s and the demise of traditional village occupations due to the 
availability of industrially-manufactured goods have brought about partial 
proletarianisation, attempts at political resistance by labourers remain isolated and 
fragmented. Labourers in the Pakistani Punjab are still largely the de facto political
153 See Wilder’s (1999) chapter three for a general description of the geography and political 
economy of the different regions of the Punjab.
154 In the Indian context authors such as Patnaik (1985) and Brass (1999) argue that forms of 
labour attachment involving coercion are still widespread and deprive labourers of proletarian status. The 
result of this is that they cannot challenge their own subordination. On the other hand writers such as 
Rudra (1994), Prakash (1990) and Breman (1993,1974) argue that rural labourers in India are, 
increasingly, proletarians in a capitalist system. This means that the relationship between them and their 
employers is increasingly one which is devoid of both coercion and patronage. For Breman the assertion 
of the continuity of historical forms of bonded labour in modem day Gujarat ignores the “materialistic 
and ideological changes that have occurred between landowners and landless in the countryside in South 
Gujarat” (Breman 1993: 311). He argues that the onset of commercial agriculture and the expansion of 
the Indian state have largely eliminated the elements of both patronage and coercion that used to 
characterise the relationship between Anavil Brahmin landlords and their Dubla labourers and servants 
previously. The result is that employers can no longer enforce debt bondage and that labourers have 
become increasingly assertive towards employers.
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subjects of landlords who frequently occupy high ranking government positions and 
have personal ties of allegiance reaching up to the highest levels of the State. This 
means that labourers often cannot freely dispose of their own labour power and are in a 
weak position to combat their own oppression. The process of proletarianisation is 
complicated by political factors such that class formation is not the inevitable outcome 
of changes in economic relations. As a result, class formation in the Pakistani Punjab 
has largely failed to take place and political mobilisation retains a vertical factional 
character which cuts across both caste and class. The effect of this is that labourers 
remain the political subjects of their local landlords and that vertical patron-client ties 
persist at the expense of horizontal ties of class.
Before analysing debt-bondage in rural Pakistani Punjab, it would be useful to 
examine briefly the political situation of labourers in India. A comparison of the labour 
situations in rural India and rural Pakistan sheds light on the larger issues of un-free 
labour and worker assertiveness and their relation to broader political and state 
processes. I take the literature from South Asia, and India in particular, as my main 
reference point given that the rural social structure of the Pakistani Punjab shares many 
of the characteristic features of the fertile plains of North India. Both areas are marked 
by high population densities, sharp inequalities in wealth and landownership, and status 
hierarchies. In spite of these broad similarities however, the present-day labour 
situations in India and Pakistan differ significantly and the explanation for these 
differences lies in the nature of the respective political processes that have characterised 
the two countries.
In India the deepening of competitive electoral politics and reservations for 
Other Backward Classes as well as for Scheduled Castes (SCs) have posed a serious 
challenge to traditional structures of authority and have curtailed the power of
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traditional landed elites to enforce debt-bondage and to coerce their labourers. Although
as Tom Brass’s work (1999) shows, the eradication of bonded labour may not have been
evenly achieved throughout India and persists in parts of north India, such as pockets of
Haryana, evidence from the neighbouring state of Uttar Pradesh suggests that
competitive electoral politics have curtailed the power of landed elites to enforce debt-
bondage. Thus for example Lerche and Jeffrey (2000) show how, in Uttar Pradesh, the
rise to power of the Dalit political leader Mayawati in 1995 and 1997 resulted in greater
assertiveness on the part of SC labourers. The authors show that Mayawati’s ascendance
forced the landed middle and upper castes to stop some of the more abusive and
exploitative practices towards SC labourers. Thus in one instance, a Chamar woman
from Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party managed to indict some Thakurs for paying
agricultural labourers below the stipulated minimum wage. Similarly, the molesting of
SC women by Jat landlords came to an end in certain villages. Although it may be
overhasty to assume that these developments are evenly distributed throughout Uttar
Pradesh, they are nevertheless significant and contrast sharply with the situation in the
Pakistani Punjab where the stranglehold of the traditional landed elite remains largely
unchallenged. Finally even in Bihar, India’s ‘lawless’ and caste ridden state, the
dominance of the upper caste Brahmins and Rajputs has been challenged by the rise to
power of the Other Backward Classes and leaders such as Laloo Yadav Prasad. Also, as
Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava and Veron (2005) show, years of Naxalite agitation in
Bhojpur district, Bihar, meant that SC groups were actively pressing for their rights and
had reached an ‘uneasy truce over agricultural pay and conditions’ (2005: 105).
Moreover they claim that slights to the honour of the Scheduled Castes could quickly
escalate into public confrontations. Thus although agricultural labourers from the
Scheduled Castes were still afflicted by chronic poverty and were largely excluded from
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governance, they were pressing for rights and empowerment in a way that their 
Pakistani counterparts were not.155
Landlords and servants: Economic and political power in Bek Sagrana
In chapter one, mention was made of the arrangement between kammis and their
various chowdri patrons known as seyp. As noted there, seyp arrangements traditionally 
served as the main source of income for many kammis. Barbers, for example, carried 
out weekly visits to a select number of chowdri patrons to cut hair. In addition to this 
barbers carried out a variety of different tasks for their patrons including cooking at life 
cycle ceremonies and religious celebrations, circumcising children, and delivering 
wedding invitations. Similarly other kammis carried out a number of tasks for their 
patrons in addition to their principal occupation. Carpenters did carpentry but they also 
carried wood used as fuel to the households of their patrons and dug graves when 
members of their patron households died. Kumhars traditionally made clay pots to carry 
water but they were also in charge of carrying the wheat from the fields to their patron’s 
household in a donkey cart. In this manner virtually every type of kammi carried out a 
variety of tasks for their various chowdri patrons in the village. In addition to carrying 
out these specified jobs, and as will be further illustrated below, kammis were often 
required to perform a variety of tasks for their patrons without payment. This was 
particularly the case for kammis who were house tenants of a landlord. Finally kammis 
also rendered services to each other in exchange for which they generally demanded no 
remuneration but largely expected the services rendered to be returned equivalently.
155 In addition several authors have pointed to the fact that the idea of equality has made 
important inroads into the popular consciousness of Indians. It has been argued that working towards 
equality through democratic means has promoted the transformation of caste as a system of interdepenent 
hierarchical social relations, as embodied by the Jajmani system, towards caste as a system of 
‘horizontal,’ disconnected groups, with their own distinct cultures. Dumont has described this process as 
the ‘substantialisation of caste’ (Dumont 1980: 226-27) while others have described this process as the 
‘ethnicisation of caste’ (Barnett 1975: 158-59; see also, Fuller 1996:22-25).
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Thus, for example, if a blacksmith fixed the metal tools of a carpenter he would expect 
the carpenter to reciprocate by fixing his charpais when they became unstable.
As noted in chapter one, the reason usually adduced for the ranking of certain 
kammis was related to the perceived quality of the occupation that they pursued.
Among the Mirasis, Pirhains and Mussallis it was the latter that were considered to have 
the lowest status. Part of the reason for this lay in the fact that the occupations that they 
pursued were perceived as requiring the least skill. Among other things these 
occupations included agricultural labour, construction, sweeping and domestic service 
for the landlords. In addition to this, like other kammis they engaged in seyp with 
various chowdri patrons in order to perform various tasks. These included covering the 
chaff and the straw collected during the wheat harvest with mud, preparing the mud to 
place on the roofs of traditional dwellings and preparing the strings that others then 
attached to charpais.156 Like other kammis they also fulfilled specific roles during life 
cycle ceremonies such as weddings and funerals during which they were in charge of 
the cooking fires as well as of preparing the hookahs.
The other reason for the particularly low status of the Mussallis was that they 
carried the stigma of the fact that prior to their conversion to Islam they had belonged to 
a Hindu sweeper caste known as Chuhras. Both Hindus and Muslims refused to eat with 
Chuhras because they removed night-soil and ate the impure flesh of animals such as 
pigs (khanzir). Reports suggest that many of them converted to Islam and Christianity in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in order to raise their social status. The 1888 
District Gazetteer for Sargodha reports that it was only after they converted to Islam and 
ceased to remove night-soil and eat forbidden (haraam) foods that other Muslims 
consented to eat with them. In recognition of their conversion they were renamed
1561 was told that it was the drummers (Pirhain) were traditionally the ones who placed the 
strings onto the wooden frame of charpais.
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Mussalli, an intended honorific that can be translated as ‘he who spends his time on the
1 ^7prayer mat.’ However despite the fact that the term Mussalli was originally one of 
honour it was nowadays practically a term of abuse and the Mussallis continued to carry 
some of the stigma of their formerly non-Muslim and untouchable status. Thus more 
than any other kammis the Mussallis were considered to be poor Muslims. Besides 
being thieving, deceitful and highly promiscuous they were said to be dirty, to live in 
overcrowded dwellings overrun with dogs and to be lax in performing daily prayers. 
Chuhras who had converted to Christianity rather than Islam fared worse and fully 
retained their low status. They also faced various discriminatory laws and social 
attitudes. While Muslims wouldn’t refuse to eat with those Chuhras who had converted 
to Islam they would often refuse to eat with those who had converted to Christianity, 
even barring them from public restaurants. There were also stories of Christians that 
were badly beaten because they polluted public water drinking facilities by drinking 
from them.158
In modem day Pakistani Punjab, however, the difference in status between 
Mussallis and other kammis isn’t always reflected in the occupations that they pursue. 
The availability of competitive, commercially produced goods has meant that many 
traditional artisanal occupations had become obsolete. The Kumhars in the village, for 
example, had entirely ceased producing the clay vessels that were traditionally used to 
hold drinking water. None of the village Mochis made shoes any longer, and only one 
of them dedicated himself to some semblance of his original craft by fixing cheap 
leather and plastic shoes from China. In addition, the advent of agricultural 
mechanisation meant that locally produced farm implements had largely been replaced 
by commercial machinery. Although some kammis had managed to transform their
157 The word mussalla refers to a prayer mat.
158 For an ethnographic account of Christian Punjabi sweepers in Karachi see Streefland (1979).
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traditional occupation into a successful business others had turned to both rural and 
urban wage labour.
In Bek Sagrana Tarkhans (carpenters) and Lohars (blacksmiths) had been among 
those successful in translating traditional occupations into viable cottage industries. The 
village Tarkhans lived in a joint household of eleven of which seven were able bodied 
siblings all dedicated to woodworking and furniture making. They continued to have 
seyp contracts with various chowdris but their large number meant that in addition to 
this they could produce furniture to sell in the market. Some of the elder siblings had 
obtained further training in Chiniot, a town renowned for its furniture making two hours 
away from the village by bus, and they were now producing increasingly sophisticated 
furniture. Some of the siblings had also made several trips to Islamabad where they had 
won contracts to do carpentry work in houses newly built for high ranking military 
officers. By 2006 when I left the village they owned several buffalos and a motorcycle 
and were planning on opening a furniture shop in the nearby market town. For their part 
the village Lohars had an even larger joint household of twenty of which seven where 
able bodied siblings. They too continued to have seyp contracts with various chowdris 
for fixing and sharpening a variety of metal farm implements159 but had additionally 
expanded their business by obtaining a welding machine, setting up a flour mill and 
expanding their sideline of installing hand pumps (nalka) for villagers. By 2006 they too 
had purchased a motorcycle and were supplementing their income by renting a total of 
ten acres of land from various chowdris.
Aside from the Tarkhans and the Lohars some other kammis had also been 
relatively successful at turning their traditional occupation into a business. One Nai 
(barber) for example had managed to set up a barber shop in Sargodha with some
159 They continued to make and sharpen the sickles (daatri) that people used for harvesting 
different crops and fodder.
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relatives and the help of a wealthy chowdri who allowed him to live in the out-building 
of a house that he owned and was renting out in Sargodha. A relative of the man who 
was also a Nai was the only person in the village to have migrated to the Persian Gulf 
where he worked in a barber shop in a town near Jeddah. In other villages I also heard 
of village tailors (<darzi) setting up tailoring businesses, cobblers (Mochis) setting up 
shoemaking businesses and even of Mirasis becoming popular singers and musicians.
However, in contrast to those artisans who had been able to translate their 
traditional occupations into viable businesses those who for whatever reason had not 
done so relied more and more on wage labour for subsistence. Consequently it was not 
uncommon to find Mussallis now working in the fields or as domestic servants side by 
side with Mochis, Kumhars, Machis, Mirasis and even impoverished Tarkhans and 
Lohars. Similarly many former tenants from agricultural (zamindar) biraderis that were 
displaced by mechanisation and the introduction of citrus orchards in the 1970s were 
also having to resort to wage labour and even debt-bondage. Although it continued to be 
Mussallis that were most commonly associated with wage labour and debt-bondage, the 
reality was that they were no longer alone in those things.
As previous chapters have shown the picture at the other end of the social
spectrum stood in sharp contrast to the gradual pauperisation of many kammis and
tenants. Besides privatised control over the means of coercion through the use of private
militias, the landowning Gondal chowdris backed their economic power with political
power through their control of access to various state institutions. As noted in chapter
one, members of the kammi biraderis were largely excluded from politics. Accordingly,
such positions as they might be able to achieve within state institutions were got
through the patronage and good will of a chowdri. Thus in Bek Sagrana many of the
village kammis who had obtained government jobs had done so during Chowdri Mazhar
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Ali’s various terms in office. As was shown in chapter one some chowdris did this in 
order to have servants that the state would pay for. In other cases however they granted 
government jobs to people in order to secure their political popularity and as a reward to 
faithful clients. In this manner, for example, a Nai who had worked faithfully for 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali was granted a position as Chowdkidar in the village school.
It was also noted earlier that villagers relied almost exclusively on personal 
contacts with Gondal patrons to mediate successfully their interactions with state 
institutions such as the police, the courts, hospitals and schools. If, for example, a 
person needed to file a complaint with the police in the form of a First Information 
Report (FIR) they needed to go through a chowdri. Without such patronage a kammi 
was likely to have to pay bribes in order to get the FIR filed.160 The chowdris could 
influence the police through their political, kinship or friendship connections within the 
police force itself. It was also widely known that various chowdris had connections with 
the police by virtue of their varied criminal activities, including buffalo theft, heroin 
trafficking and the smuggling of stolen cars, out of whose proceeds the police were 
known to take shares. As noted earlier, villagers lived in fear of the police. Some 
villagers avoided walking along the paved road leading to the nearby market town at 
night for fear that police patrols that occasionally drove by might try to extract bribes 
from them by arbitrarily arresting them on fabricated charges that they were planning a 
highway robbery. One Mirasi who was walking back from town late at night told me 
about how he hid in the nearby orchards when he saw a police van approaching. 
Villagers also told me about one occasion when, some ten years earlier, an unknown 
labourer who was working in the citrus harvest had died overnight. Apparently no one
160 In one instance the driver of one of the chowdris decided to personally place an FIR and 
between all the trips to the police station and bribes to the clerks he spent Rs.1500 which was the 
equivalent of a month’s wages.
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in the village had been willing to report this to the police for fear of being accused of 
being involved in murder. Eventually the villagers decided to send the nine year old son 
of the village Imam on the basis that the police were unlikely to cause problems for a 
child.161 There were also several cases when villagers had run away from their village 
homes when an unknown vehicle was seen approaching because they thought it might 
be a police car. It often turned out that the car had simply been that of a friend visiting 
one of the Gondal chowdris.
Throughout my stay in the village there were several cases when villagers 
sought refuge in the farmhouses of chowdris in order to escape the police. It was widely 
known that the police were highly unlikely to enter the house of a chowdri unless the 
chowdri in question had powerful enemies who were trying to deploy the police against 
him. In one instance, for example, a Mussalli who was being threatened with an FIR by 
a landless zamindar who accused him of playing with the honour (izzat) of his daughter 
hid in the farmhouse of Gondal chowdri for several days for fear that the police would 
come after him. In yet another instance a Tarkhan who had beaten someone up sought 
refuge in the farmhouse of another chowdri for several weeks.
To summarise, the discussion and evidence here and in preceding chapters 
indicate that the chowdris fully controlled the crossroads of political and economic 
influence at the local level, and in doing so delimited and determined the political and 
economic realities of the kammis through the chowdris’ own self-determined 
indispensability. As noted in chapter two, in contrast to the situation of the Anavil 
Brahmin landlords in Gujarat who retained only the coercive power inherent in wage 
relations, the Gondal chowdris of Bek Sagrana retained both private coercive power and 
political power, the latter stemming from their position as patrons with privileged access
161 The boy who by 2006 was almost twenty years old told me that he had been very frightened 
during his encounter with the police because had treated him gruffly and interrogated him extensively.
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to state resources. As the sole access points to state institutions their relationship with 
labourers and tenants had a strong and inherently political element to it. What’s more, 
the chowdris felt able to fall back on a paternalistic religious ideology both to justify 
their social prominence and lay claim to a higher moral and social status associated with 
it. Although, as will be further illustrated below, there had been an increase in free 
wage labour, and an expansion in the job opportunities beyond the village, labourers 
still had to approach the chowdris for credit and patronage during times of hardship. In 
what follows the circumstances that led labourers to seek patronage and employment 
with the Gondal chowdris will be further examined, along with the reasons that the 
Gondal chowdris actually extended patronage and credit to labourers. Finally the ways 
in which labourers who had taken loans were coerced into repaying them will be 
considered as well.
Wage Labour and Patronage
Becoming a farm or household servant attached to one of the Gondal chowdris 
was not an attractive option to most people. Nevertheless the seasonal variations in the 
availability of daily wage labour as well as the need for credit, to cover things such as 
large wedding or medical expenses, and other forms of patronage meant that servitude 
was an option that was resorted to frequently. It was well known that working for a 
chowdri was both physically and mentally exhausting. Servants were poorly paid and 
had to be at the constant beck and call of their masters who, as the servants often 
claimed, treated them like animals.
The highly seasonal demand for agricultural labour was largely the result of the 
widespread introduction of tangerine and orange orchards that began in the 1970s. This 
had also played an important role in reducing the area of land that the chowdris
162 See chapter six.
dedicated to sharecropping and causing many redundant sharecroppers to turn to wage 
labour as a result. The chowdris had introduced citrus because it was both more 
profitable and less labour intensive than other forms of cultivation, which had 
previously included sugarcane, wheat, cotton, maize, fodder crops, rice and vegetables. 
This allowed the chowdris to spend less time in the village overseeing agricultural tasks 
and village affairs and more time in the cities where their children were now being 
educated.
The greatest demand for labour in the citrus orchards occurred during the harvest 
season over the three months between the end of December and the end of March. A 
contractor (wapari) who purchased the fruit based on roughly estimated yields while it 
was still on the trees was in charge of organising the harvest. This included recruiting 
and organising labourers as well as transporting and selling the fruit. Depending on the 
size of the orchard and on the speed with which the contractor wanted to complete the 
harvest, citrus harvesting teams could comprise as many as forty people. Such teams 
comprised fruit pickers who climbed the trees, people to carry away the fruit in large 
wicker baskets and load the truck(s) and sometimes a group of people to sort the fruit 
according to grades of quality and box it. At this time of year it was common for 
various contractors and their teams of labourers to be working simultaneously in the 
orchards of different chowdris.
The chowdris had nothing to do with the process other than finding the 
contractor that offered them the best price for his services. During this time, therefore, 
labourers dealt directly with the contractors rather than with the chowdris. Fruit pickers 
earned between Tfo.100 and Tfo.120 per day making it possible for them to earn around 
Rs.2500 per month if they worked twenty-five days each month over the three months 
of the harvest. This was significantly more than what attached farm or domestic
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servants earned in monthly wages, and it was also more than what daily wage labourers 
could expect to earn throughout the rest of the year with the exception of the wheat 
harvesting season.
Outside of the harvest period, however, the demand for labour in the citrus 
orchards was relatively low and the chowdris or their managers (munshis) organised 
and recruited labour for the few tasks at hand without the assistance of a contractor. The 
orchards had to be irrigated throughout the year and in particular during the flowering of 
the trees in the spring, a task that was generally carried out by a single labourer, usually 
an attached farm servant. The orchards also had to be fertilised once a year and sprayed 
with pesticides about six times a year. These tasks were also frequently carried out by a 
farm servant and a few hired wage labourers who were paid a standard wage of Rs. 80 
per day. In addition, during the summer months, some labourers were hired to trim the 
trees and remove any dead branches that had not already been removed for firewood.
The second greatest demand for agricultural labour occurred shortly after the 
end of the citrus harvest for the wheat harvest that started around the middle of April. 
Although citrus provided the bulk of the Gondal chowdris’ agricultural income they all 
dedicated some of their land to wheat and fodder cultivation. It was possible to cultivate 
both of these crops in the citrus orchards when the trees were still relatively small and 
didn’t stop the sunlight from reaching the crops. For the most part, however, the 
chowdris saved some land solely for the cultivation of these crops. Wheat in the form of 
unleavened bread (roti) was the basic daily staple of ordinary villagers and chowdris 
alike and all households stored wheat to last them for the entire year if they could afford 
to do so. Additionally the chowdris kept an important amount of it in order to pay their
163 If the chowdri was wealthy enough to employ one.
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servants and the kammis who occasionally provided services to them and were paid 
fixed amounts of wheat on a yearly basis.
During the wheat harvest plots of land were allotted by the chowdris to teams of 
labourers of up to five people who were frequently, but not necessarily, close kin 
belonging to a single household. The work was known to be physically exhausting so 
only the able bodied took part in it, but it was also considered to be the most important 
and profitable work of the year. Teams of labourers were paid three maunds of wheat 
per acre harvested meaning that at a value of its.400 per maund a team of five labourers 
could make iis.250 per head if they harvested an acre a day. Although wheat could be 
sold and directly converted into cash most people stored it for consumption throughout 
the year and only occasionally sold some whenever they needed money.
Outside of the wheat and citrus harvests there was no time of the year when 
almost all of the villagers were working in the fields. People took up wage labour both 
in and out of agriculture and frequently found employment in construction and 
sometimes in factories in nearby industrial centres like Sialkot and Faisalabad. 
However, most of the labourers that I interviewed only took up industrial employment 
for a few months at a time and at most for a year or two. Although wages in industrial 
jobs were higher than those in agriculture living expenses in town were significantly 
higher than in the village where accommodation was free and food was less expensive. 
Also, industrial labourers had to live far from their families, who could not easily 
accompany them because of the cost of accommodation, and they were therefore 
frequently homesick. And, while young and unmarried men were free to go away 
labourers who were the heads of independent households were reluctant to leave their 
wives and children to fend for themselves in the village.
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Labourers from the various artisan biraderis as well as displaced agricultural 
tenants told me that the main benefit of free wage labour was that it allowed them to 
take advantage of the peaks in the agricultural cycle during the wheat and citrus harvests 
when daily wages were at their highest. Another benefit was that the economic 
compulsions of wage labour gave them a relatively greater degree of freedom than the 
extra-economic forms of compulsion that they were subject to if and when they became 
attached servants with a chowdri. Labourers could now find work with employers as far 
afield as Islamabad and their livelihoods no longer solely depended upon the Gondal 
chowdris of Bek Sagrana (who in any case spent each time more of their time living in 
cities). Both chowdris and kammis told me that as a consequence villagers were 
relatively freer from the influence of the Gondal chowdris than they had been in the 
past.
On the other hand, the disadvantage that labourers saw in free wage labour was 
that it could be difficult to find work on a daily basis outside of the peaks in demand 
between December and May. Free wage labourers also faced a significant degree of 
uncertainty as to whether and when employers with whom they didn’t have 
longstanding relationships would actually pay them. In addition to this free wage 
labourers faced greater difficulties than attached farm and domestic servants in 
obtaining patronage and loans, both small consumption loans as well as larger loans to 
cover wedding and medical expenses. Both the uncertainty of free wage labour and the 
need for patronage meant that many free wage labourers opted to become attached 
servants with the chowdris, sometimes out of necessity and at other times simply for the 
sake of security, despite lower wages and working conditions that were known to be 
exploitative and abusive.
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Figure 5: Labourers harvesting tangerines
Besides allowing them to take both small consumption and larger loans 
labourers also took up employment with the Gondal chowdris because it was supposed 
to entitle them to other forms of patronage including support in case of a dispute, 
mediation with state institutions and even help in retrieving an eloped wife or daughter. 
On their side, part of the reason that the chowdris extended such forms of patronage and 
gave labourers large loans was that they thereby ensured themselves a cheap and 
permanent supply of labour. This was important to them because in a great economic 
circularity permanent and reliable labour wasn’t readily available due to the reluctance 
of many labourers to work for them. Chowdris frequently complained that nowadays the 
only way to obtain labour was by giving loans and patronage. Many chowdris blamed 
this on the fact that the kammis had inflated job expectations as a result of a 
combination of education, television and easier access to urban centres. Until the time 
when the debt was fully repaid chowdris guaranteed themselves cheap labour at their
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beck and call by extending loans. Because of the Islamic prohibition on interest these 
loans were interest free. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, landlords still profited 
because extending the loans allowed them to reduce their workers’ wages. Debts could 
be repaid after weeks or after an entire generation depending upon both the size of the 
loan and upon whether the labourer had able bodied siblings that could help him in the 
process of repaying. For the chowdris having servants was also part of a display of 
status that demonstrated power and influence. Unlike in modem day Gujarat (Breman 
1993) having dependants in the Pakistani Punjab continues to play an important 
political function for the chowdris because servants, and especially gunmen, are 
frequently used to settle disputes with enemies (dushman) and because dependants more 
generally are mobilised for their votes during elections.
The sorts of labourers that the chowdris generally required and to whom 
therefore they saw particular advantage in extending loans and other forms of patronage 
were farm servants, domestic servants and drivers as well as gunmen. Depending upon 
the chowdri who employed them it was not uncommon for attached servants to end up 
having a combination of these duties. The most usual combination was of domestic and 
farm work, despite generally having being hired for either one or the other. Only in 
instances where they were hired by village factional leaders involved in politics was it 
usual for labourers to become gunmen, and only the wealthiest chowdris were likely to 
hire drivers.164 Farm work usually involved feeding and milking the livestock,165 
irrigating the orchards and the crops, sowing crops and driving the tractor. The domestic 
tasks that farm servants ended up having to attend to often included serving food and tea 
to the chowdris and their guests, cleaning, and being constantly sent on errands to fetch
164 Only six Gondal chowdris in the village and the surrounding area had drivers.
165 Most of the chowdris owned some livestock in the form of cows and buffaloes for the 
production of milk for domestic consumption.
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and buy things, frequently well into the night. Even though they might have their own 
house in the village, servants were frequently asked to stay the night in order to guard 
the livestock from roaming cattle thieves and to be on hand if the need for their services 
arose. Additionally attached servants had to work throughout the year; if they ever 
wanted a day off it was generally the case that they personally had to provide a 
replacement to work during their absence.
For all their labour farm and domestic servants rarely earned more than Tfa.1500 
per month plus eight maunds of wheat per year, two meals and a cup of tea a day, and at 
least one set of clothes per year on Eid. In total this amounted to roughly Rs. 18,000 per 
year or Rs.70 per day, which was less than the lowest wages of the agricultural cycle 
(usually around ifo.80 per day) and considerably less than peak daily agricultural wages 
earned during the citrus and wheat harvests. However if the servant happened to have a 
large debt his wages were often significantly lower at around its. 10,000 per year. It 
therefore appears that the reason that the chowdris extended loans to servants was 
because it allowed them to reduce their wages and thereby assure themselves a cheap 
and permanent supply of labour.
Child Servants and Patronage
The cheapest source of labour available to the chowdris was children as young 
as five years old. Poor households sometimes sent their children to work in the village 
or town homes of the chowdris. In exchange for their child parents either obtained some 
form of patronage, which might include a loan, or payments of around ifa.6000 per year. 
This practice was justified by the chowdris with the argument that they were doing the 
children and their families a great favour by hiring them because chowdris themselves 
would be able to provide for, protect and educate the children better than their parents 
would. One chowdri told me that the eleven year old girl that worked in his house in
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Lahore was there for the protection of her modesty (hayaa) because there were no adult 
males in her family to keep the young men of the village at bay. In most cases the 
chowdris told me that they took on such children in order for them to learn how to read 
the Holy Qur’an as well as how to read and write Urdu. However, for most villagers it 
went without saying that the children weren’t really gaining an education. Villagers 
knew the children were generally unhappy and homesick, and that they spent most of 
their time wearily washing dishes, carrying trays, sweeping floors and running errands. 
Those children who ended up in Lahore or in Sargodha often didn’t see their families 
for months on end. In fact many chowdris purposely avoided taking the children back to 
the village to visit their families because they claimed that these visits subsequently 
made them more homesick and less willing to work.
The mindless drudgery of the children’s work was clearly illustrated by the case 
of one seven year old Mussalli boy who worked for the wealthiest chowdri in the 
village. The child’s father had abandoned his family and left its members to fend for 
themselves. The child’s mother had started to work as a servant for a Gondal chowdri 
but had been unable to make ends meet and was compelled to take several loans from 
her master. Indebted and still short of money, she eventually accepted Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas’s offer to employ her son. Sufi Ahmed Abbas offered to pay her ifa.400 per 
month for her son’s labour and he also promised to feed, clothe and educate him. Even 
though her son would be required to spend most of his days and nights at Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas’s farmhouse, the fact that he would be nearby meant that she could occasionally 
see him in the little free time that she was granted by her own master. Moreover she 
consoled herself with the idea that Sufi Ahmed Abbas and his wife would be able to 
give him a better education than she ever could.
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The reality however was that her son spent little time studying. His working day 
started at around five in the morning when he was often sent laden with heavy breakfast 
trays, which he clearly struggled to carry, to the men’s house where guests were staying. 
The same tasks were often repeated at lunch and dinner times. Between these periods he 
was largely occupied carrying and fetching things for his masters. Like other chowdris, 
his masters preferred being served than doing things for themselves, which meant that 
there was almost no limit to the number of times he might be sent to fetch a glass of 
water, a cup of tea or a packet of cigarettes. I witnessed several instances when he 
would be called from another room in order to bring a glass of water that was only a 
couple of metres away from his master. He also spent so much time running around 
communicating messages between his master and different labourers that villagers came 
to refer to him affectionately as Nokia after the brand of mobile phone.
Needless to say the repetitive and mindless nature of the tasks that he was set 
meant that he often appeared weary and bored. As a result he was often careless and his 
masters frequently reprimanded him for it. By evening time he was generally exhausted 
and I often saw him fall asleep on the spot at the men’s house while guests were eating. 
Even though his mother lived close by he didn’t get so many opportunities to see her, 
and like other children in his situation he was often homesick. There were even fewer 
occasions when he could see his elder sister, who had also been placed with a family as 
a servant shortly after he had. For her part his sister had even fewer chances to see her 
mother since she lived in town. However her situation was mitigated by the fact that she 
lived with a pious middle class family who treated her with affection and appeared to be 
genuinely concerned with her education. Nevertheless, despite being treated relatively 
well she remained a servant and was not the equal of her masters’ children. While the
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other children went to school she spent her days working and studying at home, and 
while the other children played she often had to help out with domestic chores.
Attitudes of class difference and discrimination towards the servant children
were passed from the chowdris and their wives to their own children. Frequently the
children of the households were told that the child servants were jangli, meaning wild
and ill-mannered. As a result the children of the chowdris quickly came to look down
on the children who worked in their homes. On one occasion an eight year old
chowdrani, who appeared to be piqued by the fact that I was giving more attention to
the young boy servant than to her, told me that the boy servant was ill-mannered, dirty,
lazy and stupid and went on to explain that such was true of Mussallis generally. In
addition, chowdris rarely reprimanded their children if they struck a child servant in a
quarrel for example, but they were quick to reprimand a child servant if he or she had
hit their child under similar circumstances. As a result young masters quickly learned
that they were in a position of power and knew that they could get away with treating
their servants badly. For their part, child servants often grew resentful of their masters
and vented their feelings in a variety of ways. I once caught the young boy who was
described by his young mistress as ill-mannered and stupid aggressively slapping and
pinching the two year old child of his master after being left alone with it. Given the
way that he was treated around the house and his generally unhappy appearance, it is
not unreasonable to assume that he was venting feelings of anger and discontent upon
the only member of the household who was not in a position of power over him. Others
vented their discontent in different ways. One twelve year old boy told me about how
when he had been a servant as a small child he would purposely run up large phone bills
on his master’s phone by calling a friend of his in town. The same boy told me that
when in the early mornings his masters would call him he pretended to remain asleep in
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order to waste time. He also told me that on the few occasions when his masters brought 
him to stay with his family in the village for a few days he would go into hiding on the 
day that he was due to go back to Lahore.
It is clear from the evidence that even in the best cases servant children had a 
hard time. Adults who had been child servants almost unanimously told me that they 
didn’t wish their children to go through the same experiences that they had despite the 
bonds of mutual understanding that almost inevitably developed between them and their 
masters. Those who spent their entire childhoods and in some cases their entire adult 
lives as servants were effectively inferior members of their masters’ families. As family 
members of a sort, long-serving child servants developed some emotional attachment 
with the families but these ties were rarely unqualified feelings of affection and were 
most often strongly tinged with resentment. Such mixed feelings probably arose in large 
measure from the fact that while their masters inevitably took on the role of parental 
figures for them on one hand, as parental figures their masters were often demanding 
and unloving on the other. The fact that masters were parental figures for their child 
servants was underlined linguistically when servants who had been raised by their 
masters compared them to fathers and mothers (maa aur baap). It was also underlined 
by the fact that child servants often acquired the habits and mannerisms of their masters. 
In fact villagers often commented that the behaviour of close servants resembled that of 
their masters.
The most striking example of this in Bek Sagrana was provided by a close 
servant of Chowdri Mazhar Ali’s younger brother Chowdri Arif. The servant, named 
Bashir, came from a poor Machi family and had worked with Chowdri Arif and his 
family between the ages of eight and twenty-eight. Even once he had ceased being 
formally employed by Chowdri Arif he maintained a relationship with him. He often
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visited Chowdri Arif in his farmhouse and performed odd jobs for him. What was 
striking about Bashir was the degree to which Chowdri Arifs influence upon him as a 
parental role model was visible. Bashir had inherited many of the marked mannerisms 
of his master and could easily have been taken for his son. The resemblance between 
master and servant was such that villagers jokingly referred to Bashir as Chowdri Arif. 
Bashir explained to me that it was inevitable that he should have come to resemble his 
master after serving him day and night for twenty years. He had shared the intimate 
daily routines of Chowdri Arif and his family and knew all of the family’s quarrels, 
vices and secrets, including the many secrets that members of Chowdri Arif s family 
kept from each other.166 Such shared secrets obviously added to the intimacy between 
Bashir and his masters, but despite this intimacy and some material benefits Bashir felt 
that his time spent as a servant had not been worth it. This was the case even though 
Bashir could approach his masters for patronage and that Chowdri Arif had helped him 
to buy a rickshaw after his term of employment had ended. Bashir claimed that Chowdri 
Arif had tricked him into becoming his servant when he was eight by promising to teach 
him how to drive. Had it not been for this trick Bashir claims that he would not have 
voluntarily left his family. Although he eventually did learn how to drive he spent most 
of his childhood doing tiresome household chores. He complained that his masters had 
often slapped him and that Chowdri Arif frequently punished him in the manner of 
schoolmasters by making him squat down and hold his ears with his arms under his legs 
(kaan pakarna). He also complained that Chowdri Arif, who was a notoriously stingy 
man, had generally made sure that his wife served him only leftovers of food and very 
little meat.
166 For example, he knew that both Chowdri Arif and his eldest son drank alcohol and frequented 
prostitutes.
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Another villager who regretted his childhood as a servant was Bilal Mirasi. He 
was frequently singled out by villagers as an example of the psychological damage
I
suffered by child servants. Bilal Mirasi, or Ballu as he was nicknamed, had started to 
work for Chowdri Mahmood Abbas at the age of five following his father’s death. He 
continued to work for him until he was twenty. Afterward, like Bashir, he had 
maintained contact with his masters and occasionally worked for them. For example he 
would sometimes accompany Sufi Ahmed Abbas’s younger son when he travelled to 
visit friends. Like other child servants he had performed mindless work for long 
hours throughout his childhood. However, unlike Bashir, he had acquired few skills that 
might help him find employment in the wider world. While Bashir had learned how to 
read and drive, Bilal had learned nothing and remained illiterate.
Villagers commented that because Bilal had been treated as if he had no 
feelings, like an animal (janvaar), he had grown up to be useless as well as mentally 
damaged (pagal). They claimed that it was because of this that Bilal was unable to work 
consistently and spent his days smoking marijuana. As a result he was unable to provide 
for his children, who went around dressed in rags. His reputedly peculiar sense of logic 
was also used as evidence of the damage that had been done to him. People additionally 
observed that the damaging hardship that he had endured as a child wasn’t even 
mitigated later by any significant form of patronage from his former masters. As 
evidence, villagers cited the fact that Bilal was one of the poorest men living around the 
farmhouse (dera) of Sufi Ahmed Abbas. Bilal lived in a mud hut with a single bedroom 
that had almost no furniture. The hut remained unconnected to the electrical grid
167 Kammis and servants were often given nicknames so that a name like Qasim became Qasu, 
Mehmood became Mooda, Ghulaam Ali became Gamma and Bilal became Ballu. Chowdris on the other 
hand were always called by their full names and were additionally addressed with the honorific term 
chowdri when they were being addressed by subordinates.
168 This could sometimes be lucrative because his master’s friends occasionally gave him gifts of
money.
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because Bilal couldn’t afford the bills. His former masters rarely offered him assistance 
and showed little concern for his children, who ran around naked or in rags with faces 
caked in mud and mucus. Once when Bilal’s eldest son suffered a severe electric shock 
from a faulty fan (pankah) Sufi Ahmed Abbas offered no help in getting the child to a 
doctor. Instead it was the village mullah, who lived near Bilal but didn’t possess even a 
fraction of the wealth and influence of Sufi Ahmed Abbas, who took Bilal’s son to the 
local hospital on his motorcycle.
This evidence and more made villagers certain that the costs of being a child 
servant with a chowdri outweighed any of the benefits. Parents who sent their children 
away to work as servants were often embarrassed about it and justified it to themselves 
and others by invoking necessity or the need for their children to get an education.
Many people told me that they would only send their child to work with a chowdri as a 
last resort because of economic hardship or because a chowdri had forced them to do so. 
People’s desire for their children not to become servants of the chowdris was clearly 
illustrated when Dr. Muzaffar Abbas, Sufi Ahmed Abbas’s eldest son, asked his 
Mussalli driver to send one of his sons to work for him as a servant in Lahore. The 
driver implored his master not to ask this of him, arguing that it would break his wife’s 
heart to see any of her children go. Later the Mussalli driver decided that his son would 
be much better off if he worked as an apprentice with a mechanic in the nearby market 
town. He argued that in this way he would actually learn a skill other than carrying 
serving trays. After the driver succeed in sending his son to become an apprentice many 
of the other kammis who lived around Sufi Ahmed Abbas’s farmhouse decided to 
follow his example with their own children for the same reasons.
180
Debt and Bondage
The extending of loans by chowdris to kammis was discussed earlier, and it was 
noted that this benefited the chowdri by ensuring him of reduced-cost labour over a long 
period. Various factors worked together to keep this situation stable and ensure that 
servants remained bound to their debit obligations towards the chowdris. To begin with 
servants who had debts couldn’t simply run away for the simple reason that they usually 
had no place to go. Servants had few places outside their home village they could run to 
and be beyond the reach of the chowdris. If they ran away from Bek Sagrana to nearby 
villages, or even to the nearby town of Sargodha, the chowdris were likely to find them 
through their local contacts. Generally kammis had few contacts in faraway cities or 
villages that they could rely on to help them find employment and accommodation, but 
even if they did have friends or relatives in cities like Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Jhang or 
Lahore, those relatives that stayed behind in the village were likely to know where those 
contacts lived and to tell the chowdri if put under pressure. It was also widely believed 
that the chowdris could enlist the support of the police to retrieve and even jail escaped 
bonded labourers (although this hadn’t happened to any of the bonded labourers that I 
knew). In fact findings by Human Rights Watch (1995: 70) confirm that the Pakistani 
police frequently arrest bonded labourers who resist their employers or try to file 
charges against them. The labourers are often arrested on fabricated charges of theft and 
the police routinely fail to file complaints against employers (ibid).
In most cases, however, the chowdris could rely on the kin of attached servants 
to ensure that they repaid their loans and didn’t run away. When a chowdri made a loan 
to a labourer he generally obtained a guarantor (zaman) from among the labourer’s 
household’s kinsmen. The guarantor was responsible for repaying the loan, in labour or 
in kind, if the labourer failed to meet his obligations through abandoning his duties,
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illness or death. In cases where the house of an attached servant was located on the land 
of the employer it was generally taken for granted that other able bodied household 
members would be held responsible in case the attached servant defaulted on his debt 
servicing obligations. It was therefore in the interest of kinsmen to prevent their 
attached relatives from running away, and by extension it was also in their interest to 
help the attached relatives to service their debts so as to prevent them from wearying of 
their work and running away, leaving the kinsmen with the burden of servicing the debt 
in their place. This help took the form of supporting them economically so that they 
didn’t need to take their monthly wages from the chowdri. Thus an indebted attached 
servant who was paid Rs. 10,000 per year could eliminate that amount from his debt if 
he refrained from claiming his wages and relied on his kinsmen to cover for his basic 
needs.
The case of Muhammad Hussain Mussalli and his younger brothers serves to 
illustrate how siblings could cooperate in order to repay a loan from a chowdri. 
Muhammad Hussain’s family was well off in comparison to most other Mussallis. The 
family lived in one of the colony schemes established in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s time and 
possessed legal title to the plot of land where their three bedroom brick and mud house 
was situated. Muhammad Hussain’s father had made a decent living by dealing in 
timber and by working as the cleric (maulvi) at the small mosque in the centre of 
Sikander Colony. He had five sons of whom Muhammad Hussain was the eldest, and he 
had been able to pay for Muhammad Hussain’s education through primary and 
secondary school. Subsequently Muhammad Hussain had spent two years in a nearby 
Barelvi madrassah where he had become a Haflz-e Qur’an.169 After this he had taken 
up a job as a teacher in a small private primary school owned by a retired air force
169 A Hafiz-e Qur’an is a person who can recite the Holy Qur’an by heart.
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1 7 0major in nearby Gullhapur. He earned only about Rs. 1500 per month but between his 
wages and those of his two siblings of working age, along with some money that his 
now old and half-retired father continued to receive on Eid, they lived relatively well. 
The two brothers immediately junior to him had dropped out of school at a young age 
and worked as daily wage labourers, taking up employment according to the agricultural 
cycle. Muhammad Hussain’s two youngest brothers were still attending school.
Given his educational qualifications, Muhammad Hussain hoped that he might 
obtain a low ranking government job or even a job in the military. However he was 
painfully aware of the fact that he needed the patronage of an influential person for this 
to happen. The retired air force officer who owned the school where he worked, and 
who was a relatively influential chowdri in his area, offered to help him out on the 
military side but was not able to guarantee anything. As for the possibility of a 
government job Muhammad Hussain complained that despite vague promises none of 
the Gondal chowdris in the area were helping him. Like many others in similar 
situations, Muhammad Hussain asserted that the reason for this was that the Gondals 
didn’t want to see locals becoming economically independent because it meant that they 
would no longer have people around to serve them. He also claimed that many of the 
chowdris resented the fact that he was an educated Mussalli. He claimed to notice a note 
of mockery when they referred to him with the honorific Hafiz-ji. This suspicion was 
not groundless; several chowdris who knew that I was Muhammad Hussain’s friend told 
me that he was an uneducated Mussalli and couldn’t possibly have any real 
understanding of Islam.
170 This was far less than the minimum of its.6000 that junior school teachers earned in 
government schools, and was the equivalent of what most farm and domestic servants earned. Wages for 
teachers in small private schools were generally low and most of the teachers in them wanted to get work 
in a government school but were unable to for lack of a patron willing to help them.
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When Muhammad Hussain reached the age of twenty his father decided to have 
him marry and also decided that his second son should obtain a loan of /fa.30,000 from 
a landlord to finance the wedding. The father hoped that by pooling their earnings and 
selling some of their livestock all three siblings would be able to repay the loan in under 
a year. Unfortunately things didn’t turn out so well. Within three weeks of Muhammad 
Hussain’s wedding his father had a heart attack and was hospitalised. This meant that 
the family had to borrow a further /fa.30,000 from the same chowdri in order to cover 
multiple medical expenses. Even though half of the debt had been incurred on behalf of 
Muhammad Hussain it was the second son, Muhammad Irfan, who became the servant 
of the landlord from whom the loan had been taken. One reason that it wasn’t 
Muhammad Hussain was that he already had a job with which he could contribute to 
repaying the loan. Another reason was that his parents still hoped that with his 
qualifications and some patronage he might be able to get a better paid job that would 
help the family cover its debts. Yet another reason was that, although he was hard­
working, Muhammad Hussain was unfit to do the sort of physical labour that would 
have been expected of him working for a chowdri, and was better suited to work of a 
more intellectual nature. Muhammad Hussain told me himself that he was incapable of 
doing heavy agricultural labour. He said that he had once tried harvesting wheat and had
171ended up severely ill for several days as a result.
Muhammad Irfan was offered the low salary of twenty four maunds of wheat per 
year. At the price of /fa.450 per maund this was equivalent to about Rs. 10,800 per year. 
In addition to this he was to be provided with two meals per day and a cup tea in the 
afternoons. His main task was to attend to the livestock but, like most other attached 
farm servants, he also had to perform a wide range of other tasks which included
171 Wheat harvesting is done with a sickle and occurs around May when the temperature starts 
rising. It is extremely physically demanding.
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running errands and attending to guests well into the night. He was required to sleep at 
the chowdris’ farmhouse to guard the livestock from roaming thieves and was only 
allowed to take a day off if he could provide someone to replace him. Muhammad Irfan 
frequently complained that his master verbally abused him and never gave him a 
minute’s rest.
Although it was Muhammad Irfan who had to put up with the worst hardship his 
two siblings worked hard to help him eliminate the debt incurred by the family as a 
whole. Muhammad Hussain and his other younger sibling pooled their incomes in order 
to sustain the entire family. This included sustaining Muhammad Irfan so that he 
wouldn’t need to claim the twenty four maunds of wheat from his chowdri, diminishing 
the ./fa.60,000 debt by Rs. 10,000 by the end of the year. They provided Muhammad 
Irfan with pocket money of around /fa.300 per month in order for him to purchase basic 
necessities such as soap and cigarettes. In order to repay the debt more quickly 
Muhammad Hussain took on extra work in the afternoons after he was finished teaching 
in the school. At one stage Sufi Ahmed Abbas offered him /fa.600 per month plus daily 
breakfast and dinner to make the call to prayer three times a day and recite the Holy 
Qur’an on the loudspeaker in the mornings.172 Muhammad Hussain accepted the offer 
and did it for a month, but when the time came to claim his wages Sufi Ahmed Abbas 
falsely accused him of shirking and failing to perform the call to prayer on several 
occasions.173 Sufi Ahmed Abbas decided to deduct the cost of the two daily meals from 
the monthly pay and told Muhammad Hussain that he would only pay him -/fa.300. 
Muhammad Hussain was outraged by the behaviour of the pious chowdri and left 
without taking any of the money. After this Muhammad Hussain managed to get a
172 Teaching obligations prevented Muhammad Hussain from making the late morning and 
afternoon calls to prayer.
173 The truth was that Muhammad Hussain had only missed a total of two calls to prayer.
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temporary job as a security guard at a construction site in the nearby market town. There 
he earned Rs. 1000 for his evening and night shifts. The job didn’t last for more than 
three months but during that time Muhammad Hussain became completely exhausted by 
working all night then teaching from nine in the morning until three in the afternoon.
The younger brother contributed to the repayment of the debt by working during the 
tangerine and wheat harvests and by finding work in construction outside the peak 
periods in the agricultural cycle.
With great effort the family managed to decrease its’ debt by Rs. 10,000 within a 
year. In the second year Muhammad Irfan shifted to another chowdri who offered to pay 
him Rs. 15,000 per year and purchased the remaining debt of /to.50,000 from the 
previous employer.174 In that year the debt was further reduced by Rs. 15,000 through 
the ongoing combined efforts of the three siblings. Muhammad Hussain continued 
teaching and taking up supplementary jobs in the afternoons. In the meantime he 
continued searching for patronage in order to obtain a formal sector job. During this 
time his younger brother continued doing daily wage labour. The remaining fts.45,000 
was repaid shortly after the end of this second year when the family sold a buffalo and 
some goats that they had been raising in order to cover the debt. When the debt was 
finally repaid Muhammad Irfan returned home and Muhammad Hussain invited me to 
his house to celebrate the end of their ‘punishment’ (azaab) with a large meal.
After this Muhammad Irfan, who felt physically and mentally drained after his 
two years of hard labour, took several months off work to recover. Muhammad Hussain 
managed to get a government job in southern Punjab with the National Logistics Cell 
through the patronage of the retired air force major. In the end, however, the job proved
174 It was possible for indebted labourers to leave their employer as long as another employer 
was willing to purchase their debt. It was an unwritten rule amongst the chowdris that they didn’t poach 
each other’s bonded labourers, even when they were hardened enemies. Doing so was seen as a lowly act 
by the chowdris as it was tantamount to stealing money.
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to be a great disappointment. The National Logistics Cell was a notoriously corrupt 
branch of the army supposed to combat smuggling of various sorts on Pakistan’s main 
highways. As it turned out patronage was not only necessary to obtain the job but also 
in order to keep. While he was on the job Muhammad Hussain witnessed one of his 
superiors taking a bribe from a heroin smuggler. When the superior in question was 
later questioned about this by his own superiors he summoned Muhammad Hussain to 
lie that he hadn’t seen him taking the bribe. But when Muhammad Hussain was asked to 
swear on the Holy Qu’ran that his superior hadn’t taken a bribe he refused to do so. As a 
result his superior, who actually got away with taking the bribe, transferred Muhammad 
Hussain to a remote location in Sindh. Muhammad Hussain told me that without a 
superior to look after his interests it was impossible not to be pushed around in such 
cases. Furthermore his pay was only Rs. 3000 per month and he spent almost its. 1000 of 
this when he returned to visit his family and wife. In the end he decided that he would 
be better off earning only ifa.2000 somewhere nearer to home where he wouldn’t be 
homesick and wouldn’t have to compromise his integrity by turning a blind eye to 
heroin smuggling and human trafficking.175
As a result of all of these experiences Muhammad Hussain grew increasingly 
bitter about the daily injustices faced by the majority of Pakistanis. He would often talk 
about the way that the landlords were holding the country back and about how all of 
their activities violated the basic tenets of Islam. At one stage he even joined a local 
worker and farmer (kisan aur mazdoor) movement headed by a retired army colonel in 
Sargodha. Muhammad Hussain told me that the movement gained a number of 
followers from within the district and that rallies and other functions were held on a
175 Muhammad Hussain told me that following the devastating earthquake in Kashmir in 2005 he 
witnessed two instances of human trafficking in which Pathans had stolen orphaned Kashmiri children in 
order to sell them into various kinds of servitude in Karachi.
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regular basis. Muhammad Hussain became a member and discretely went around the 
area of Bek Sagrana getting people to sign up and make small contributions to the 
movement. He claimed that he managed to arouse the interest of some people but that 
the majority appeared to think that the whole exercise was futile. The doubters were 
eventually proven right when the retired colonel ran away with all of the money that he 
had allegedly been collecting for the movement. Obviously this episode left Muhammad 
Hussain even more embittered.
Other Cases
Instances whereby families cooperated in order to repay a loan from a landlord 
like the one described above were quite common. For example, one labourer who 
belonged to a family of impoverished non-Gondal zamindar tenants also managed to 
pay off a loan from a chowdri thanks to the income and labour of three able bodied 
siblings. The labourer had obtained a loan of Rs. 50,000 from a chowdri in order to 
cover his father’s medical expenses. Thanks to the labour of his siblings and the sale of 
some livestock the loan was repaid after two and a half years of toil.
There were instances, however, when the joint servicing of debts didn’t go so 
smoothly and could result in bitterness and conflict within households. In one Mirasi 
household the older of two brothers secured a loan of Rs. 15,000 from a Gondal chowdri 
in order to cover joint wedding expenses for himself and his younger brother. The 
brothers agreed that they would service the debt by working for two different landlords. 
In the end, however, it was the older brother who ended up having to pay the greater 
part of the loan because his younger brother left his master after only six months of 
work and then spent several months wasting time without permanent employment. Thus 
the elder brother worked for a year and a half for a chowdri and repaid Rs. 11,000 while 
his younger brother repaid only ifo.4000. This situation created a great deal of bitterness
between the two brothers but they still continued to live in a joint household with their 
parents.
When indebted servants had no able bodied siblings or parents to assist them, 
repaying a loan could take an entire lifetime and, rather than see their debts diminish, 
they were likely to see them grow. Repayment was even more difficult if a household 
was afflicted by additional crises such as illness or drug addiction. In one instance, a 
Mussalli who was a heroin addict had given his seven year old son Fazi over as a 
servant to a Gondal chowdri in exchange for Rs.6,000 per year and various small cash 
advances. The family had come to depend economically on the young boy because of 
the father’s addiction and the absence of other able bodied males in the household. By 
the time Fazi turned seventeen, the debt had risen to Rs.20,000 as the household was 
continually short of money. The father had sold much of the furniture in the house in 
order to finance his heroin addiction. The debt further increased by Rs. 30,000 when Fazi 
and his sister got married. At the time of fieldwork, the outstanding amount totalled 
Rs. 50,000 and the Ranjha chowdri had decided to cut off any further flow of credit 
because it was becoming unlikely that the loan would ever be repaid.
The situation for Fazi had, however, become more hopeful as he now had a
younger sibling of working age who was working in a vermicelli (sevian) factory in
Sargodha and was contributing to family finances. The father had also ceased to be a
burden since going to Islamabad where he found work in a market carrying people’s
shopping bags to finance his heroin addiction himself. In addition, a charitable and
pious Ranjha chowdri had given Fazi a baby buffalo to rear, such that when the animal
was fully grown they would share the proceeds equally. An adult buffalo could be sold
for about Rs. 80,000, allowing Fazi to reduce his debt by as much as Rs.40,000 from his
share. However, there was an unfortunate setback: his sister contracted tuberculosis and
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her in-laws sent her back home because she had become a financial burden. Medical 
treatment was expensive and Fazi, who was desperate to repay his debt, complained that 
it was the duty of his sister’s in-laws to take care of her. He threatened not to make any 
financial contributions towards her treatment.
Weapons of the Weak176
Most of the servants that I interacted with deeply resented their employers. On 
one occasion I saw a servant spit and throw angry punches at a photograph of his 
master. The same servant would often steal flour from his master’s kitchen whenever 
his master was away in Lahore. He would also occasionally raid his master’s hidden 
alcohol supplies and then invite friends over to his master’s empty house to get drunk 
and watch Punjabi and Bollywood movies on the DVD player. For servants who had no 
debts, and gunmen in particular, the greatest gesture of discontent was to desert their 
masters and join their rivals, to whom they generally revealed all of their former 
master’s secrets. Servants with debts could not do this because the chowdris had an 
agreement not to poach them from each other unless their debts were settled. They 
could of course try to run away altogether but as noted above this wasn’t easy to achieve 
and relatives left behind were likely to pay the price for it.
Because these acts were largely individual and isolated and because they never 
openly challenged the chowdris they were a far cry from the openly assertive behaviour 
of labourers in Gujarat documented by Breman (1993) or the assertive behaviour of 
Dalits in Uttar Pradesh described by Jeffrey & Lerche (2000). In public servants and 
villagers generally continued to enact displays of subordination towards the chowdris 
whom they greeted with a bow and with their right hand upon their hearts expressing 
thankfulness. When they sat in a group with the chowdris it was still quite common for
176 Scott (1985)
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them to squat on the floor while the chowdri sat above them on a charpai. In any case, 
the fact that they didn’t just walk out of their jobs but instead resorted to ‘weapons of 
the weak’ such as surreptitious shows of contempt or petty theft illustrated the absence 
of any real bargaining power on their part.
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that changes in the regional agrarian economy, largely 
due to the introduction of citrus orchards together with broader economic expansion in 
non-agricultural sectors, resulted in the decreased economic dependence of rural 
labourers on the chowdris. However, these changes in the regional economy were not 
matched by changes in the highly unequal political structure, and the livelihood 
strategies of labourers continued to be circumscribed by the political influence of the 
chowdris. Not only did the chowdris have the means to coerce labourers physically, in 
certain cases through their gunmen, but they also had a virtual monopoly over access to 
the state meaning that they had the power to grant and withhold patronage in ways that 
almost always furthered their personal interests. Labourers continued to depend largely 
on the chowdris for patronage in the form of mediation with state institutions, dispute 
resolution and the extension of credit. The result of this was that despite their dislike of 
the chowdris labourers going through periods of hardship were compelled to seek 
attached employment with them. However, the partial proletarianization of the 
workforce did have the important consequence that it caused the chowdris to rely 
increasingly on the threat of coercion and on their capacity to grant and to withhold 
patronage in order to obtain both labour and political support. Without these things the 
chowdris were finding it increasingly difficult to attract labourers. Arguably the result 
of this was that relations between the chowdris and the labourers increasingly fraught. 
The chowdris continued to expect villagers to serve them but the latter increasingly
sought better job opportunities outside the village. As a result the chowdris complained 
about the raised expectations of villagers whom they believed to be aiming to rise up 
above their ‘proper’ station in life, and some chowdris even actively sought to put them 
back into place. For example, one chowdri prevented a Mussalli from getting a 
permanent job in a nearby factory by phoning the management and telling them not to 
take him on. The chowdri in question later told me that if all the villagers started getting 
such jobs that there would be no one left to work in the fields. Others sought to keep 
kammis in their place by humiliating them when they wore new clothes or by mocking
1 7 7them when they spoke Urdu rather than Punjabi.
However, unlike in the areas of India referred to at the beginning of this chapter 
where labourers were increasingly independent from as well as increasingly assertive 
towards their employers, the outward behaviour of labourers in the Pakistani Punjab 
remained solicitous and obsequious. I suggest that the principal reason for these 
differences is found in broad differences in the political evolution and development of 
India and Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan lacked a popular national political party at 
independence and that repeated military interventions over the country’s sixty year 
history severely curtailed the possibility of the development of genuinely popular 
political parties and had highly deleterious consequences for the country’s social and 
political development. One significant consequence of this was that the Pakistani 
masses never witnessed the sort of political empowerment that some of their 
counterparts in India enjoyed over the past several decades. Thus the assertiveness of 
the Dalits described by Lerche and Jeffrey (2000) under Mayawati in Uttar Pradesh as 
well as that of labourers described by Breman (1996) in Gujarat remained largely
177 Urdu was considered to be the language of the educated elites and therefore the chowdris 
thought that it was ridiculous for kammis to speak it. On several occasions chowdris made fun of kammis 
who spoke with me in Urdu by sarcastically telling them that they had now become teachers (ustad).
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unthinkable for many labourers and kammis in much of the central, southern and 
western Punjab. Nevertheless, as this chapter has illustrated many labourers and kammis 
resented their subordination and their lack of assertiveness could not be taken to mean 
that they fully acquiesced to it. The case of Muhammad Hussain Mussalli, who felt 
strongly enough to join a workers’ movement however corrupt its leader turned out to 
be, illustrated the fact that given a chance some of the more enterprising and thoughtful 
labourers were prepared to mobilise against their oppressors. In fact political 
developments in the 1970s (discussed in chapter two) illustrate that the pent up 
frustration of landless labourers, artisans and tenants could erupt into the political scene 
if given a chance.
Subsequently the result of policies implemented by successive military regimes 
in Pakistan was to fragment the political landscape and to thereby forestall the 
emergence of large scale popular political movements such as the one witnessed during 
the rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1970. In this fragmented political landscape politicians 
largely ceased to focus on national issues, legislation and policy making and became 
almost exclusively concerned with consolidating their position as local patrons. One 
consequence of this is that rural strongmen in the Punjab, such as members of the 
Gondal biraderi described in this thesis, consolidated their political and economic 
fortunes and continued to be the principal mediators between the have-nots and the 
state. There was no political party or organisation based either on class or on caste to 
which tenants and landless labourers could turn for support and they were therefore 
largely restricted to seeking patronage from local landlords. In this manner political 
mobilisation in much of the rural Pakistani Punjab remained factional, characterised by 
a vertical structure of power that cross cut both ties of caste and class.
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Chapter Five: Elections and Devolution
The previous chapter concluded with the argument that one of the reasons that 
landless tenants and labourers didn’t unite in order to assert themselves politically was 
that authoritarian and military rule had succeeded in forestalling mass political 
movements by fragmenting the political landscape. As a result grievances and 
discontent were only furtively expressed through the weapons of the weak (Scott 1985) 
and people continued, both actively and passively, to participate in a system of 
domination that reproduced their own subordination. Their active participation in the 
reproduction of their own subordination consisted not only in their working for the 
chowdris on terms that were highly unfavourable to them (generally in exchange for 
loans or patronage) but also, as this chapter will illustrate, in their frequent political 
support for the chowdris, to whom they gave their votes either under compulsion, in 
exchange for temporary compensation, or even in the hope of obtaining future 
patronage. Their passive participation consisted in their doing little to challenge their 
own subordination (though not without reason given the potential consequences) and, as 
this chapter will also illustrate, in their frequently indifferent and cynical attitudes 
towards politics.
This chapter further explores the links between authoritarian rule and the 
consolidation of the political power of the landlords by focusing on the issue of 
electoral politics. It shows why elections have largely failed to empower the 
underprivileged masses, unlike in areas of India such as Uttar Pradesh. It also shows 
how the interaction between politics at the centre and politics at the local level has 
contributed to the consolidation of the chowdris’ political power through the electoral 
process. By exploring the interaction between politics at the centre and at local levels
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the chapter seeks to impart to and expand upon existing literature on Pakistan that 
focuses on national-level politics but often doesn’t consider the various ways in which 
local factors impact upon it. The work of authors such as Wilder (1999, 2004) and 
Waseem (1993), among others, as well as various reports by the International Crisis 
Group (2005b, 2004b) have all provided valuable evidence of the various machinations 
employed by authoritarian central governments in Islamabad to retain political power. 
These include various forms of electoral and pre-electoral rigging as well as the holding 
of non-party elections, devolution programmes and national referendums. This has 
rightly led Wilder to claim that a consistent theme running almost throughout the seven 
national party-based elections held in Pakistan prior to 2008—as well as the various 
non-party and local party elections and presidential referendums—has been “to 
legitimize the retention of power by the unelected institutions of the state rather than to 
transfer power to local institutions” (Wilder 2004: 102). What needs to be added to this 
account of the lack of popular political enfranchisement, however, is that the local 
power structures described in this thesis also work against it, even though ultimately 
these structures are reinforced by authoritarian governments. This chapter shows that 
the entrenchment of parochial politics has perpetuated the inability of even military 
central governments to determine what happens locally. Not only is the government 
unable to implement its policies because in villages like Bek Sagrana and others 
throughout the Punjab powerful landlord lineages wield disproportionate political and 
economic power (often with the assistance of armed militias), but also because the 
police and other government institutions often act in pursuit of their own predatory local 
agendas. As previous chapters have shown, institutions such as the police sometimes 
pursue these activities on their own and at other times in collusion with local landlords 
and the criminal elements that are frequently allied to them. Consequently, both the
195
central government’s well intentioned and less well intentioned policies can often be 
totally subverted locally.
Against this background, even if General Musharraf s devolution programme 
had genuinely been geared towards the empowerment of the masses and towards greater 
accountability on the part of local government that this would imply (and it will be 
argued below that there is reason to doubt that this was actually the case), it is by no 
means clear that this end could have been achieved without a drastic redistribution of 
political and economic resources and the mass social mobilisation—not to mention 
social upheaval—that this would require. As this chapter will show, even if the central 
government wanted to hold free and fair elections it appears unlikely that it would be 
able to do so by relying solely on the local arms of the state due to the stranglehold over 
their constituencies of many local politicians. Even where Musharraf s government was 
determined to rig local body elections,178 local factors could often intervene to subvert 
this aim. In fact the evidence provided here shows that there were instances in the local 
body elections of 2005 where local opposition politicians actually succeeded in rigging 
the elections in their own favour. This was achieved through the cooperation of polling 
officers and policemen who were friendly towards local politicians and were willing to 
overlook, and sometimes actively to cooperate in, a wide array of electoral malpractices. 
These might include among other things the takeover of polling stations by the 
strongmen of local politicians.
Devolution
On the 23rd of March 2000, General Pervez Musharraf declared that devolution 
“was the beginning of a constructive, democratic, dynamic revolution whose sole 
objective is to place in [the] hands of the people the power to shape their own
178 It will be seen that there is ample evidence to show that this was true in some cases.
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destiny.. .an unprecedented transfer of power will take place from the elites to the vast 
majority.” (ICG 2004b: 5) The programme, devised and funded by various international 
organisations including Britain’s Department for International Development, the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank, aimed to encourage grassroots political 
participation and greater government accountability through the creation of various tiers 
of local government. According to a report by the World Bank (1998) entitled “A 
Framework for Civil Service Reform in Pakistan” governance in Pakistan suffered from 
(a) an over-centralised organisational structure, (b) a serious lack of accountability to 
the public resulting from both a colonial legacy and years of military dictatorship and 
(c) the politicisation of civil service decision-making and the failure of politicians to 
exercise their oversight role in the wider public interest.
LaPorte (2004: 155) argues that the lack of accountability of Pakistan’s civil 
service can be traced back to the early days of independence when Mohammad Ali 
Jinnah perpetuated the colonial vice-regal tradition by designating himself Governor 
General with the power to bypass ministers and deal directly with civil servants. After 
Jinnah’s death successive governors general179 largely retained these vice-regal powers. 
Up to the time of Musharraf s takeover, the local embodiment of this centralised, top 
down, bureaucratic power structure had been the Deputy Commissioner, who served as 
a one-man locus of judicial, executive and revenue functions at the divisional level. The 
Deputy Commissioner was largely an instrument of centralised government control who 
kept opposition politicians in check and rewarded political supporters. One fairly 
obvious consequence of this was that the concentration of powers in the Deputy 
Commissioner’s hands created a vast potential for corruption and the abuse of power.
179 The 1956 Constitution changed the title of the head of state to President.
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General Musharraf s devolution programme was ostensibly aimed at doing away 
with the vice-regal tradition of governance in order to further democratisation and 
accountability. It was to do this by giving greater administrative powers to various 
elected tiers of local government and abolishing the powerful position of Deputy 
Commissioner. However, aside from the fact that democratisation through a military 
government is in itself contradictory, there are various reasons to doubt the intentions of 
Musharraf s government in implementing devolution. Evidence from the International 
Crisis Group as well as the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that Musharraf s 
military government may in fact have been more interested in appeasing international 
donor countries and reducing pressure from them than with actual democratisation and 
accountability. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989 Pakistan 
lost its status as a frontline state in the war against communism, and two years later the 
United States cut short its economic assistance to Pakistan when Pakistan begem trying 
to develop nuclear capability. In 1998, the USA imposed economic sanctions on 
Pakistan after the country tested two nuclear bombs. General Musharraf s military 
takeover in 1999 did little to improve the country’s international standing. Given 
Pakistan’s historical dependence on foreign aid, the implementation of a devolution 
programme was a good way to appease international calls for democratisation and to get 
foreign aid flowing once again.
Although the devolution programme on its own may have achieved some of 
these aims it was the events of September 11th, 2001 which decisively got foreign aid 
flowing back into Pakistan. The Afghan Jihad in the eighties had helped to prop up the 
military regime of General Zia-ul Haq through military and development funds and 
other assistance received principally from the USA. Similarly, the events of September 
11th propped up General Musharraf s government and transformed Pakistan from an
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international pariah into a frontline ally in the war on terror almost overnight. In the 
context of the international war on terror devolution took on renewed importance as it 
was presented to the international community as a way of increasing political stability in 
Pakistan and therefore, implicitly, as a way of avoiding the possibility of extremists
i fintaking control of the country and, most particularly, its nuclear assets.
It is reasonable to conclude that domestically General Musharraf was following 
in the footsteps of his military predecessors who through similar though supposedly less 
radical devolution schemes sought to institute lower tiers of government as a substitute 
for democratisation at the provincial and national levels. The ICG report of 2004 
suggests that both General Ayub Khan’s and General Zia-ul Haq’s military 
governments used local government programmes in order to: “(1) depoliticise 
governance; (2) create a new political elite to challenge and undermine the political 
opposition; (3) demonstrate the democratic credentials of a regime to domestic and 
external audiences; and (4) undermine federalism by circumventing constitutional 
provisions for provincial political, administrative, and fiscal autonomy” (ICG 2004b: 1). 
General Ayub Khan introduced his Basic Democracy plan as a nominal concession to 
democracy after having suspended the constitution. He argued that the nature of 
Pakistani society meant that it wasn’t ready for fully fledged democracy and that it 
needed the benevolent, modernising guidance of an enlightened elite. Under the Basic 
Democracy plan Pakistan was divided into 80,000 wards to elect a ‘Basic Democrat’ on 
a non-party basis, and local councils were created at the district as well as at the union, 
tehsil and thana levels. Roughly half of the members of the local councils were 
officially nominated while those who were directly elected largely remained under the
180 See the international Crisis Group (2005b: 11) on how the government claimed that the local 
government scheme helped weaken extremism.
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control of the district administration (which unlike under Musharraf s local government 
system remained unreformed, and retained the power to overrule council decisions and 
suspend the execution of their orders). General Ayub Khan also circumscribed 
provincial powers through the federal appointment of provincial governors. This meant 
that Ayub Khan’s regime was able to create a new class of politicians over which the 
central government could directly extend its control through the district administration. 
As was noted in chapter two, many of these Basic Democrats were selected from gentry 
and middle-ranking landlord backgrounds, such that Ayub Khan’s regime was able to 
bypass not only the obstacle to centralised state power that political parties and 
provinces posed, but also the obstacle of the powerful ashrafi landlords that dominated 
them. Additionally the Basic Democrats were made into an Electoral College for the 
presidency as well as for the provincial and national assemblies. Because this Electoral 
College could easily be manipulated by the district administration (which was 
ultimately controlled by centrally appointed governors), it was used for the purpose of 
rubber-stamping the continuation of the Ayub regime. Thus, through the Basic 
Democrats General Ayub Khan was able to obtain a 95.6 per cent approval rating in a 
presidential referendum to extend his presidency for five more years. Thirty years later 
General Musharraf obtained a similarly high approval rating of 97.5 per cent in a 
presidential referendum thanks to his system of devolved government.
Following the rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Ayub Khan’s basic democracy
scheme was scrapped and it was almost another decade, following General Zia-ul Haq’s
military coup, before a similar scheme was implemented again. In its details General
Zia’s Local Government System differed somewhat from the Basic Democracy system
but its fundamental aim was the same: “to cloak a highly centralised, authoritarian
system of government under the garb of decentralisation” (ICG 2004b: 4). Like General
200
Ayub Khan’s system it aimed to establish an elite of faithful local politicians that could 
be manipulated through the district administration. General Zia used these local 
politicians to undermine the political opposition constituted by the popular PPP. He did 
this principally by staging non-partisan elections and using local governments as a 
means of extending patronage to pro-military politicians in order for them to win 
elections. Where his system differed from General Ayub Khan’s was that local 
politicians didn’t form the Electoral College for the national and provincial assemblies. 
Nevertheless, because the bulk of the finances of local governments came from federal 
transfers this gave the central government ample scope to provide patronage to pro­
military politicians to help them win elections. Following the restoration of democracy 
after General Zia’s decade in power, his local government scheme was allowed to decay 
and was eventually scrapped in the early 1990s. It wasn’t until General Musharraf s 
military coup in 1999 that the idea of local government returned to the national political 
agenda.
Although the planned reforms under General Musharraf s local government
system were far more significant than the local government reforms carried out by both
General Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul Haq, the evidence suggests that once again the
scheme served to provide the garb of democracy and decentralisation to a highly
centralised and authoritarian regime. Whereas neither of the previous two local
government programmes had aimed to reform the district administration, General
Musharraf proposed to do so radically by replacing provincially and centrally appointed
bureaucrats with democratically elected local representatives. Under Musharraf s
programme the indirectly elected district administration headed by the district nazim
was, among other things, to take over the responsibility for law and order, education,
health, agriculture and transport from the traditional district Management Group and the
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Deputy Commissioner. Below the district level the tehsil administration was to take 
charge of municipal infrastructure, water, sanitation and roads. Finally at union council 
level, the lowest administrative tier in the scheme, the union council administration was 
put in charge of registering births and deaths and also of encouraging the formation of 
voluntary associations termed Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) composed of a 
minimum of twenty-five unelected members. These voluntary associations were 
planned to encourage grassroots participation for the sake of monitoring service 
delivery and promoting accountability, as well as for the implementation of minor 
infrastructure projects. Additionally the union council was to serve as the Electoral 
College for the district nazim.
Despite these seemingly significant transfers of power to elected representatives, 
the evidence suggests that like previous local government programmes implemented by 
military rulers Musharraf s devolution programme served to ensure regime survival by 
actually centralising power and fragmenting the political opposition. It appears that the 
central government was able to retain significant power over local bodies by bypassing 
both political parties and provincial governments. As under previous local government 
programmes elections for local bodies were held on a non-party basis and the 
government was able to bypass provincial governments by essentially retaining control 
over the finances of local bodies. This was achieved by making the provinces transfer 
forty per cent of their total revenue to local governments. The reason for the bypassing 
was that it made it easier for the central government to control a large number of 
disunited local politicians than it would have been to control relatively more cohesive 
provincial governments and political parties.
In this manner Musharraf s government, like the governments of his military 
predecessors, was able to create a political constituency that could be easily
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manipulated through the granting and withholding of government funds and patronage. 
This political constituency could then be used to stage elections that would give a 
mantle of legitimacy to the regime. Just as General Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul Haq 
had done before him, General Musharraf used his local government scheme in order to 
extend his term in power through a presidential referendum. During the April 2002 
presidential referendum on extending Musharraf s term in office by five years it was 
widely reported, including in the village of Bek Sagrana, that the central government 
channelled funds through local governments to union councillors in order for them to 
campaign on Musharraf s behalf. Union councillors were said to have used the money 
to buy votes through cash payments as well as through minor infrastructure projects. 
Additionally, the funds were used to hire large numbers of buses in order to get 
supporters who didn’t have means to travel to the polling stations. In Bek Sagrana 
Chowdri Abdullah Gondal who had been elected union council nazim gave voters the 
additional incentive of a free meal at the polling station, allegedly by using government 
funds. In addition, the fact that in Musharraf s devolution programme the councillors 
served as a restricted electoral college for the district nazim was further evidence of the 
way in which the devolution programme actually served the objective of entrenching 
Musharraf s regime rather than its stated objective of encouraging grassroots political 
participation and democratisation. Because union councillors could be easily 
manipulated through the granting and withholding of patronage it was easier to get them 
to vote for a pro-govemment district nazim than it was to influence an average of 
around a million voters per district. Once a pro-govemment district nazim was in place 
the government could then keep patronage flowing to its supporters in order to 
consolidate its power.
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To further ensure favourable results in the presidential referendum (as well as in 
other local, provincial and national elections) General Musharraf s government is also 
widely reported to have taken various other measures. These measures, which will be 
further illustrated below, included harassing and even abducting political opponents181 
through the police and the secret services, as well as arbitrarily disqualifying opposition 
politicians from running for office. Politicians aligned with opposition political parties 
were barred from entering elections in both of the local body elections of 2001 and of 
2005 on the grounds that these were supposed to be non-partisan, but politicians who 
were openly entering elections on a PML-Q platform were allowed to do so. 
Additionally, many candidates were disqualified for ‘unspecified defects’ in their 
educational qualifications and others were disqualified for their alleged inability to 
prove ‘adequate knowledge of Islamic injunctions’. Under the Local Government 
Ordinance of 2001 contestants for the positions of nazim and vice-nazim (naib-nazim) 
were required to have no less than a secondary school certificate or matriculation for the 
alleged reason that this would raise the quality of politicians. In practice, however, this 
measure not only served to disqualify a large number of opposition politicians, 
including the PPP politician Ghulam Ali Midhiana mentioned in previous chapters, but 
also to exclude the large majority of the population, who fell short of these standards. 
This contradicted General Musharraf s claim that the devolution programme aimed to 
‘transfer power from the elites to the vast majority’.
Another significant measure taken to ensure electoral success through the local 
government system was the large scale manipulation of the judiciary through the 
transfer and replacement of judges by more pliable ones. This began at the highest level, 
that of the Supreme Court. This practice allowed Musharraf s government to place
181 See ICG (2005b).
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partisan Session and district Judges, who since 1988 had acted as returning officers, at 
polling stations in order for them to either overlook or participate in various forms of 
electoral rigging. It also allowed the government to try to ensure that polling stations 
were located either in friendly territory182 or, if this wasn’t possible, to locate polling 
stations in remote areas in order to make it difficult and costly for people to present 
themselves to vote. A large number of transfers was also widely reported to have taken 
place prior to both local body elections in various branches of the civil bureaucracy and 
the police. Yet other measures to ensure favourable election results included the large 
scale gerrymandering of constituencies in order to divide the opposition. According to a 
report by the International Crisis Group, this was particularly aimed at the PPP in its 
Sindhi strongholds (ICG 2005b: 5).
The combination of all of these measures led to overwhelming victories for pro- 
govemment candidates in both the local council elections of 2001 and of 2005 and the 
presidential referendum of April 2001, when the proposal to extend General 
Musharraf s term in office by a further five years was approved by 97.5%. This almost 
farcically high approval in the referendum clearly pointed to widespread pre-election 
and election day rigging and led Musharraf himself to admit reluctantly that 
“unbeknownst to him some of his supporters had shown over-enthusiasm” (Wilder 
2004: 107). Nevertheless, following the 2005 local body elections and in situations 
where similar strategies were used by the central government, the Prime Minister 
Shaukat Aziz declared that the overwhelming pro-govemment turnout indicated that 
people had shown their support for president Musharraf and for his policies of 
enlightened moderation.183
182 In order to be able to intimidate opposition voters and politicians as well as to facilitate the 
possible takeover of the polling station by local pro-govemment factions.
183 See ICG (2005b: 11).
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The evidence therefore indicates that General Musharraf s devolution 
programme was only nominally geared towards democratisation and accountability. As 
will be discussed further below, even if the programme had genuinely been geared 
towards transferring power ‘from the elites to the vast majority’ as General Musharraf 
claimed it was and as various donor organisations and NGOs working in Pakistan 
appeared to believe, it is unlikely that an apolitical programme that excluded political 
parties from participation and which was engineered by technocrats could have 
achieved this goal to begin with. One important reason for this was that candidates had 
to run in elections as independents—in other words, without a political party to fund 
them. This meant that only individuals with independent economic means would have 
the ability to finance an election campaign. This requirement, together with the 
requirement of secondary school certificates for all candidates, made it highly unlikely 
that the vast majority would be represented in the elections and would therefore have 
any real chance of gaining power. Inasmuch as General Musharraf s devolution 
programme served to further entrench the elite parochial patronage based political 
system, independent candidates from elite backgrounds remained focused on divisive 
local issues and enmities rather than uniting for a joint cause through a political 
organisation whose power lay in numbers. The result was to worsen the already severe 
factional, clan, sectarian and ethnic conflicts that were already fracturing Pakistan as 
local leaders scrambled for political supremacy in their own regions. Thus the 
International Crisis Group reported that in 2005 on election days alone at least sixty 
people were killed and some 550 people were injured across Pakistan (ICG 2005: 10). 
In the end what all of this meant for the masses of landless labourers and kammis in 
most rural areas was that, rather than released from an unfair and unrepresentative
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system, they remained dependent on the local landlords for patronage and for protection 
in an increasingly violent and factional environment.
Devolution in Bek Sagrana
Bek Sagrana was one of the thirteen villages that comprised the union council of 
Gullapur. In light of the foregoing, it is not surprising that Gullapur’s first union council 
nazim elected in 2001 hailed from the zamindar class and was none other than the 
strongman Chowdri Abdullah Gondal. There were two factors that had greatly 
facilitated his becoming union councillor. The first was the fact that his most powerful 
rivals, Chowdri Nawaz Ali and siblings, had been jailed and forced underground by 
Musharraf s government. This had cleared the way for him to grab the seat without any 
substantial opposition. The second was that he had obtained the backing of Chowdri 
Khuda Baksh Mekan, a powerful member of General Musharraf s ruling PML-Q who 
had supported his campaign by channelling government funds to him and directing the 
local police and civil service in his favour. In exchange Chowdri Abdullah had 
supported Chowdri Khuda Baksh Mekan’s choice of district nazim and would deliver 
votes to Chowdri Khuda Baksh Mekan in future elections. This in turn meant that 
Chowdri Abdullah received substantial patronage from Chowdri Khuda Baksh Mekan 
thereby giving him far greater influence than the office of union council nazim alone 
gave him.
Throughout my time in Bek Sagrana between January 2004 and July 2006 it 
became clear to me that neither Chowdri Abdullah, his political opponents, nor the 
villagers which the programme allegedly aimed to empower appeared to be particularly 
concerned with, or even aware, of the devolution programme’s stated aim of 
democratisation and popular empowerment. Both Chowdri Abdullah and his opponents 
were principally concerned with the consolidation of their own power at each other’s
207
expense. Neither was concerned with even attempting to pay lip service to the idea that 
devolution was about creating greater government accountability through the 
empowerment of the masses. Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Mazhar Ali largely saw 
the devolution programme for what it was: an attempt by Musharraf s government to 
extend central government control over politicians and to weaken the political 
opposition. Chowdri Nawaz Ali, who was an experienced politician and who had seen a 
similar programme implemented by General Zia, thought that the exercise was all a big 
show (namuna) and that it wouldn’t survive beyond Musharraf s regime. As he was in 
opposition to the government he realised that for his faction and other factions allied 
with it to obtain the majority of union council seats in the district would be difficult. He 
was keenly aware that the government would not only be dispensing funds to pro- 
govemment candidates but that the entire judiciary and civil services would be 
manipulated in order to support them. His hope was at least to be able to prevent his 
rivals from consolidating their hold over the new government structure.
In order to achieve this Chowdri Nawaz Ali joined forces with his erstwhile 
enemy Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana who, as a member of the PPP, was also in the 
opposition.184 As a part of the peace deal (sula) between them, which was agreed to 
only two months prior to the union council elections and followed years of violent 
feuding, Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana agreed to support each 
other in order to obtain as many of the twenty-two union council nazim seats in the 
tehsil of Qot Momin as possible.185 It had also been agreed that during the district nazim 
elections which followed the union council elections Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s faction 
would get all of his allied union councillors to vote for a district nazim of Midhiana’s
184 This was discussed in chapter three.
185 The tehsil of Qot Momin included the Union Council of Gullapur in which Bek Sagrana was
located.
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choice. Chowdri Nawaz Ali would also give all of his votes to Chowdri Ghulam Ali 
Midhiana’s candidate for the tehsil nazim elections. In exchange for this Chowdri 
Ghulam Ali Midhiana would later support Chowdri Nawaz Ali in future elections for 
the Provincial or National Assembly.
The absence of popular empowerment and of public accountability on the part of 
politicians following the implementation of devolution is clearly demonstrated by the 
case of Chowdri Abdullah. To begin with, a large number of the twenty-one elected 
union council members whose role was to approve the budget and oversee the delivery 
of different services delegated all decision-making to Chowdri Abdullah. If Chowdri 
Abdullah required their signatures for a given project the union councillors gave it 
without any questions and I heard of no cases where they opposed any of Chowdri 
Abdullah’s expenditure decisions. Part of the reason for this was that a number of union 
councillors had been personally selected by Chowdri Abdullah from among his most 
faithful subordinate clients and employees and made to run in the elections by him. One 
councillor, for example, was his sharecropper and another was a kumhar whose family 
had worked as kammis for Chowdri Abdullah’s family. Given that these councillors 
depended on Chowdri Abdullah for either employment or patronage, they were unlikely 
to start questioning Chowdri Abdullah’s decisions. They were also unlikely to do so for 
the simple reason that clients and employees were supposed to display deference and
respect towards their chowdri patrons. If a client or employee questioned his patron he
186 While in the area of Bek Sagrana allied landlord factions vied with each other to capture the 
new local government structure, there were areas of the Punjab, particularly in the South and in the West, 
where single households were able to capture all of the elected government positions in their areas. For 
example, in one village that I visited near the town of Chiniot, an hour and a half s drive south of Bek 
Sagrana, an influential household of Shia Sayyid pirs managed to secure seats at every level of 
representative government. The eldest of the three brothers in the family was elected to the National 
Assembly, the middle one to the Provincial Assembly, and the youngest became district nazim. What’s 
more, the son of the eldest became tehsil nazim while the youngest son of the brother elected to the 
provincial assembly became union council nazim in the family’s ancestral village. Although such cases 
were not the necessarily the norm, people that I spoke to at the Asian Development Bank in Islamabad as 
well as in other NGOs working in the Punjab indicated that such cases were quite common.
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was likely to be seen as trying to rise above his station, and was equally likely to be 
quickly put back into his place.
Although most of the other union councillors weren’t kammis, tenants or 
permanent employees of Chowdri Abdullah’s, all of them were his clients and power 
brokers. They were predominantly Gondal smallholders but there were some that were 
non-Gondal smallholders from neighbouring villages as well. As power brokers they 
served as channels for people to approach Chowdri Abdullah for patronage. Kammis or 
smallholders who who needed Chowdri Abdullah’s patronage but didn’t have close or 
direct relations with him would first approach one of them. Their knowledge of issues in 
their own neighbourhoods meant that they could keep Chowdri Abdullah informed 
about different problems around the union council. Their close knowledge of people’s 
changing political alignments in their own neighbourhoods also meant that they were 
invaluable to the electoral strategies of their patron. They also played an important role 
during elections because they could influence their neighbourhoods to vote for Chowdri 
Abdullah.
The issue of Citizen Community Boards (CCBs) also clearly illustrates how 
devolution failed in its stated goal of empowering people and making politicians more 
accountable. The voluntary CCBs, described earlier, fell under the purview of the union 
council. With Chowdri Abdullah as union council nazim not only did no such voluntary 
organisation emerge but almost no one that I spoke to was aware of what CCBs were 
supposed to be. In any case, it is unlikely that, even if they had been aware of them and 
their function, they would have seen any benefit in creating one.
It therefore appears that landlord politicians largely used the new local 
government structure to reproduce the highly personalised, patronage-based politics that 
they had always practiced. As illustrated in chapter three, such factional patronage
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politics was based on loose alliances between individuals, often joined by kinship and 
friendship ties but also by purely instrumental ties arising from shared interests and 
enmities, who sought to appropriate the spoils of power. A further characteristic of this 
factional patronage-based politics was that in rural areas its leadership was restricted to 
a relatively small elite emerging from the landed classes. By virtue of both these 
characteristics factional patronage politics was incompatible with the two ostensible 
principal aims of the devolution programme, accountability and participation, which 
rested on fair and open representation for the public at large. These politicians did not 
seek power with the public in mind but rather to benefit their own factions composed of 
close kin, friends, allies and clients. The fact that the political leadership were members 
of the powerful landed class made reduced their accountability that much further, since 
few villagers were likely to risk standing up to or questioning the likes of Chowdri 
Abdullah or his counterparts.
The August 2005 Union Council Elections
It is worth considering the August 2005 union council elections in some detail to 
shed further light on why elections in Pakistan, both under the devolution programme 
and more generally, failed to empower ordinary citizens. One obvious reason for this 
was that many kammis had to vote according to the dictates of their chowdri. However, 
even those kammis who weren’t under the direct authority of any single chowdri and 
could therefore cast their vote freely didn’t feel that they would derive any benefit from 
it. On the contrary, many believed that by casting their vote for one or the other 
candidate they risked incurring the ill will of one or another of their local chowdris. For 
them, their vote could at best be a source of cash from candidates willing to buy it. In
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short and for reasons already discussed, both chowdris and kammis had good reason to 
believe that only wealthy and powerful individuals could become effective leaders. 
Elections were therefore seen as a means of obtaining powerful patrons rather as a 
chance of participating in governance, and the fact that various forms of pre-poll and 
poll day rigging took place further confirmed the view that elections were simply a 
contest to reveal who wielded the most power by winning.
But by what means were these outcomes brought about? How did factions and 
their candidates actually go about gaining people’s votes, and what forms of 
interference prevented the electoral process from empowering—or even just feeling like 
it could empower—the majority of villagers? To answer these questions, four aspects of 
the 2005 elections will be considered: nomination, campaigning, rigging and the polling 
day itself.
Nomination
As noted earlier, the union council election of August 2005 followed a five year 
period where chowdri Nawaz Ali’s faction had been forced underground and where 
Chowdri Abdullah had become union council nazim for Gullhapur. In doing so,
Chowdri Abdullah came generally to be seen as the most important and powerful 
politician in Bek Sagrana. By 2005, however, Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his faction had 
returned to the political scene and allied themselves with Chowdri Ghulam Ali 
Midhiana. Given that Chowdri Haq Nawaz was the head of the Ghulam Baksh Ke 
faction in Bek Sagrana, and that he was the person in the union council of Gullapur with 
the greatest interest in defeating Chowdri Abdullah, he would have been the most 
obvious person for Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s faction to agree upon as candidate for union 
council nazim. The fact that Chowdri Haq Nawaz was a close relative of Chowdri 
Nawaz Ali also suggested him as an obvious candidate since this meant that he was
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more likely to share political and economic interests than someone more distantly 
related would. Moreover, the fact that he was one of the wealthier Gondals of Bek 
Sagrana meant that he would be able to raise sufficient funds to finance a significant 
proportion of electoral campaign costs, which could run up to and over Rs. 800,000. And 
last but not least, the fact that he could mobilise armed men also argued for his 
suitability to the challenge of taking on Chowdri Abdullah.187
Nevertheless there were various problems with putting forth Chowdri Haq 
Nawaz’s as a candidate. Chowdri Nawaz Ali and his siblings realised that his bad 
reputation would be a liability to the faction. Even though Chowdri Nawaz Ali and 
Chowdri Mazhar Ali knew that many people would still vote for Chowdri Haq Nawaz 
simply because he was the representative of more powerful politicians such as 
themselves, they also realised the importance of enticing swing voters whose vote might 
be lost because they disapproved of Chowdri Haq Nawaz. Additionally, the fact that his 
philandering had once been publicised in the Sargodha press and that he had a criminal 
record rendered his application for candidacy unlikely to be accepted by the 
government, particularly since it was well known that he was part of a faction which 
opposed the Musharraf government.
It was therefore necessary for Chowdri Nawaz Ali to find another candidate who 
would ideally be a wealthy close relative and would additionally have his own 
connections with influential people. The candidate needed to be wealthy because this 
would enable him to fund his electoral campaign, and he needed to have his own 
connections because this would make him an effective patron. The first alternative to be 
considered was Chowdri Mahmood Abbas, who was Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s nephew and
187 Obviously this also meant that he had muscle he could also use to coerce voters to vote for 
him, or at least to deter them from voting against him.
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the husband of Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s sister.188 Not only was Chowdri Mahmood Abbas 
a close relative, but he was also a wealthy landlord and the son of the pious Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas, who was the second largest landowner in Bek Sagrana after Chowdri Abdullah. 
Chowdri Mahmood Abbas was a lawyer who had studied at the Christian Foreman 
College in Lahore, which was the city where he continued to spend most of his time and 
where his two sons were being educated.189 He was well connected and had a reputation 
for being a sharif admi, a pious, noble man who abstained from immoral activities. 
Chowdri Mahmood Abbas, unlike Chowdri Haq Nawaz, had never touched a drop of 
alcohol, had never been involved in criminal activities and remained relatively aloof 
from village strife; accordingly he had no criminal record and was not a particularly 
divisive figure. Furthermore, Chowdri Mahmood Abbas was likely to take up the offer 
of running for union council nazim because he bore a personal grudge against Chowdri 
Abdullah who had recently belittled him in public.
The fact that Chowdri Mahmood was a sharif admi had its advantages as well as 
its disadvantages, however. As noted, the advantages included the fact that he wasn’t a 
divisive figure and that few people, other than possibly Chowdri Abdullah, had any 
significant quarrel with him. His status would also provide a cover of respectability for 
Chowdri Haq Nawaz who would continue playing a prominent role in the Ghulam 
Baksh Ke faction. The disadvantage was that being a sharif admi could suggest that a 
person was neither comfortable nor familiar with the political utility of violence and 
force, and would therefore be ineffective in a political context which required leaders 
that were ready to face up to powerful opponents by these and other means. What’s 
more, when people referred to Chowdri Mahmood as a sharif admi they implied that he
188 See kinship diagram on page 120. The nephew in question was the son of Chowdri Nawaz 
Ali’s sister.
189 At Aitcheson College.
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was not only apt to be ineffective but that he was also lazy. Both villagers and relatives 
illustrated his laziness through the fact that Chowdri Mahmood paid little attention to 
his lands and that his labourers did as they pleased and frequently stole from him. Even 
his father once publicly reprimanded him after Chowdri Mahmood left his wheat 
standing several weeks after everyone else had harvested theirs. His father called him a 
badshah admi, a term indicating a person who lived a kingly lifestyle and who had little 
concern for work.190 As a result of the widespread perception that he was lazy, several 
people in the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction quietly voiced their concern about how 
effective Chowdri Mahmood would be both in running his campaign and, in case he 
won, in his subsequent position as union council nazim.
The most reasonable alternative to Chowdri Mahmood who was willing to run in 
the elections against Chowdri Abdullah was Dr. Shafique Gondal, a distant Gondal 
cousin of Chowdri Haq Nawaz who owned land in Bek Sagrana. Unlike Chowdri 
Mahmood who came from a higher-ranking family of Gondals, Dr. Shafique’s family 
came from the Gondals’ middle ranks. Nevertheless, Dr. Shafique’s father owned some 
fifteen acres of citrus orchard that had permitted him to send all of his three sons to 
university in Sargodha. The eldest of the three was now a police inspector working in 
the office of the Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) in Sargodha, and the 
youngest worked at the government education board in Sargodha. Dr. Shafique, the 
middle son, worked in the Sargodha government health department. The three siblings 
lived in separate rented accommodation in Sargodha and occasionally travelled to the 
village on their motorcycles. All three brothers had a good reputation and there was 
nothing in Dr. Shafique’s personal track record that would have allowed the government 
to interfere with his nomination. Additionally, although Dr. Shafique and his brothers
190 Badshah literally means king.
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were not as wealthy or as well connected with the mighty of the land as were some of 
the wealthier Gondals, they were still in a position to pull strings for their relatives and 
to dispense patronage to villagers. Dr. Shafique’s younger brother (who worked in the 
Sargodha Education Board) had, for example, obtained a job for the son of the Imam 
Masjid as a school teacher in his home village. He had also helped another villager 
obtain a high school matriculation certificate even though the man in question had never 
completed high school. Dr. Shafique’s elder brother (who worked at the ASP’s office in 
Sargodha) had helped a few villagers in sorting out problems with the police. Dr. 
Shafique himself had helped obtain hospital treatment for several people in Bek Sagrana 
and the surrounding area and was promising to use his position to secure government 
jobs as low ranking hospital chowkidars and cleaners for others.
Despite his relatively solid position in the village Dr. Shafique would have been 
unlikely to run in the elections at all if he had not been put forward by one of the more 
powerful village chowdris. Dr. Shafique had neither the financial means nor the power 
to stand independently of either Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s or Chowdri Abdullah’s faction. 
As discussed earlier, election costs could run up to Rs. 800,000 and beyond, covering 
everything from fuel for vehicles to payment for votes, and the funding of minor 
infrastructural projects to payment for meals and campaign advertisements. Funds were 
also required to provide poorer voters with transport to the polling station on election 
day. In addition, Dr. Shafique was likely to be thought of as a weak candidate by the 
electorate if he didn’t have the backing of influential politicians. As noted, the electorate 
expected and wanted powerful and well connected politicians since they were the 
people who could deliver on promises of patronage. Furthermore, especially against a 
figure as powerful and well connected as Chowdri Abdullah, a candidate who wasn’t
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well connected risked being intimidated and victimised through the threat of force and 
the use of the judiciary and its processes.
Thus, Dr. Shafique only decided to run in the union council elections because he 
had been asked to do so by Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s faction through Chowdri Haq Nawaz. 
The campaign expenses were principally going to be covered by a collective effort of 
the principal stakeholders including Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Haq Nawaz, as 
well as by occasional contributions in the form of a vehicle or a meal by other 
supporters including Chowdri Mahmood . The latter, for example, put his car at the 
disposal of Dr. Shafique for more than ten days and paid for a great deal of the fuel 
expenses incurred by the extensive daily travel to various households and villages in the 
union council of Gullapur by the candidates and their close supporters. Nevertheless, 
the principal support for Dr. Shafique came from Chowdri Haq Nawaz who was 
constantly at his side throughout his campaign and who put his vehicle, funds and 
gunmen at Dr. Shafique’s disposal.191
Although a reputation for piety and gentleness could help a candidate by making 
him more likeable to the electorate making it harder for the government to find an 
excuse to refuse his nomination, put simply it was wealth and the capacity to mobilise 
force that were crucial in determining whether a candidate was able to run in an 
election. It is for this reason that Chowdri Haq Nawaz and Chowdri Abdullah where 
eminently suitable as candidates. In the case of Dr. Shafique, although the fact that he 
was largely considered to be a sharif admi might help the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction 
obtain some extra votes, in the end it was the fact that he had powerful backing that
191 Meanwhile, on the other side of the contest, Chowdri Abdullah decided that he wouldn’t 
personally run for the seat of Union Council nazim that time around, deciding instead to let his younger 
brother Chowdri Ehsanullah run in his place. The reasons for this were unclear but many people in the 
village claimed that it was mainly because Chowdri Ehsanullah had a gentler personality than his choleric 
elder brother and that this might make him more attractive to voters. Nevertheless, it remained an obvious 
fact to the majority of the electorate that just as Chowdri Haq Nawaz remained the main force behind Dr. 
Shafique, the main force behind Chowdri Ehsanullah was his powerful elder brother Chowdri Abdullah.
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made it possible for him to run as a credible candidate. Had Dr. Shafique simply been a 
sharif admi without the backing of powerful leaders he would not have stood a chance 
in the elections. In fact, despite the backing that he enjoyed of powerful politicians in 
the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction, many ordinary villagers remained sceptical of Dr. 
Shafique’s capacity to deliver patronage. Many villagers, including kammis, thought 
that Dr. Shafique was a nobody, and they underlined their view by pointing to the fact 
that he rode around on a motorcycle while his opponent, Chowdri Abdullah, rode 
around in a brand new Lexus Land Cruiser.
The foregoing makes the reasons that ordinary villagers didn’t present 
themselves as candidates in the union council elections obvious. Given what it took to 
qualify as a candidate in both practical and reputational terms—even to the extent that 
Dr. Shafique, despite his powerful backing and his already respectable personal status 
and contacts, remained a figure of questionable political effectiveness to ordinary 
villagers—the thought of a candidate emerging from the ranks of kammis or labourers 
was unthinkable and literally risible. Muhammad Hussain, discussed in the previous 
chapter, explained to me that people’s mentality was such that if a kammi stood up to 
contest elections everyone would laugh at him. Not only would the chowdris laugh at 
him (and possibly punish him for insubordination), but his fellow kammis would also 
find him ridiculous. Hussain said that people would completely discount a poor 
politician who didn’t campaign with a large convoy of cars and cohort of gunmen.
Hussain concluded that the reason that the poor were oppressed and powerless
was the result of their mentality, which worshipped the outward signs of power and
wealth. Yet the poor had good reason to believe that only the rich and powerful could be
effective politicians. Because politics was largely about power and patronage it was
obvious to people that a poor kammi, even in the unlikely event that he managed to be
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elected as union council nazim, would almost certain to be unable to deliver patronage 
to his clients in the same way that a well connected zamindar would. Since the majority 
of influential politicians and civil servants in the district and the Provincial Government 
belonged to elite zamindar families—and were also connected to each other through 
kinship and friendship ties—a union councillor who was a zamindar was obviously 
much more likely to be able to mobilise contacts in order to deliver patronage than a 
kammi. Thus, if even Dr. Shafique’s power was questionable to members of the 
electorate (let alone the fact that the faction that supported him was currently out of 
power) the notion of a kammi even standing as a candidate represented a simple 
impossibility.
Campaigning
For both Chowdri Abdullah and Dr. Shafique the key to winning the union 
council Elections was their capacity to gain the allegiance of the various heads of 
zamindar families living in the thirteen villages that comprised the union council of 
Gullapur. By gaining the allegiance of these zamindars, the majority of whom were 
middle-ranking and owned less than fifty acres of land, the candidates sought to win not 
only the votes of entire households (which included close servants), but also the votes of 
these zamindars’ dependent and client households. It was often the case that members of 
zamindar households voted according to the decision of their household’s head. Where 
heads of households had conflicting loyalties or desired to remain neutral they either 
told their household members to abstain from voting altogether or instructed them to 
split their votes equally between the candidates.192 Zamindar household heads could 
also determine the way their tenants, labourers and kammis voted. As a result, 
campaigners tended to bypass kammis and labourers who were known to be under the
192 In cases where heads of households had little interest in the outcome of the elections, 
individuals within the households often just disposed of their votes as they saw fit.
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authority of a particular chowdri and simply approached the latter for their votes 
instead. In fact directly approaching kammis without first consulting the chowdri under 
whose authority they lived was likely to be interpreted as a challenge to his authority.
In order to obtain the votes of these zamindars, candidates relied upon both 
friendship and patronage. Candidates could rely upon their close supporters to mobilise 
their zamindar friends on their behalf since friends were supposed to support each other 
politically. In cases where the core faction members had neither kinship nor friendship 
ties with particular zamindars these zamindars had to be won over either with promises 
of future patronage or, more effectively, by offering them immediate patronage. Thus, 
approximately two months before the elections candidates from both sides could be 
found busily travelling around the district trying to resolve different zamindars’ issues 
in order to gain their votes. Among other things, candidates became involved in 
resolving land disputes, mediating with the police, getting people treated in hospital, 
getting school teachers to attend to their duties, and repairing municipal infrastructure 
such as roads, bridges, phone lines and gutters.
Although Dr. Shafique was able to resolve several police disputes thanks to his
elder brother’s help and was also able to get some people treated in hospital, Chowdri
Abdullah had a significant advantage when it came to granting patronage for two
obvious reasons: because he was the incumbent union council nazim and because he
was aligned with the ruling coalition. In one instance for example, some Ranjha Jat
cultivators who lived along the irrigation canal downstream from Gullapur essentially
offered to give their votes to whichever candidate built a bridge over the irrigation canal
for them. Although several bridges already existed, the cultivators complained that they
had to walk thirty minutes upstream to get to the closest one and that this caused them
unnecessary delays. Dr. Shafique had been the first candidate to approach them in order
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to find out what they needed in hopes of gaining their votes. Although Dr. Shafique 
didn’t have the Rs. 100,000 that building the bridge would cost at his immediate 
disposal, he promised the cultivators to return after a week with the necessary funds. 
Before the week had passed, however, Chowdri Abdullah, who had access to local 
government funds, appeared in the hamlet and offered the cultivators a cheque for 
Rs. 100,000 on the spot to cover the costs of the bridge, on condition that they all went 
into the local mosque and made a vow to give him their votes. The cultivators happily 
accepted the offer and Dr. Shafique lost out because he had been unable to muster funds 
quickly enough.
Similarly Chowdri Abdullah managed to snatch a number of zamindar votes 
away from Dr. Shafique by getting the authorities to install a telephone line for them. 
The zamindars in question, who lived downstream from Bek Sagrana, had tried to get 
the relevant authority to install a phone line for years but had failed to make any 
progress. With the onset of elections Dr. Shafique had promised to help them. However, 
Chowdri Abdullah managed to get the relevant authorities moving before Dr. Shafique 
was able to do anything, and he accordingly gained their votes. Apparently Chowdri 
Abdullah achieved this by getting MNA Khuda Baksh Mekan to pull strings in the 
relevant ministry, providing another obvious example of the power of connections in 
political outcomes.
Although the bulk of patronage was dispensed to existing and potential 
supporters from zamindar families, in certain instances both factions did try to reach out 
directly to kammis and landless labourers. This was generally done in cases where these 
people were either not under the direct authority of any particular chowdri or where the 
chowdri under whose authority they were desired to remain neutral or was indifferent 
about the elections. People who weren’t directly under the influence of particular
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chowdris included some who lived in the Bhutto colonies, some who lived in villages 
and who earned an independent livelihood from the chowdris and some who had settled 
on government land adjacent to paved roads. Unlike people who settled around the 
farmhouses (deras) of chowdris or in a house on their fields and who were therefore 
generally supposed to vote for whomever their chowdri told them to vote for, voters 
who weren’t directly under the authority of any particular chowdri were free to cast 
their vote however they pleased.
In most cases these independent voters were cynical and were themselves 
indifferent about the elections since they believed that they had nothing to gain from 
them. Many kammis that I spoke to during the campaign period told me that chowdris 
who had a stake in the elections suddenly became friendly and greeted them as they 
drove past. One day a Mussalli who lived in a Bhutto colony and earned his livelihood 
independently of any Gondal chowdri, told me that one of the Gondals campaigning 
with Dr. Shafique even got out of his car to greet him and ask him for his vote. He 
commented that this was unthinkable outside of electoral campaigning when if a Gondal 
addressed him it would be either to boss him around or to insult him. Like many others 
he told me that as soon as the campaigning was over things would revert to the old way.
Another factor that contributed to the cynicism and indifference of these less 
privileged voters was the fact that although they were relatively independent from the 
chowdris many of them preferred not to take sides so as not to provoke ill will from any 
of the chowdris concerned. As was indicated in the previous chapter even kammis who 
lived in the colonies or at the side of the road on government land sometimes had to ask 
for permission from neighbouring chowdris to settle there and had to remain on good 
terms with them subsequently. Even if this wasn’t the case many still preferred not to 
risk provoking ill will in case an issue arose in the future where they might need the
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cooperation of a chowdri. As a result even those people who were actually planning on 
supporting a particular candidate kept it quiet and appeared nervous about revealing 
their preference when asked either by myself or other villagers. Part of the reason for 
this was that they were keenly aware of the fact that there were informants among the 
villagers who might reveal their voting intentions either out of a personal grudge or 
simply in order to ingratiate themselves with a particular chowdri. In any case, many 
people preferred not to take sides or vote at all, even if they privately believed that a 
particular candidate might possibly be better than another. This was not only out of fear 
of being found out through informants prior to the election but also out of fear of being 
found out on polling day, where the secrecy of the ballot box was far from adequately 
ensured.
In the case of independent landless villagers who were either indifferent to the 
elections or who desired to remain impartial out of fear of displeasing any of the 
chowdris, the most effective way of securing their votes was to buy them with cash. Dr. 
Shafique’s limited funds meant that he was largely unable to do this, but chowdri 
Abdullah managed to secure a large number of votes in the two days prior to the 
elections by paying people ifa.500 for their vote. Several people including Dr. Shafique 
commented that by buying people’s votes Chowdri Abdullah was effectively carrying 
out a commercial transaction that absolved him of any future responsibility towards his 
voters. Dr. Shafique explained to me that in the future if any one of those individuals 
whose votes Chowdri Abdullah had purchased went to him in order to obtain patronage 
he would simply turn them away by telling them that they had already received money 
for their votes. Those people who obtained cash for their votes realised this, but when 
queried about it many of them said that cash in hand was better than promises which 
were likely to remain unfulfilled. For them at least Chowdri Abdullah had something to
offer immediately while Dr. Shafique could only make promises. In this light it can be 
said that even for independent voters elections did not represent an opportunity for 
political empowerment.
Rigging
Another important reason why the elections were regarded with cynicism and 
indifference by kammis and landless labourers was that they took it for granted that 
both sides were involved in a wide array of electoral manipulations which made a 
mockery out of the idea of fair elections. It was clear to everyone that the wealthiest and 
most powerful candidate was likely to win. This was not only because people believed 
that a powerful candidate was a more effective patron and because he would be able to 
obtain people’s votes through patronage and cash, but also because he was more likely 
to be able to rig the elections in his favour. Once again Chowdri Abdullah had a distinct 
advantage when it came to both pre-poll rigging and polling day rigging by virtue of the 
fact that he was the incumbent union council nazim and that he was aligned with the 
ruling PML-Q coalition. This didn’t mean that his opponents were merely rendered 
victims of General Musharraf s government, and that they didn’t have their own means 
of rigging elections in their favour, however. It is worth emphasising this point because 
both the printed press and international observers, including the International Crisis 
Group, have tended to emphasise the rigging carried out by Musharraf s government. 
Although it is true that an overwhelming proportion of the rigging was carried out by 
the government, this didn’t make opposition politicians paragons of democratic virtue. 
Another problem with focussing almost solely on rigging by pro-government supporters 
is that doing so seems to assume that Musharraf s military backed coalition had the 
monopoly of power whereas in fact opposition politicians could often wield their own
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power against the ruling coalition by virtue of their local strangleholds and influence at 
various levels of government.
Chowdri Abdullah’s access to government funds was one among many of the 
means at his disposal to carry out pre-poll rigging. Additionally, as the incumbent pro- 
government union council nazim, Chowdri Abdullah had an important degree of 
influence over the issuing of identity cards, which were necessary for voting, and 
enjoyed a significant measure of support from the local police. Because a large number 
of people in the union council didn’t possess identity cards Chowdri Abdullah obtained 
them for people who were planning on voting for his brother. Dr. Shafique complained 
that through his influence on the issuing of identity cards Chowdri Abdullah was also 
able to create hurdles to obtaining them for people whom he suspected were planning 
on voting against him. Dr. Shafique also alleged that Chowdri Abdullah’s faction 
managed to obtain up to two hundred fake identity cards for supporters. Although this 
figure may not have been accurate there is no doubt that fraudulent identity cards were 
issued. This was accomplished by having identity cards issued in the names of people 
who were on the electoral register but who had died and had not yet had their names 
removed from it. Chowdri Abdullah gave these cards to supporters who for whatever 
reason were not on the electoral register themselves. Some identity cards were also 
given to supporters who both already had one and were already on the electoral register 
simply so that they could present themselves to vote twice.193
Chowdri Abdullah also managed to use police support to undermine his 
opponents’ chances of electoral success. One of the ways in which he did this was by 
using them to entangle his opponents in fabricated cases of abduction and theft. This 
was not only an effort to make his opponents lose money and time extracting
193 A former employee of Chowdri Abdullah showed me one of these identity cards, it had his 
picture on it but another man’s name to go with it.
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themselves from the police investigations (and possibly even to eliminate them 
completely from the electoral contest), but also to discredit them in the eyes of the 
electorate for their apparent involvement in criminal activities. On one occasion 
Chowdri Abdullah managed to get several people belonging to the coalition formed by 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali and Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana detained for the illegal 
possession of weapons as they were driving towards a political rally to be held in the 
village of Bek Sagrana. Chowdri Abdullah had heard about the rally and had called 
upon his contacts in the local police to stop them and check their cars for unregistered 
weapons. Far from unusual, the possession of unregistered weapons by politicians was 
commonplace, and given that his opponents, who were duly stopped at several police 
checkpoints, did have unregistered weapons with them, they were detained by the police 
for several hours and thereby prevented from attending the rally. When this happened 
Chowdri Haq Nawaz and Dr. Shafique were quick to conclude that Chowdri Abdullah 
had been behind the actions of the police since having three of their cars stopped 
separately on the same day was unlikely to be merely coincidental. The fact that I later 
heard a close supporter of Chowdri Abdullah boasting about how they had got their 
opponents into trouble with the police lends credibility to Chowdri Haq Nawaz and Dr. 
Shafique’s conclusions about Chowdri Abdullah’s involvement in the affair.
A few days after the unregistered weapons episode, Chowdri Abdullah allegedly 
tried to get Chowdri Haq Nawaz entangled in a case of buffalo theft. One night one of 
Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s gunmen, who was actually covertly working for Chowdri 
Abdullah, stole two buffaloes and placed them in Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s dera. Having 
done this the gunman fled to Chowdri Abdullah’s dera under cover of darkness. The 
next morning before dawn the police, acting on a tipoff, raided Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s 
dera to retrieve the stolen buffallos and arrested two of his servants. The two servants
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appeared not to know anything about the stolen buffalos and claimed that the first time 
they had seen them was that morning. Chowdri Haq Nawaz happened to be away that 
night but when he heard of the situation he appeared genuinely surprised and it took him 
little time to conclude that Chowdri Abdullah must somehow have been involved. This 
was later confirmed when he was summoned to the police station where the Station 
House Officer (SHO) wanted to file an FIR against him. Although the SHO was 
rumoured to be in cahoots with Chowdri Abdullah another officer who was on good 
terms with Chowdri Haq Nawaz told him, in my presence, that the person who had 
called to inform them about the stolen buffalos in his dera was none other than Chowdri 
Abdullah. In the end although the SHO threatened to place an FIR against Chowdri Haq 
Nawaz this never happened because Chowdri Nawaz Ali was able to use his own 
contacts higher up in the police hierarchy to prevent it. Nevertheless, Chowdri Abdullah 
was somewhat successful in his attempt to discredit Chowdri Haq Nawaz in the eyes of 
the public because the case was published in the Sargodha press. His success was 
limited, however, because most people in the village didn’t read the papers and 
suspected political intrigue in any case. They were well aware that even though 
Chowdri Haq Nawaz might have been involved in a case of buffalo theft that Chowdri 
Abdullah himself was not above engaging in such activities. The foregoing examples 
illustrate well the chess game played by politicians at election time, marshalling their 
respective resources in the form of influence and contacts both offensively and 
defensively in a variety of shady gambits.
In the buffalo episode, Chowdri Nawaz Ali was able to mobilise some of his
own contacts to counter Chowdri Abdullah’s move against him. Later he was also able
to pull strings with the local judiciary in order to obtain favourable results during the
polling. The fact that Chowdri Nawaz Ali was a lawyer and had various friends in the
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local judiciary meant that he was able to influence where the polling stations would be 
located. As an example of this influence, although in the union council of Gullapur 
Chowdri Nawaz Ali was unable to have the polling stations located in friendly territory 
he was at least able to ensure that they weren’t located in enemy territory. This meant 
that the polling stations were located where the supporters of both factions were roughly 
equal in numbers and strength, and that no one faction would be able to take over the 
polling station wholesale.
In at least one instance Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s influence within the judicial 
system also allowed him to have a polling officer placed who was favourable to his 
faction and was therefore prepared to overlook an array of electoral malpractices in 
favour of it. Even though Chowdri Nawaz Ali was unable to secure a favourable polling 
officer in Bek Sagrana, he did manage to have one that was favourable to his faction 
placed in Bukhuwala. The village of Bukhuwala, Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s village of 
residence, wasn’t part of the union council of Gullapur but was in one of the many 
union councils that Chowdri Ghulam Ali Midhiana and Chowdri Nawaz Ali sought to 
capture. In Bukhuwala the electoral contest was between Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s 
candidate, who was a paternal cousin of his, and a Makhdoom from a neighbouring 
village who was part of the larger pro-government political block that included Chowdri 
Abdullah and the MNA Khuda Baksh Mekan. Because the Makhdooms were the pro- 
government faction they like Chowdri Abdullah had various advantages over their rivals 
which, among other things, included a judiciary that was manipulated in favour of pro- 
government candidates. Despite this Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s contacts within the judiciary 
allowed him to obtain a favourable polling officer. However, because the judiciary was 
overwhelmingly influenced to favour pro-govemment candidates, the only way he was 
able to achieve this was by making the polling officer pretend to the Makhdooms that he
was working in their favour. Thus the Makhdooms were deceived into believing that the 
polling officer at the Bukhuwala polling station would work on their behalf while in fact 
on the day of the elections he overlooked a great deal of rigging which took place in 
favour of Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s candidate. Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s cunning in this case 
was greatly admired and praised by his followers and allies.
Polling Day
From early morning on the day of the elections both factions were busy 
coordinating transport to transport people who had pledged to vote for them to the 
polling station. Chowdri Abdullah’s brother owned the bus which provided the principal 
transport service between the village and Sarogodha. On polling day the service was 
suspended and the bus was used to bring supporters of Chowdri Abdullah and his 
brother back and forth between their villages and the polling station. Chowdri Abdullah 
also secured another bus through the government, which had hired a large number of 
buses for pro-govemment candidates. When it came to fetching more influential voters 
from zamindar biraderis, Chowdri Abdullah dispatched his Lexus Land Cruiser and his 
brother’s new Toyota Corolla.
On Dr. Shafique’s side there were no buses but the candidates managed to
gather a number of vehicles from friends and supporters, including two pickup trucks
which could be filled with a number of voters. Around the polling station, which was
situated inside the village school, both factions set up large tents where people were
offered meat, roti and sweet rice as well as cold lemonade (skanjbi) made with local
citrus as an added incentive to come and vote. This gave the elections the festive feel of
a wedding. In fact for many locals who had little to gain or lose in these elections
polling day was very much seen as a festive occasion where they could obtain free food
and drink as well as observe the village leaders and gossip about them. This gossip ran
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from speculations about their chances of success in the polls to the various conspiracies 
surrounding the elections, as well as to the various quarrels between members of the 
two opposing factions in the preceding weeks. Many people, particularly the young, 
also looked forward to a bit of entertainment in the form of a quarrel during the polling. 
For many of the poorer villagers and children who weren’t even going to vote this was 
an occasion to eat as much as they could, and some of them even ate and drank from the 
two enemy tents.
After weeks of campaigning and entanglements with the police as a result of 
Chowdri Abdullah’s Machiavellian schemes the nerves of Chowdri Haq Nawaz and his 
supporters were frayed, and on the night prior to polling day Chowdri Haq Nawaz 
repeatedly declared that if Chowdri Abdullah continued with his interference during the 
polling he was going to take him on personally. He even declared that either himself or 
Chowdri Abdullah would have to die because it wasn’t possible for both of them to 
coexist in the same village. Although in the end neither of them lost their lives there 
were various instances throughout the day when irregularities at the polling station 
almost did erupt into gunfights. The inside of the polling station was very disorderly and 
there were many people loitering in it who weren’t officially supposed to be there.
Some of these were chowdris from both factions who were there to look out for any 
irregularities in the polling. There were two reasons why it was they rather than the 
police and the polling officers who carried out this task. The first was that the police had 
insufficient staff to oversee the elections, and the second was that neither party was sure 
that either the police or the returning officers would be impartial, and they therefore 
demanded the right to oversee the proceedings themselves. In this instance it was 
Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s faction that was particularly keen on overseeing the proceedings
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given that its members knew that the police favoured Chowdri Abdullah. They also 
suspected the polling officers of favouring him too.194
Although the chowdris inside the polling station were supposed to put a check 
on polling irregularities, that didn’t prevent some of them from trying to influence the 
results in favour of their candidate whenever their opponents were insufficiently 
vigilant. They did this by intimidating voters and looking over people’s shoulders to see 
how they were casting their votes. In other instances some chowdris grabbed people’s 
ballots from them and filled them in according to their own wishes. When quarrels 
between the two factions broke out it was generally because a member from one faction 
had seen a member from the opposing faction putting pressure on a voter and looking 
over the voter’s shoulder as the selections were made. In one instance, for example, a 
chowdri who supported Dr. Shafique had seen a chowdri who supported Chowdri 
Ehsanullah whispering something into a kammi’s ear presumably telling him how to 
vote, and then looking over the kammi’s shoulder to make sure that he cast his vote 
correctly. Seeing this the chowdri who supported Dr. Shafique began to complain about 
the interference and soon a heated argument was in full swing with both parties started 
hurling accusations at each other and threatening to draw their guns. The quarrel ended 
only after the village Imam interfered and made all the parties involved hold each 
other’s hands and raise them in unison while reciting the Islamic profession of faith 
(ikalma). Chowdri Haq Nawaz however was left muttering about how by the end of the 
day either he or Chowdri Abdullah would be no more.
In addition to the chowdris there to oversee the polling process there were other 
people who tried, and were often successful in the effort, to cast their votes several 
times and who added to the disorder inside the polling station. One person admitted to
194 The fact that the police supported Chowdri Abdullah was later confirmed when the head 
policeman celebrated Chowdri Abdullah’s victory once the results came out.
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me that he had voted four times. One youth even told me that he had cast his vote twice 
for Chowdri Ehsanullah and twice for Dr. Shafique simply for the fun of it and because 
he didn’t really care what the result of the elections turned out to be. One chowdri who 
wasn’t even on the electoral register boasted to me about how he had cast his vote in 
favour of Dr. Shafique three times. There were several factors that made irregularities of 
this sort possible. To begin with, the chaos inside the polling station was such that the 
polling officers had a hard time following what was happening. Additionally there was 
the possibility, mentioned above, that certain polling officers were ready to overlook 
multiple voting in favour of one or the other of the candidates. Even polling officers 
who were impartial and honest appeared to want to avoid raising too many objections if 
someone was caught casting his vote twice because they were afraid of the chowdris. A 
friend of mine who worked as a polling officer on two occasions told me that polling 
officers preferred not to antagonise certain chowdris who were reputed to be violent by 
pointing out irregularities carried out in their favour. The fact that the ballots didn’t 
have voters’ numbers on them also meant that once they were inside the polling station 
people could try and pick up and cast as many ballots as they wished, and also that there 
was no way of telling how many times an individual may have voted after the ballot 
boxes were opened.
There were others who added to the disorder inside the polling station by being 
there to spy on behalf of the chowdris in order to discover if the people who had 
pledged their votes, sometimes in exchange for money, actually kept their promises. 
Some of these ‘spies’ also gave assistance to illiterate voters who didn’t quite 
understand how they were supposed to vote to fill in their ballots, which allowed them 
to ensure that the voters cast them for the correct candidate. Finally there some people 
who were simply hanging around inside the polling station for the fun of it and for a
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little bit of gossip. Once in a while police officers, who spent most of their time in the 
tents eating and drinking, would barge in and unceremoniously expel some of the 
people who weren’t chowdris and who had no business inside the polling station. After 
a while, however, the same chaos would return and the police would eventually repeat 
the same exercise all over again.
After the voting had been completed by mid-afternoon, the hard core supporters 
of each faction stayed on around the polling station until nine o’clock in the evening 
when the results were released. Although the results were never officially published in 
the village, Chowdri Abdullah appeared to have won by a comfortable margin. People 
claimed that his lead in the village of Bek Sagrana was of about one hundred and fifty 
votes. The moment the results came out the supporters of Chowdri Abdullah began 
shooting rounds into the air with their Kalashnikovs and taunting the supporters of Dr. 
Shafique. That night celebratory shooting was heard until late, and over the next few 
days samosas and jalebis were distributed to supporters who went to congratulate 
(mubarak dena) Chowdri Ehsanullah and Chowdri Abdullah on their victory.195
There were no celebrations on Dr. Shafique’s side although they comforted 
themselves with the idea that their faction was the more popular one and that Chowdri 
Abdullah had won only because of fraud. They alleged that he had played all sorts of 
tricks on them, purchased votes, tampered with the voting lists, and issued hundreds of 
fake identity cards. Chowdri Haq Nawaz was unable to contain his bitterness, and on 
the day after the elections he threatened to ban the Rajputs from using their community 
centre adjacent to his land because they had voted for Chowdri Abdullah. The fact that 
the secrecy of the ballot was not ensured meant that it did not take a long time for the
195 The giving of food was considered meritorious and was a way of gaining savaab or spiritual 
credit. The issue of feeding people and gaining savaab as a result of their gratefulness and their prayers 
will be explored in a following chapter.
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chowdris to ascertain who had voted for whom. Chowdri Haq Nawaz was particularly 
angry with the Rajputs because he claimed that Chowdri Nawaz Ali had given them 
their community centre and had even provided some of them with government jobs. 
Following Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s threat of eviction one of the Rajputs who used the 
community centre appealed to one of Chowdri Haq Nawaz’s close supporters known to 
be a level headed man in order to stop Chowdri Haq Nawaz from taking action against 
them. The chowdri had reasoned with Chowdri Haq Nawaz and had eventually 
convinced him that he should be merciful, in part because evicting the Rajputs would 
only lessen his chances of winning future elections.
Although Chowdri Nawaz Ali’s candidate was able to defeat the Makhdoom 
candidate in his home village of Bukhuwala (partly thanks to the friendly polling 
officer), it also became clear on the day following the elections that the alliance which 
included Chowdri Abdullah had managed to win the majority of union council seats in 
the area. This meant that they would be able to gain a district nazim favourable to their 
interests. Even though Chowdri Nawaz Ali vowed to contest the results through the 
local courts on the basis that they were the result of rigging, he and his allies would 
have to wait until 2008 in order to regain some of the political power that they had lost 
since Musharraf s takeover.
Conclusions
This chapter has shown that there is a substantial amount of evidence indicating 
that the intentions behind General Musharraf s devolution programme differed from its 
stated aims. It is true that Musharraf s devolution programme, in a departure from 
similar programmes implemented by his military predecessors, envisaged the abolition 
of the position of Deputy Commissioner and placed significant emphasis on popular
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empowerment. However, evidence provided in reports by the International Crisis Group 
and as a result of fieldwork suggests that like previous local government schemes the 
devolution programme actually sought to consolidate the power of the government at 
the centre. To achieve this the programme was implemented without the participation of 
political parties in order to prevent the opposition from coalescing effectively and to 
keep politicians focused on local issues. Additionally the government consolidated its 
position through the local government programme by using it as a partisan device to 
dispense patronage to supporters and withhold it from opponents. Pre-poll and polling 
day rigging during local government elections in favour of pro-government candidates 
provides even further evidence of the way in which the local government system was 
used and abused in order to consolidate Musharraf s and his PML-Q coalition’s hold on 
power.
Additionally, it was argued that even if we assume that Musharraf s devolution 
programme was actually well intentioned its apolitical nature meant that it was largely 
doomed to failure from the start. The apolitical nature of the programme consisted in the 
fact that it was devised by technocrats from above rather than being the result of a 
popular movement seeking political empowerment. It largely failed to address 
fundamental issues about the local distribution of political and economic resources and 
was therefore likely simply to reproduce elite factional politics under the cloak of a new 
institutional framework. The present chapter sought to demonstrate that this is in fact 
what happened in Bek Sagrana where the contest to gain control over the local 
government system largely took place within the dominant Gondal biraderi. There 
members of rival factions sought to consolidate their hold over the district government 
and thus over the means of distributing and obtaining patronage. It was shown that since 
the majority of locals had neither the funds to contest elections nor the contacts in
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government necessary for the distribution of patronage required of politicians, no one 
who wasn’t a zamindar, or even a Gondal, seriously considered the possibility of 
participating in elections unless it was with the support of an influential chowdri.
As a result the electoral process, described in the second part of the chapter, was 
largely seen and experienced by the majority of the local population as a contest 
between members of the elite in which the common man had little to gain in terms of 
political and economic empowerment. There were several reasons for this. First, the 
electorate was limited to a choice between two candidates that represented the same, 
albeit divided, elite class interests. Second, a significant number kammis and landless 
labourers were told how to vote by their chowdris. Third, widespread rigging meant that 
people saw elections as an exercise that determined which candidate was powerful 
enough to influence results in his favour rather than as a means of securing the will of 
the people; in other words, what determined whether a particular candidate won was 
seen as related to a candidate’s political connections and economic influence. As a 
result the majority of the local population had a cynical and sometimes carefree attitude 
towards the elections such that for many polling day was more of a festive occasion of 
free food, gathering with friends and gossiping than an opportunity to use their vote in 
order to gain political power.
To conclude it is worth pointing out that anecdotal evidence suggests that the
findings presented in this chapter are likely also to be relevant for higher-level
provincial and national elections outside of periods of military government. I gathered
from various conversations with Gondal and other rural politicians that during such
elections they went around collecting votes in much the same way as they did during the
local government elections described above. Just as during the local elections,
candidates often had to fund their own campaigns because despite the fact that political
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parties were participating they often lacked sufficient funds and relied upon powerful 
and wealthy candidates to fund their campaigns for them. Similarly, just as during the 
local council elections, powerful candidates were able to gain votes through a mixture 
of coercion, patronage and cash. Thus for the majority of the rural population in the 
Punjab elections under democratic rule weren’t necessarily any more empowering for 
the masses than were those held under military rule. The principal difference between 
provincial and national elections as compared to local elections was that for candidates 
the costs involved were much greater in the former case, so that it wasn’t uncommon 
during provincial and national elections for politicians to sell land and other assets in 
order to finance their campaigns.196 It was largely assumed that once in power the 
money spent would quickly be regained.
There is also evidence to suggest that pre-poll and polling day rigging was just 
as widespread during national and provincial elections under civilian administrations 
thus further emphasising the point that political parties in Pakistan weren’t necessarily
1 07any more democratic than the military. Anecdotal evidence suggests that when in 
power political parties also tried their best to rig elections in their own favour (although 
possibly less successfully than their military counterparts) by strategically releasing 
government funds and transferring police officers and members of the local judiciaries. 
Often the local stranglehold of powerful landlords in certain areas made it possible for 
them to rig elections in their own favour without the need of support from the central 
government. Thus, for example, in February 2008, when General Musharraf started to 
loosen his hold over power by allowing both the PPP and the PML-N to participate in
196 Chowdri Mazhar Ali told me that the average expenditure during provincial elections was 
around eighty lakh rupees.
197 It has, for example, been widely reported that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto rigged the 1977 elections 
by using the Federal Security Force, which he created, and the police in order to disrupt opposition 
campaign rallies (see Bennet-Jones 2002: 229).
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elections, I learned that Ghulam Ali Midhiana’s son had won a seat in the provincial 
assembly with a huge majority due to rigging. A close friend of mine, whom I remained 
in telephone contact with after fieldwork, acted as a polling officer during the elections 
and told me that because the polling was held in Midhiana’s home village where 
opposition to him was weak, his supporters were able to takeover the polling station. 
Because the police had close ties with Midhiana they did nothing to prevent this. 
Without police support, and surrounded by Midhiana supporters, the polling officers 
were too intimidated to object to multiple voting by Midhiana supporters and Midhiana, 
who was poised to win in any case, won with an overwhelming majority.
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Chapter Six: The Islam of Power and the Islam of Powerlessness
This chapter raises the question of whether local Islam dominated by saints 
(pirs), with its personalised and hierarchical emphasis, might be the cause of
1 Qftpersonalised authoritarianism as Hammoudi (1994) argues, or alternatively whether it 
is simply the case that pir-dominated Islam allows powerful individuals to make sense 
of and legitimise the existing social and political order.
Various Pakistani commentators, including Pakistan’s ideological founder 
Muhammad Iqbal, have argued that pirs, much like saints in Morocco for Hammoudi, 
posed a serious obstacle to the establishment of a universal Muslim democracy in 
Pakistan.199 Iqbal argued that the cult of saints, which he referred to as ‘Persian 
mysticism’ (Iqbal 1964: 81), was an obstacle by virtue of its creating a spiritual 
aristocracy pretending to claim power and knowledge not accessible to the average 
Muslim. Hammoudi claims that the absence of democracy in the Middle East is 
similarly related to the cult of saints. According to him authoritarianism in the Middle 
East is rooted in a deeply ingrained respect for authority that derives from the highly 
authoritarian relationship between Sufi masters and their disciples. He argues that large- 
scale organisations in Morocco such as government bureaucracies and political parties 
are governed by criteria of personal allegiance and faithfulness that replicate those 
governing the interactions between masters and their disciples in Sufi brotherhoods. He 
further argues that political authoritarianism in the Middle East has deep cultural roots.
198 As noted in chapter one, Hammoudi argues this to be the case for Morocco and large parts of 
the Middle East. Hammoudi’s argument is relevant to this thesis for two reasons: because in Pakistan as 
in Morocco saints play a prominent social and political role, and because politics in Pakistan is 
authoritarian and personalised, as Hammoudi claims is the case in Morocco.
199 The writer K.K. Aziz (2001) has recently added to this chorus by arguing that the cult of 
saints is a barrier to enlightenment that leads to the ignorance of Islam, denial of personal reponsability, 
quietism, feudalism, dictatorship and to moral corruption in social life.
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It cannot be simply explained, he says, with reference to “class structures and 
dependency, the patronage system and the elites’ segmentary competition” because 
these explanations fail to explain “the apparent acquiescence to it of much of the 
populace” (Hammoudi 1994: 3).
The explanations put forward in this thesis for personalised authoritarianism, 
which emphasise dependency, the patronage system and segmentary competition200 
among the elites, are in fact better able to account for authoritarianism than is 
Hammoudi’s cultural explanation. Although certain pirs belonging to the local chowdri 
elite make claims to spiritual superiority these claims are generally contested by 
subordinate kammis. This suggests that the political quiescence of the masses isn’t 
related to belief among its members that they are spiritually subordinate as Hammoudi 
claims. Although it is true that the rural poor in Pakistan are not revolutionary, a purely 
ideological or cultural explanation cannot account for this fact. It is better explained by 
the fact that within the existing factional, patronage based political system their 
opportunities for collective action are limited. These limitations mean that passive 
acceptance and cooperation are pragmatic responses to their socially subordinate 
position.
Moreover contrary to Hammoudi it is not the social order that is the reflection of 
a culturally ingrained model of religious values; rather the opposite is more accurate.
The material doesn’t demonstrate, as classical Durkheimian sociology argues (see 
Durkheim and Mauss 1963 [1903]), that people’s religious categories are the reflection 
of the social order as a whole but it does illustrate that the emphasis that individuals 
place on aspects of the vast Islamic tradition that they can draw upon reflects, or at least 
relates to, their own position within the social order. This is because individuals
200 Or factional competition according to this thesis.
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emphasise aspects of Islam that help them understand, justify and give value to life 
experiences which are to an important degree shaped by their position within the 
political and economic order. Thus the local form of Islam espoused by dominant 
groups within the village reflects aspects of the existing personalised and hierarchical 
social and political order because it not only legitimises their position within it but helps 
them to make sense of their experience. Against this, the form of Islam espoused by 
poor kammis places less emphasis on formal ritual and ideology emphasising hierarchy 
and instead puts greater emphasis on inner feelings and sincerity. This greater interior 
focus makes sense given that as a result of poverty and illiteracy kammis are often 
unable to practice a more scriptural and ritual based form of religion: because of their 
poverty-level subsistence kammis may often not have the luxury of time or the ritually 
clean clothes to perform their prayers, and because of widespread illiteracy kammis may 
often not have access to a range of spiritual positions otherwise available scripturally.
To them the exoteric Islam of the religious and political elites is the Islam of power and 
not the true Islam of love and devotion exemplified by the great figures of the faith who, 
in their eyes, were often persecuted and oppressed by the powerful.
Pirs in the Punjab: A Historical Overview
Pirs in the Pakistani Punjab, in contrast to the saints of the Atlas (Gellner 1969) 
and to the Sheikhs of North Lebanon described by Gilsenan (1990, 1996), have often 
become important land-owners and power-holders in their own right. Historically the 
great Sufi pirs of the Punjab, such as Baba Farid of Pakpattan and Baha-al Haq Zakaria 
of Multan, established themselves as mediators between local Jat tribes and played a 
central role in their conversion to Islam. Ansari’s (2003) work on the neighbouring 
province of Sindh indicates that many pirs played an important role in settling disputes 
between individuals belonging to different tribes. They also helped to foster the
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possibility of cooperation between tribes on issues such as irrigation and trade. By 
virtue of their role as local mediators the influence of many of these pirs and their 
associated shrines grew. Although many of the major shrines in both the Punjab and in 
Sindh were originally founded by ascetic Sufis with little or no material wealth, many of 
them and their descendants came to form a wealthy landed aristocracy. This was the 
result of gifts from disciples, patronage from the courts in Delhi and later, British 
colonial patronage. Thus, for example, in the area of Pakpattan Sharif the descendants 
of the thirteenth century Pir Baba Farid came to form a “separate ‘Chishti’ caste 
possessing both economic privileges and ritual status vis-a-vis the local clans” (Eaton 
1984: 349). The settlement report of 1892-99 for the district of Montgomery reports that 
the Chishtis owned nine percent of all the land in Pakpattan Tehsil (Gilmartin 1984:
224). Richard Eaton reports that this land was acquired by the Chishtis over several 
generations as a result of gifts (futuh) from disciples, as well as patronage from the 
Dehli court starting during the Tughluq Period in the 14th century.201
By extending their patronage to Sufi Shrines the various Delhi royal courts, and 
later the British and Pakistani governments, essentially sought to augment their local 
influence within their wider political frameworks. In so doing these different authorities 
increased the influence of those shrines and their guardians (sajjada nishin). Eaton 
reports that the Delhi court not only made donations to the shrine of Baba Farid in the 
form of land and magnificent tombs but also gave the guardians of his shrine revenue- 
collecting functions. He argues that as a result of the incorporation of shrines such as 
Baba Farid’s into the larger political structures centred in Delhi, the pirs adopted 
various symbols, terms and titles from the Indo-Islamic royal courts, including some 
pertaining to tax collection. He also draws a particular parallel between the dastar bandi
201 The Tughluq Period lasted from 1321 to 1398.
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ceremony, in which a pir symbolically bestowed legitimate authority by tying a turban 
on a chiefs head, and coronation ceremonies. All of this demonstrates that the 
development of shrines as centres of power had at least as much to do with political 
considerations as it had to do with the beliefs of the faithful. The implication of this for 
Hammoudi’s argument is that it wasn’t simply the political order that was a reflection of 
the beliefs and rituals surrounding the Sufi shrines but rather that these practices and 
beliefs were themselves shaped and informed by broader power structures; in other 
words the hierarchical relationship between pirs and their followers was affected and 
informed by worldly power.
In fact the evidence suggests that the social, political and economic influence of 
pirs was heightened through their interrelationship with worldly power and that this led 
to tensions with the more egalitarian ideals of renunciation that are also inherent to 
Sufism and Islam more generally. Sources suggest that the close relationship between 
pirs and the secular authorities was from an early date problematic because the ascetic 
ideal of poverty and renunciation that they were meant to embody came into conflict 
with the practice and displays of worldly power. Thus Baba Farid is reported to have 
“assiduously avoided contact with the mundane world of the court and its ministers” 
(Eaton 1984: 338). Diya’ ad-Din Barani records that Baba Farid cautioned a Sufi 
travelling to Delhi with the following words: “I give thee a bit of advice, which it would 
be well for thee to observe, have nothing to do with maliks and amirs, and beware of 
their intimacy as dangerous; no darwesh ever kept up such intimacy, but in the end 
found it disastrous” (Elliot, H.M and Dawson 1964: 144).
With the advent of British colonial rule the tensions between worldly power and
spiritual authority were further heightened as the political power of the pirs came to
depend upon cooperation with foreign, non-Muslim rule. The British made significant
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land grants to pirs throughout the Punjab and Sindh and intervened in the various 
succession disputes that seemed to follow almost inevitably upon the death of a pir. In 
the case of Pakpattan the British even tried to send the young successor to stewardship 
of the shrine (sajjada nishin) to Aitchison College in order to ensure future political ties 
between themselves and the shrine. However although many important pirs had come to 
accept their political position in the British system they largely continued to reject the 
idea that their incorporation into the British value system. Thus the mother of the young 
sajjada nishin of Pakpattan, whom the British were trying to send to Aitcheson College, 
wrote to the governor of the Punjab in 1936 telling him that various influential sajjada 
nishins persisted in “maintaining that the sajjada nashin should be a darwesh and he has 
no need of receiving the education which is imparted to the sons of rich families” 
(Gilmartin 1984). This excerpt illustrates that there was not only a tension between the 
authority of pirs and British values but, even more fundamentally, that there was also 
one between wealth and power and the simple life of renunciation of the darwesh. 
Gilmartin (1984) argues that Punjabi pirs attempted to reconcile such tensions between 
their politico-economic position and their religious authority by increasingly espousing 
variants of reformism aiming to reassert Qur’anic Islam. Like other reformists, such as 
those in the traditions of Deoband and of the Tabligh-e Jamaat,203 pirs increasingly
203 For an account of the rise of the Deoband movement and its attempt to purify Islam of 
popular accretions and of the excessive veneration of saints see Metcalf (1982). For an account of the 
Tabligh-e Jamaat and its attempt to encourage Muslims to be stricter in the practice of their daily rites see 
Metcalf (1993). It is important to note that Muslims in the Wahabbi and Deobandi traditions are not the 
only ones to have undergone reform, and that Sufi shrines throughout South Asia also played an 
important role in religious reform through the Chishti, Naqshbandi and Barelvi movements among others. 
For an account of the rise of the Barelvi movement at the end of the nineteenth century and its 
systematisation of the theology surrounding the cult of saints see Sanyal (1996, 1998).
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sought to reshape the political order through their moral force rather than through direct 
political action. However because this approach failed to challenge the structure of 
tribal and landed power of which the pirs had become an integral part, the dilemmas 
facing their religious authority remained. All of this indicates that the position of pirs in 
the political and economic hierarchy wasn’t simply the result of personalised 
hierarchical values, and that although such values did exist they were in tension with 
other more egalitarian ones.
In independent Pakistan the prominent political and economic position of pirs, 
like that of other landlords, came to be seen as an obstacle to state power (Nasr 2001), 
democracy, and social progress. Muhammad Iqbal believed that Islam was a deeply 
democratic religion wherein all believers were equal before God and that Islam was 
therefore completely compatible with modem parliamentary democracy. However 
‘Persian mysticism’, by virtue of creating a spiritual aristocracy pretending to claim 
knowledge and power not open to the average Muslim, posed an obstacle to the 
establishment of democracy.
Subsequently in his book The Ideology o f Pakistan Muhammad Iqbal’s son 
Javed claimed that enlightenment, liberalism and meaningful faith were impossible to 
achieve in the face of the paralysing influence of mullahs and pirs. Following this 
suggestion, General Ayub Khan set up the ministry of Auqaf set up to manage all 
religious endowments and in order to curb the influence of pirs by nationalising the 
management and care of shrines. This policy was subsequently maintained by Bhutto 
and extended by General Zia-ul Haq, who tried to incorporate the task of appointing 
Imams in rural mosques and paying their salaries to the Auqaf department. Katherine 
Ewing (1990) describes how all of these governments tried to recast the shrines and pirs 
light that they felt was congruent with government social and political goals. Thus
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General Ayub Khan tried to rationalise the cult of saints by distributing pamphlets on 
the urs of important pirs that omitted any reference to their miracles and stressed their 
piety and role as social reformers. In order to further emphasise the secular role of the 
pirs in promoting social welfare he also built hospitals at various shrines. Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto was not as concerned with stripping the cult of saints of superstition as he was 
with stressing the popular social welfare imparted at the shrines. In a position that 
combined elements of Khan’s and Bhutto’s, General Zia emphasised the role of pirs in 
promoting social welfare policies aimed at a particular type of Islamisation, but returned 
to a policy designed to strip the cult of saints of superstition and stress the piety and 
Sharia-mindedness of the pirs.
Pir Ahmed Abbas Gondal and his Descendants
In June 2008, one year after his death, Ahmed Abbas Gondal was publicly
declared to be a pir by another pir in Sargodha who belonged to the same Sufi 
brotherhood of the Qadri order as he had. The pir also declared that Ahmed Abbas’s 
son, Dr. Muzaffar Abbas Gondal, was to be his successor. At the same time an 
upcoming urs in order to celebrate the anniversary of Pir Ahmed Abbas Gondal’s death 
and union with God was announced. In the days that followed posters advertising the 
urs went up on the road leading to the village. The posters advertised the fact that Pir 
Muzaffar Abbas Gondal was holding an urs on behalf of Pir Ahmed Abbas Gondal who 
had built Astana-e Alam as a place of worship and had spent over Rs. 500,000 on behalf 
of the poor over the years.
With over 300 acres of land to his name Ahmed Abbas Gondal had been one of 
the wealthiest landlords in the village of Bek Sagrana. Unlike many of his Gondal 
relatives he remained aloof from the violent factional politics of the area and devoted
most of his life to God. Until his late thirties, and before 1971, he had lived in one of the
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largest houses in the centre of the village. The two other large adjacent houses belonged 
to his relatives, the rival factional leaders Ghulam Baksh and Ahmed Rasool. At the 
time he had briefly worked as a lawyer after taking a law degree at the University of 
Sargodha. However he is said to have quickly renounced the legal profession because he 
believed that the corruption that plagued it made it incompatible with leading a pious 
life. Like his father before him Muhamamd Hayat was a devoted disciple (mureed) of 
Pir Alam Shah of the Qadiri order lineage (silsilah). In 1971, having noted Ahmed 
Abbas’s piety, Pir Alam Shah designated him one of his emissaries (khalifa) and 
ordered him to build a Sufi lodge, known as an astana204 at a designated location at a 
distance from the village next to the irrigation canal. The astana was to be a place of 
peace where people could come into contact with God through the practice of 
remembering God by repeating his various names (zikr) and via Pir Alam Shah who 
like other pirs mediated between mankind and God, as will be explained below. 
Adjacent to the Astana, Ahmed Abbas was also to build a mosque. The astana was also 
to be a place where the poor could obtain free Islamic medication (hikmati davai) and 
be freely fed during the monthly religious celebration of Gyarvi Sharif marking the 
anniversary of Sheikh Abdul Qadir Gilani’s union with God. Pir Alam Shah told 
Ahmed Abbas that the astana needed to be built in a peaceful and pleasant location for 
these purposes, at a distance from the village where corruption, violence and ignorance 
(jahliyya) reigned. The astana was named Astana-e Alam after Pir Alam Shah. It was an 
eight-pointed star-shaped building located next to the running water of a large irrigation 
canal in the centre of a four acre compound covered with tall fragrant trees. Many of the
204 The word astana literally translates as ‘threshold’. The term alludes to its being a place where 
one can pass from this world into the spiritual realm of God.
205 Abdul Qadir Gilani was an influential Sufi teacher who lived in Baghdad between 1077-1166 
A.D. He is considered to be the figurehead of the Qadri order. In South Asia he is often referred to as 
Ghaus Pak.
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trees were planted by Ahmed Abbas and included several mango and rubber trees which 
had grown to a considerable size over the years. The trees and the nearby irrigation 
canal made Astana a cool, shady place where people could escape the torrid heat of the 
summer months and find peace (sukoon) in the greenery. Green was the favourite colour 
of the Holy Prophet and it was thought to possess certain curative qualities including 
that of improving people’s eyesight and making people that set their eyes upon it feel at 
peace. Ahmed Abbas also built two small mosques within the compound and placed 
hand pumps (nalka) next to them for to allow people to carry out their ablutions and 
have water to drink. The astana was to be a place of peace where wayfarers could stop 
on their way not only to devote some time to worship, but also to rest in the cool shade 
and quench their thirst. It was a place, much like the Sufi lodge described by Werbner 
(2003), that was meant to stand beyond the conflict-ridden, corrupt world that 
surrounded it, where people could become both physically and spiritually whole.
Over the years several kammi families who at one time or another worked for 
Sufi Sahib under seyp contracts or as servants and labourers built seventeen mud houses 
around the walls of the Astana-e Alam compound. The village Imam also moved in and 
erected the only other brick and mortar house at Astana-e Alam other than Ahmed 
Abbas’s. Astana-e Alam also acquired its own shop. In this manner the place became a 
somewhat self-contained unit set apart from the village. This allowed Ahmed Abbas and 
his family to separate themselves from the factional conflicts that were raging in the 
village. Ahmed Abbas’s desire to stay out of politics and the factional conflict that it 
inevitably brought was expressed by the fact that throughout his life he sought to remain 
impartial in the conflict between the Ghulam Baksh Ke and the Ahmed Rasool Ke 
factions. To this end he went as far as marrying his children into both factions: he had 
one of his daughters and one of his sons marry with the children of Hajji Sahib (the son
of Ghulam Baksh), and he had another son marry the daughter of Ahmed Rasool.206 On 
the basis of the impartiality this provided him, during the local council elections 
described in the previous chapter, for example, Ahmed Abbas instructed all of the 
kammis living at Astana either not to vote at all or to divide their votes equally between 
both factions.
By virtue of his impartiality Ahmed Abbas acted as a mediator in some of the 
disputes between Chowdri Abdullah and Chowdri Haq Nawaz. I was told that Ahmed 
Abbas had frequently called members of both factions, including Chowdri Abdullah and 
Chowdri Haq Nawaz, to the astana and had asked them to settle their disputes at the 
time when factional conflict in the village was at its peak in the early 1990s. Although 
Ahmed Abbas never managed to establish lasting peace between the two factions he 
apparently did succeed in temporarily halting hostilities on a few occasions. During my 
stay in Bek Sagrana, when factional conflict had abated but was still latent, Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas didn’t play a major role in the settlement of disputes between the factions but he 
frequently called on the village faction leaders to set aside their differences and jointly 
address matters relating to village morality. On one occasion Sufi Ahmed Abbas 
summoned both faction leaders and asked them to stop protecting bootleggers and drug 
dealers as well as to personally renounce alcohol on another occasion Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas summoned the village leaders in order for them to jointly address the growing 
concern of theft in the village. According to villagers theft of all kinds had risen 
dramatically over the years and many of them attributed this to the growing number of 
heroin addicts. One particular concern was the theft of citrus from the orchards at night. 
Sufi Ahmed Abbas proposed that all of the chowdris should set aside their differences
206 Had he established marriage ties with only one of the two factions his impartiality is likely to 
have been jeopardised as he would have been expected to support members of the faction with which he 
had established marriage ties. With marriage ties to both village factions, when they competed for votes at 
election time Muhammad Hayat could step back from supporting either.
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in order to tackle the issue jointly. He proposed that they create a jointly funded patrol 
to go around the village at night. He further proposed that any thieves caught should be 
made examples by filing cases against them with the police. In both cases the results 
were similar. Although on both occasions the rival leaders expressed their deference to 
the pious old man, in the first case they didn’t actually change their behaviour and in the 
second, although they agreed to the proposal, they never got together to implement the 
patrol nor was any consistent policy in dealing with thieves established.
Despite being a mediator and an advocate of village unity and Islamic morality, 
Sufi Ahmed Abbas reproduced the particularistic social values and practices of the 
surrounding social order in various ways. To begin with he was after all an influential 
Gondal landlord, and his close kinship relations with the factional leaders of the village 
meant that his impartiality ended where his interests and those of the Gondals of Bek 
Sagrana were at stake. Thus Sufi Ahmed Abbas had supported the struggle of his 
kinsmen against the Makhdooms and even claimed that Chowdri Abdullah’s 
appropriation of their land was legitimate. He made this claim on the basis that the land 
appropriated by Chowdri Abdullah had once been given as an offering to a Makhdoom 
pir by an ancestor known as Kala Gondal. Kala Gondal had gained a son thanks to the 
Makhdoom pir’s intercession but, Ahmed Abbas argued, since the son of the 
Makhdoom pir had produced no legitimate male offspring the land should revert to the 
Gondals. Like other Gondals Sufi Ahmed Abbas claimed that the current head of the 
Makhdoom lineage in Nawabpur was in fact the son of a Tarkhan who was adopted by 
the Makhdoom pir who had been unable to produce a son. Moreover Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas, despite making sure that he earned his livelihood through lawful (halal) means, 
had no qualms about using particularistic kinship relations in order to secure state 
resources and patronage when he needed them. Thus although he, unlike many of his
relatives, refrained from stealing irrigation water and electricity he used his kinship 
relations with the Ghulam Baksh Ke faction while Chowdri Mazhar Ali had been in 
power to obtain hand pumps (nalkas) from the government for use in Astana-e Alam. In 
other instances Sufi Ahmed Abbas had no qualms about using kinship and friendship 
ties to secure jobs and benefits for close relatives, friends, and clients. For Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas giving patronage to such people was part of the moral give and take (len-den) of 
life just as it was for his secular relatives. His moral outlook was therefore not
*)(Y7necessarily any less particularistic than that of his relatives.
Ahmed Abbas’s vision of the spiritual order, and of a social order that was in 
line with it, was in fact a highly idealised version of the existing social order. Like the 
existing social order it was particularistic in its emphasis on kinship, hierarchy and 
patronage. It was idealised in the sense that, unlike the existing social order, it was an 
order where individuals knew their position in kinship and social hierarchies, where 
spiritual and worldly patronage flowed generously downwards from superiors, and 
where people were truthful and avoided the things forbidden (haraam) by Islam. For 
Sufi Ahmed Abbas the world was governed by God through a hierarchy of Prophets 
followed by a hierarchy of saints at whose head was Ghaus Pak. Just as higher ranking 
politicians and bureaucrats had greater powers and larger areas of jurisdiction so did 
higher ranking saints (although the areas of influence of the saints didn’t correlate with 
worldly and political jurisdictions). Thus if Ghaus Pak governed the entire world those 
saints just below him governed continents and those below them might govern 
countries. At the bottom of the spiritual hierarchy saints might govern geographical
207 It is interesting to note that after Sufi Muhammad Hayat’s death his elder son, Dr. Muzaffar 
Abbas, was unable to maintain his father’s impartiality towards the two Gondal factions within the 
village. The reason for this was that Dr. Muzaffar Abbas had married Chowdri Abdullah’s sister and was 
therefore bound to be partial towards Chowdri Abdullah.
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areas no larger than a union council. Worldly hierarchies and spiritual hierarchies were 
in fact often explicitly compared by people. It was quite common for a comparison to be 
made between the intercession carried out by saints and the worldly patronage provided 
by politicians. When, for example, Ahmed Abbas’s younger son explained to me the 
need for saintly mediators between humankind and God he argued that just as it wasn’t 
reasonable or realistic for people in need of patronage to try to contact the President 
directly it was similarly unreasonable for most men to try and directly reach God. Thus, 
he argued, if a person wanted better roads in his neighbourhood he should try to contact 
local politicians in his constituency and not President Musharraf. Similarly if a person 
required help from spiritual authorities it was most realistic for him to approach an 
accessible pir rather than to try and approach Ghaus Pak or even God Himself.
Whereas politicians could only provide ephemeral worldly goods to their clients, 
saints could provide their disciples and supplicants with access to the infinite generative 
powers that flowed down from God through the hierarchy of Prophets and saints to 
humankind. Saints were seen as channels through which God’s power (itakat), as well as 
his grace (barkat), flowed down to humans. Barkat was a generative and fertile quality 
that descended from God and inhered in people and things. It was the source of all 
fertility, order, prosperity, and well-being on earth. If the crops were abundant and 
people were healthy and strong, if there was social order and harmony—these were due 
to God’s barkat flowing down. If on the other hand there was scarcity, people were 
sickly and weak, and there was social strife, it was because God had cut off the flow of 
barkat as a result of people’s immoral behaviour. In fact it was widely believed that in 
the present era barkat had become scarce because people had strayed from the straight
208 This argument was often used against Deobandis who were sceptical about mediation by 
saints and who frowned upon the attribution of divine powers to saints, seeing it as a violation of the 
principle of the Unity of God (tauheed).
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path of Islam. Because people had forgotten God and now followed their own personal 
greed and impulses, men fought against their brothers and parents, fornicated, stole, 
committed adultery and consumed alcohol. The result was that people were unhappy 
and suffered from spiritual, social and even physical want. The fact that even milk, 
considered to be a crucial source of vitality, was diluted with water was a sign of the 
lack of barkat of the times. It was even believed that the absence of barkat was evident 
from the perceived fact that people were nowadays weaker, sicklier, smaller and even 
darker skinned than in previous generations. Elderly chowdris told me about how in 
previous generations men were much taller and stronger. Such men had been able to 
work for an entire day having consumed a single glass of buffalo milk—undiluted, it 
was observed—in the morning. They told me that even further back in time, when 
Prophets still appeared on earth and people were truly pious, humans were powerful 
giants who lived hundreds of years.
The lodges of the pirs stood in contrast to this social world devoid of barkat. The 
lodges were places where barkat entered the social world through the mediation of the 
lodge’s original founding pir and his descendants. They were places where God’s plenty 
flowed down to earth. This was most clearly illustrated through the practice of freely 
distributing food to disciples at the shrines. Many of the more important lodges and 
shrines had places known as langars where food was cooked for disciples and 
supplicants from large tin pots (degs) over fires. The most important ones held a 
perpetual langar, while some of the smaller lodges, like Ahmed Abbas’s, only held a 
monthly langar on the occasion of Gyarvi Sharif. The langar was proof of the piety of a 
pir because it showed that the pir was generous. Such generosity could also be 
construed as the sign that a pir was a channel for barkat and abundance. In fact 
generosity was often construed as a sign of piety and therefore of the flow of barkat
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through a person. This was because people who gave freely demonstrated their faith in 
God and were therefore rewarded by God with plenty. Thus pious old men who freely 
fed the poor often told me that the more they gave others, the more God gave them.
They contrasted this with the behaviour of stingy people who, because they worshipped 
the world and its goods (dunya parasti) instead of God, never had enough of anything.
In the case of great pirs their piety and proximity to God was such that disciples and 
supplicants considered that the langars at their lodges and shrines could never run out of 
food. This was vividly portrayed to me upon a visit to the Chishti shrine at Jalalpur 
Sharif where one disciple (mureed) explained to me how the langar at the shrine could 
never run out of food. He told me that during colonial times the British authorities had 
told the incumbent pir to cut down on food expenses at the langar because feeding 
thousands of disciples and supplicants for free would ruin him. The pir had apparently 
replied that the langar put no strain whatsoever upon his resources because it was God’s 
endless barkat that flowed through it.
The barkat that flowed through pirs and their descendants was also evident in 
places like Astana-e Alam in a variety of other ways. As illustrated above, Astana-e 
Alam was a place of peace and greenery. It was a place where people could come to 
quench their thirst and seek remedies for illnesses. Ahmed Abbas hired a local Sayyid 
practitioner of Islamic medicine (hakeem) to attend patients at Astana-e Alam in the 
afternoons. People from all around the area of Bek Sagrana came to him to address 
ailments ranging from common colds to more serious cases of hepatitis. The hakeem 
combined herbal and religious prescriptions. The latter might involve the recitation of 
certain prayers and verses of the Qu’ran. The idea behind this was that physical ailments 
were also moral ones and that ultimately only God could make a person whole. The fact
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that people who went to Astana-e Alam could become whole was, like the langar, proof 
of the fact that barkat flowed through Ahmed Abbas.
Additionally Astana-e Alam was a place where the disciples of Pir Alam Shah, 
including Ahmed Abbas, could quite literally connect with the infinite power of God 
through the performance of zikr. Zikr is a devotional act, generally associated with 
Sufism, whereby people remember, or invoke, God by reciting His ninety-nine names.
It can be performed either in a group or individually. At Astana-e Alam the disciples of 
Pir Alam Shah, most of whom weren’t from Bek Sagrana, generally performed zikr 
individually by either sitting on the ground in a cross-legged position or by sitting on 
their knees as people did during prayers (namaaz). They believed that through this they 
could acquire some of the supernatural powers of Pir Alam Shah. All of the disciples of 
Pir Alam Shah, including Ahmed Abbas’s younger son, explained the performance of 
zikr at Astana-e Alam in terms of the modem imagery of electricity. They told me that 
when they performed zikr at Astana it was as if they pressed an electrical switch that 
enabled them to connect to a broader electrical grid. The ‘electrical grid’ was basically 
the network of saints who channelled God’s infinite power and who by virtue of this 
governed the world. In this scheme Pir Alam Shah represented the local power station to 
which they could most readily connect. Ahmed Abbas’s son explained that once 
connected to this ‘electrical grid’ people could become vehicles for God’s infinite 
power, which he compared to nuclear power. As such, he claimed that through his 
connection with God by way of Pir Alam Shah his father could sometimes see into the 
future and also that his father had even greater powers that he didn’t reveal to people.
Like other pirs Ahmed Abbas claimed privileged access to hidden divine 
knowledge. This included knowledge of revelations other than those contained within 
the Holy Qu’ran that had been secretly transmitted by the Holy Prophet himself to
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Hazrat Ali and then down lengthy lineages (silsilahs) of saints. Knowledge of these 
revelations needed to remain secret because it was too complex for the common man to 
understand. If the common man gained access to this knowledge he would distort it and 
create social unrest. Thus, for example, Ahmed Abbas and his sons ‘knew’ that the 
Sharia expounded by the maulvis was simply a tool to keep social order, but that much 
of it was in fact inessential to the Islamic faith. This, however, couldn’t be revealed to 
everyone. Ahmed Abbas believed that the the spiritual value of fasting and praying was 
limited and that the purpose of the five daily prayers and of fasting during Ramadan was 
really to maintain individual discipline and social order. People who were close to God, 
like himself, had no need for them. As a result Ahmed Abbas rarely performed namaaz. 
Although he fasted during Ramadan—in order to maintain self-discipline—neither of 
his two sons did. Instead of the namaaz of the common people Ahmed Abbas and his 
sons performed zikr which gave them access to divine powers and knowledge reserved 
for a select few. Similarly Ahmed Abbas believed that heaven and hell, as expounded 
by the maulvis, was another device to keep people disciplined with the threat of eternal 
damnation. He believed that without the threat of hell society would quickly descend 
into anarchy as people would have no fear about the consequences of their actions. 
According to him the truth was that heaven and hell were states of mind. A person who 
was in contact with God was in fact in heaven while on earth. On the other hand those 
who were completely estranged from God because they were driven by selfishness 
(ikhudgarzi) were already living in hell.
Ahmed Abbas and his sons believed that it would be dangerous for the majority
of people to gain access to some of the true divine knowledge (haqiqi ilrri) to which they
had access. Inherent in the vision of how power and barkat flowed down through the
system of Prophets and saints was a strongly hierarchical view of the world. It was only
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a select few who could gain access to the secret knowledge and powers of pirs such as 
Alam Shah. The rest of the world was too ignorant and immoral to be able to gain direct 
access to those things and had to rely on saints for their mediation.
To recapitulate, from the above account several parallels emerge between 
political mediation and spiritual mediation. Just as the political elite in the form of the 
landlords mediated between the common man and the higher authorities, the spiritual 
elite of pirs mediated between the common man and God. Moreover just as it was the 
duty of politicians to provide for and protect their clients, it was the duty of pirs to 
provide for and protect their disciples and supplicants. Politicians provided clients with 
political and economic patronage, while saints provided disciples and supplicants with 
spiritual ‘patronage’ as well as worldly patronage in the form of charity (food, free 
medication). Among many other things, spiritual ‘patronage’ could involve the 
intercession of a pir on behalf of a disciple or supplicant who wanted a son, who needed 
a cure for an illness, who needed medicine for sick livestock or who suffered from 
marital or other family problems. Pirs could also intercede with God in order to solve 
people’s land and political disputes. It was also not uncommon for influential pirs to 
intercede with worldly authorities on behalf of those who appealed to them for 
assistance. Thus influential pirs could make their more powerful disciples obtain 
patronage for other less powerful disciples. This could involve help finding jobs or 
resolving court and police cases among other things. Although Ahmed Abbas’s 
influence was localised and his spiritual following was restricted in comparison to many 
of the more important pirs of the Punjab, he sometimes interceded to obtain jobs for 
people and to resolve their disputes.
Ahmed Abbas’s vision of the spiritual world also resembled the social and 
political order in that power, and barkat, flowed in it along personalised lines. For
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example, kinship in the spiritual order played just as significant a role as it did in the 
social and political order. This is most clearly illustrated by the prominent spiritual 
position often attributed to the descendants of the Holy Prophet (as is the case in other 
places throughout the Muslim world). My informants believed that the prayers of 
descendants of the Prophet (sayyids) were more likely to be answered because the Holy 
Prophet himself had a particular interest in the wishes and wellbeing of his offspring. As 
a result a large number of pirs in Pakistan as elsewhere were, or at least claimed to be, 
descendants of the Holy Prophet. However, the importance of kinship in spiritual 
hierarchies wasn’t solely restricted to the descendants of the Holy Prophet. In less 
exalted families as well sainthood was often inherited from father to son as in the case 
of Ahmed Abbas and his son Dr. Muzaffar Abbas, who made no claims to Sayyid 
lineage. Part of the rationale behind this was that the son of a pir was thought to be 
better placed than anyone else to get his father to intercede for supplicants. God Himself 
was also likely to have bestowed favour upon the descendants of a pir. It was also 
assumed that pirs passed on most of their secret spiritual knowledge to their sons and 
successors. It should also be noted that in Sufi brotherhoods people who were the 
disciples of the same pir referred to each other as pir-bhai meaning that their common 
affiliation to a pir made them brothers. Just as the children of the same father were 
blood brothers, the disciples of the same pir were spiritual brothers, and the relationship 
between disciples and their pir was regarded in much the same way as the relationship 
between father and son. Pirs, like fathers, were benefactors towards whom love, respect 
and loyalty were due. Also, pir-bhais, like blood brothers, were supposed to support 
each other in times of hardship. In one instance that I witnessed, a police officer who 
was about to order the demolition of a house illegally erected upon government land 
changed his mind when he noticed that the person whose house he was about to
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demolish belonged to the same Sufi brotherhood as he did. He realised this when he saw 
that the owner of the house wore a skull cap (topi) with a thin red fringe around it 
signifying that he belonged to the same Chishti brotherhood of Pakpattan Sharif as he 
did.
Furthermore, just as personalised ties other than kinship, including friendship 
and patron-client ties, played an important role in the social and political order, so 
friendship and discipleship played an important role in the spiritual order. The role of 
friendship in the spiritual order was most clearly illustrated by the use of the term wali 
(which could be used as an equivalent for the term pir), which in Urdu indicated that a 
man was a friend of God. Thus the powers of intercession of pirs stemmed from the fact 
that as men who devoted their lives to God they were in some sense God’s friends.
Previous chapters showed how good patrons were expected to have intimate 
personal knowledge of the lives of their clients, and this held in spiritual relationships 
between pir and supplicant as well. For example, it was shown that Chowdri Abdullah 
was praised for the fact that he remembered common villagers by name, and that he 
knew and remembered their problems. This often included knowledge of their intimate 
marital issues. Such intimate knowledge was an important factor in determining how 
effectively a patron dealt with clients’ and it helped determine his popularity. In 
exchange for the patronage that they provided, patrons expected to obtain the deference 
and the political loyalty, as well as the services and sometimes the labour of clients. In a 
similar manner pirs such as Ahmed Abbas had intimate knowledge of their disciples’ 
and supplicants’ lives and problems because people who came to see them revealed 
their most intimate worries and secrets to them in order to obtain intercession and 
guidance. In exchange for their services pirs’ demanded strict obedience from them. 
Jamal Malik writes that rural pirs “guarantee the villagers’ participation in divine
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blessing (baraka) [sic], which is tied to strict obedience.. .and self sacrifice by followers 
of the pir” (Malik 1998: 188). In the case of the followers (known as hurs) of the 
powerful Sindhi landlord Pir Pagaro, self-sacrifice on behalf of their spiritual leader 
historically included waging jihad against the British (see Ansari 2003). More mundane 
examples of self-sacrifice by people for their pirs might include the provision of labour 
services, as well as making tributary offerings and gifts (futuh) to them. These labour 
services and offerings were supposed to demonstrate the love (pyaar/mohabbat) of 
disciples towards their pir and were therefore strongly distinguished from ordinary 
economic transactions.
As a sign of their devotion disciples frequently spent a couple of days a year at 
the shrine of their pir in order to help out with various chores. As Pnina Werber (2003) 
has illustrated, disciples helped with cleaning the premises of a shrine, helping with the 
langar, or serving tea and food to people. Even members of elite classes, used to having 
servants doing everything for them, performed such chores as a mark of their love and 
devotion towards their pirs. This was the case at Astana-e Alam where, on occasions 
such as Gyarvi Sharif, several Gondal chowdris would become involved in serving 
villagers food from the langar. Disciples of Pir Alam Shah and a handful of people who 
had become the disciples of Ahmed Abbas during his lifetime also occasionally came to 
Astana-e Alam to help out with maintenance and cleaning. On one occasion for 
example, a builder who was a disciple of Pir Alam Shah came to Astana-e Alam in 
order to repair some of the run-down structures around the compound. Kammis who 
lived around Astana-e Alam also occasionally freely provided their labour services, 
although in their case this was not always out of free will. Ahmed Abbas believed that it 
was their duty to show their devotion to God by helping out. Their position as his 
kammis and house tenants meant that they had little choice but to do so. Thus, as
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previously mentioned, the Tarkhans living at Bek Sagrana had no choice but to help out 
with electrical work prior to the celebration of an urs for Pir Alam Shah because they 
feared that refusal might lead to eviction. As noted, they later complained that they 
would normally have received at least ifo.5000 for the work they had carried out.
The case of Muhammad Ashraf Ranjha further illustrates how pirs and their 
descendants received services and gifts in return for their spiritual ‘patronage.’ 
Muhammad Ashraf Ranjha was the village Imam, a pir, and a zamindar-smallholder.
His grandfather became a pir in his home village of Bhukki as a result of the fact that 
following several years of drought and hunger he once ensured an excellent harvest 
through his prayers.209 As a mark of their gratitude, villagers gathered four maunds of 
wheat on a yearly basis to give to him and, following his death, to his descendants. 
Because two generations later there were several descendants of the original pir living 
across several villages, the payment was rotated among them on a yearly basis. The 
village Imam and his siblings received the four maunds every third year.
In addition to this, the village Imam received various gifts and services from the 
villagers of Bek Sagrana. He was given gifts from people following a death in their 
family so that he would pass on religious merit (savaab) to the deceased. According to 
villagers and Muslims educated in the Barelvi Islamic tradition210 that is dominant 
throughout rural Punjab, the living could pass savaab on to the dead and therefore 
increase God’s favour towards them through their prayers. In villages around the Punjab 
the people considered the most qualified to do this were pirs and maulvis. Their 
knowledge of Islam and their greater proximity to God meant that their prayers were 
more likely to be answered by God. In giving gifts to religious leaders following a death
209 It was because the village had suffered so many years of drought and hunger that the village 
came to be known as Bhukki, meaning ‘hungry.’
210 See Sanyal (1996) for an account of the historical roots of this tradition as well as an account 
of its theology.
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people showed generosity and therefore acquired savaab which could then be 
transferred to the deceased through the religious leader’s superior prayers. Besides gifts 
following a death and various other gifts (that are beyond the scope of this chapter), 
Muhammad Ashraf and his elder brother also received daily gifts of bread (roti) from 
different households in the village on a rotating basis. In exchange for the meritorious 
act of giving roti the village Imam would offer his prayers on behalf of the villagers.
The village Imam also obtained the labour of many of the village children in exchange 
for his wife and him teaching them how to read the Holy Qu’ran. Accordingly it was 
common to see young boys and girls sweeping the courtyard of Muhammad Ashraf s 
house.
Kammis and Spiritual Mediation
The previous section focussed principally on Sufi Ahmed Abbas in order to 
illustrate how the religious practices and beliefs of an individual at the top of the village 
hierarchy promoted a hierarchical and particularistic vision of the social and spiritual 
order. In this section I will examine whether individuals less favourably located in the 
social hierarchy shared this vision and whether their political quiescence was related to 
the fact that they had internalised the view propounded by spiritual leaders, such as Sufi 
Ahmed Abbas, according to which they were spiritually subordinate.
Kammis and other individuals located at the bottom of the social hierarchy 
didn’t unquestioningly accept the idea that they were spiritually subordinate. Not only 
did kammis often display a highly critical attitude towards particular figures of religious 
authority, including both pirs and maulvis, but they also often strongly contested the 
idea that they were spiritually subordinate. Moreover, although the kammis were 
generally ardent devotees of particular saints, they tended to place much greater 
emphasis upon inner states of loving devotion (ishq) than upon formalistic doctrine and
ritualism emphasising hierarchy and order. As such, although their spiritual 
understandings and practices didn’t constitute an outright rejection of mediation and 
spiritual hierarchy, their greater focus upon individual inner states of being made their 
form of religiosity less concerned with the reproduction of the social status-quo. This 
was related to the fact that unlike people such as Sufi Ahmed Abbas, and to a lesser 
extent the village Imam, they had little invested in reproducing a status-quo from which 
they derived little benefit. Moreover, as indicated in the introduction, their lack of 
worldly capital, including that of power and status, prompted them to look inwards to 
identify value in their lives.
The dominant class of the village believed that the social subordination of the 
kammis was the result of a spiritual inferiority that stemmed from the fact that, like
^ 1 1animals, they lacked self control and were driven by their lower carnal selves (nafs).
For them sober self-control and reason (aql) were the basis for honour (izzat), as well as 
for true faith; consequently, they were also the basis for social order. Men without self 
control became idle and indulgent. They lost control over their women and their 
servants. A man who let this happen was despised and was disparagingly referred to as 
a beghairat, indicating that he had no shame because he was unable control himself and 
others. A beghairat allowed the socially disruptive forces of the nafs, which should 
ideally be concealed and controlled, come out into the open. Therefore only a man of 
honour, and thus a man with control over himself and others, could properly practice 
Islam and prevent society from disintegrating. For socially dominant individuals Islam 
was therefore closely associated with notions of izzat whereby a man’s worth was 
judged by his control over himself and others.
211 Similarly see Marsden (1997:60) for an account of how ex-Chitrali serfs were regarded as 
being animal-like by the region’s former nobility.
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Kammis were seen by the chowdris as inherently lacking self control and 
honour. They therefore needed both worldly and spiritual patrons to protect, guide and 
provide for them. The chowdris argued that the lack of self control was due to the less 
developed, more animalistic, nature of kammis and of Mussallis in particular. They 
claimed, for example, that Mussallis were sexually promiscuous. As mentioned in 
chapter two, chowdris believed that Mussalli women were sexually willing and 
undiscriminating.212 They also claimed that the Mussallis’ lack of self control was 
illustrated by the fact that they displayed excessive emotion in their everyday life and 
especially during funerals when they, particularly the women, wept and beat their 
chests. They also believed that Mussallis were incapable of any form of respectable 
form of work because they were too lazy and self-indulgent. According to a joke that 
was widely circulated among the chowdris, a Mussalli had once been employed by a 
chowdri solely in order for him to perform his five daily prayers but he had quit half 
way through his first set of prayers because he felt the task to be too arduous. The joke 
was meant to illustrate both the view that Mussallis were incapable of both hard work 
and of ensuring their own spiritual salvation 213 Instead of hard work and spiritual 
discipline, it was said that the Mussallis earned their money through illegal activities, 
and when they weren’t ‘working’ they were lying around, taking drugs and procreating. 
The chowdris claimed that the Mussallis wasted what money they had on useless 
frivolities and spent far beyond their means on weddings at the expense of meeting the 
basic needs of their families. Accordingly the children went around ill-clothed and 
filthy, and behaved like animals because their parents could not afford to send them to
212 What those who said this failed to mention was the fact that in instances when Mussalli 
women were apparently ‘sexually willing’ it was because a chowdri was in a position of power over them 
and their husbands.
213 It must be noted that just as many landlords believed that kammis were incapable of handling 
their own worldly affairs and that they needed their firm guidance, pirs such as Muhammad Hayat 
believed that kammis were incapable of handling religious truth and that they needed the guidance of 
spiritually superior beings.
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school. As they could not keep what little money they earned, they had to fall back on 
loans and servitude. Thus, the chowdris argued, Mussallis and other bonded labourers 
were themselves to blame for their servile condition.
Mussallis and kammis more generally did not accept that they were spiritually 
inferior and rejected most of the claims typically made by the chowdris. They accepted 
that there were some individuals among them who were involved in a variety of un- 
Islamic activities but rightly pointed out that this made them no different from many of 
the chowdris. Furthermore, kammis interpreted their behaviour not as being out of 
control and excessively emotional (nafsiati) but rather as passionate, impulsive, 
generous and self-sacrificing. The term that they often used to describe it was jezbati 
which indicated a nature that was willing to sacrifice itself for loved ones such as family 
and friends, as well as for the Holy Prophet Muhammad and for Islam. For them the 
fact, that they openly expressed their grief during times of bereavement—which 
chowdris and maulvis criticised—illustrated their loving nature and was not a sign of 
their sinful lack of acceptance of God’s will. The fact that they were derided for it by 
maulvis and chowdris was evidence of the shallowness of their own faith (imaan) which 
was only concerned with external appearances and not with love of their fellow beings. 
The Mussallis and kammis also claimed that the criticism they received from maulvis 
and chowdris for not performing their prayers as evidence of the fact that those people 
were solely concerned with outward appearances.214 Thus although many of them 
accepted that they didn’t perform their prayers frequently, in some cases because they 
had no ritually pure (pak) clothes for the purpose, they claimed that true faith consisted 
in a pure heart (pak dil) and love for one’s fellow beings. For them performing prayers
214 See also Marsden (2005) for an account of how Chitrali villagers believed in the importance 
of heartfelt sincerity and compassion and how they criticised the local figures of religious authority 
(dushmanan) for their lack of these things.
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with ritually clean clothes on was meaningless without a pure heart. They argued that 
although chowdris and spiritual leaders might perform their prayers frequently, they 
often performed them with an impure heart. For many of the Mussallis and kammis who 
claimed to hold love and self-sacrifice to be the essence of Islam, maulvis and pirs 
(including the village Imam and Sufi Ahmed Abbas) were concerned instead only with 
their own stomachs (pet-parasti)215. Many also argued that both the village Imam and 
Sufi Ahmed Abbas were simply interested in their social status and with obtaining gifts 
and services from people. Thus although many people appreciated the frequent 
generosity of the village Imam, others pointed to the fact that he took bread from poor 
people even though he was well off. Even more people pointed out Sufi Ahmed 
Abbas’s greed and stinginess because had several bonded labourers whom he 
overworked in exchange for extremely poor wages.
The idea that for kammis Islam was about a clean heart (pak dil) and fervent, 
self sacrificing devotion (jezbaat) took many outward forms. Again the issue of grieving 
at funerals provides an example. Most of the Gondal chowdris in Bek Sagrana, as well 
as the village Imam, objected to excessive grieving at funerals on the grounds that it 
betrayed a lack of acceptance of God’s will. They objected on the same grounds to the 
Shia rituals of self-flagellation (matam) during the Islamic calendar month of Muharram 
when people mourned the martyrdom (shahadat) of Hazrat Imam Hussain. According 
to the village Imam, self-flagellation was strictly forbidden in Islam because it involved 
harming the body which, as an invaluable gift from God, had to be treated with care.
215 Apet-parast was a person who worshipped his stomach just as a bhud-parast was a person 
who worshipped idols. Worshipping of one’s stomach was just as much a form of idolatry as idol worship 
was.
216 Although there were criticisms about the village imam including that he was the imam of the 
rich, many people appreciated the fact that unlike many of the chowdris he was generally the first to offer 
help to people. If someone needed a lift on a motorcycle to go to hospital, for example, he was often the 
first person that people would approach. Furthermore people often approached him for small loans and 
food. The wife of a heroin addict who lived next door to him and who was very poor often got her food 
from his family whenever she had run out of money.
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For him even attending a Muharram procession as a spectator was a sin (gunnah) 
because it both condoned and encouraged an un-Islamic practice. But despite the village
• 9 1 7Imam’s warning, many kammis nevertheless attended. They told me that they 
attended because they wanted to demonstrate their heartfelt love and respect for Hazrat 
Imam Hussain, who had fought against the tyranny (zulm) of Yazid. For them Imam 
Hussain was in many ways a symbol of the struggle against tyrannical and unjust 
leaders. Several people explained to me that without Imam Hussain’s martyrdom the 
Sharia would have ceased to exist because Yazid intended to modify it in order to suit 
his evil and tyrannical purposes. For them it was Hazrat Imam Hussain who had 
prevented tyranny from prevailing over Islam through his jezbaat and self-sacrifice. It is 
worth noting that the kammis sometimes compared certain chowdris in the village to 
Yazid. Although most of my informants agreed that self-flagellation with whips and 
razor blades was extreme, they nevertheless thought that it was an understandable 
demonstration of grief and support for a hero who had saved the Islamic faith. For them 
the heartfelt emotions expressed through matam was proof of people’s love for the Holy 
Prophet and his descendants. One informant told me that the objections of maulvis were 
misguided because there couldn’t possibly be anything wrong with expressing such 
heartfelt devotion. He also told me that the fact that one of the Holy Prophet’s 
companions (sahabas), whose example Muslims were supposed to imitate, had smashed 
all of his own teeth with a rock after learning that the Holy Prophet had lost a single 
tooth clearly indicated that expressions of grief such as those expressed during 
Muharram by Shias were permissible.
The kammis’ emphasis on the fact that true faith was about heartfelt devotion, 
and not simply about formal ritual and doctrine, was further illustrated by their
2,7 Although as Sunnis they didn’t actively take part in the rituals.
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appreciation for religious figures that had sometimes ignored or even gone against the 
Sharia as it was propounded by the religious and worldly authorities. For them truly 
pious men were often wandering ascetics (malangs and fakeers), who claimed no 
worldly privileges and were frequently scorned by temporal rulers and their stooges 
among the learned scholars of Islam {ulema). These wandering ascetics placed greater 
emphasis on internal practices that fostered purity of the heart and devotion than upon 
the external rituals of purification and worship associated with the Sharia. As the work 
of Katherine Ewing (1984) illustrates, Punjabi malangs saw themselves as being in such 
close proximity to God and with the purity of the sacred that they could not become 
polluted and so had no need for external rituals of purification. Ewing claims that the 
direct contact of malangs with God means that even bodily wastes are not polluting to 
them. Thus instead of emphasising the need for prayer and the ritually cleansing 
ablutions associated with it, malangs seek direct communion with God by inducing 
themselves into states of intoxication with the use of marijuana (charas). Views such as 
these relating to the relative or even total insignificance of external rituals of 
purification were widespread among kammis with whom malangs often had a shared 
social background.218 This was clearly illustrated by an elderly Mirasi’s statement that 
even a dog, the most impure of creatures, that had served any of the friends of God— 
including the Prophets, the companions of the Holy Prophet and the saints—would be 
dressed up as a man on judgement day and sent to heaven. He said that similarly a poor 
man who didn’t perform his prayers because he didn’t possess ritually clean (pak) 
clothes could also go to heaven. Moreover, like the malangs described by Ewing,
218 Although Ewing does not discuss the social background of malangs the evidence suggests 
that many of them came from kammi backgrounds. For example one malang that I met in Bek Sagrana 
when he came to visit his brother was a Mussalli. He led a nomadic existence living off alms and the 
money he gained from displaying his performing monkey that accompanied him everywhere. Yet another 
Malang that I met in Bek Sagrana was from a Mirasi family.
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kammis often placed a great deal of emphasis on inner states of divine intoxication 
(,diwanagi) as the true form of worship. They saw truly pious men as being intoxicated 
by their ardent love of God and their union with Him. Because they had achieved gnosis 
malangs realised the illusory nature of the ephemeral phenomenal world and therefore 
showed little concern for worldly matters. As a result they often dressed in rags and 
cared little for outward norms of worldly respectability. Their achievement of gnosis 
also meant that they often uttered things that were incomprehensible to ordinary mortals 
whose access to divine truth was veiled. This combination meant that ordinary mortals, 
and particularly the powerful whose interests they might challenge, mistook them for 
madmen (pagalon) when in fact they were intoxicated with divine love («diwanas). Thus 
there was a distinction between simple madmen, pagalon, who were entangled in 
ephemeral worldly concerns, and diwanas who appeared to be madmen because of their 
lack of worldly concern but who were actually in contact with ultimate truth (haqiqat).
Kammis frequently referred to Pir Shamsuddin of Multan, also known as Shah
Shams Tabrez, as an example of how the Ulema and the worldly authorities often
scorned wandering ascetics who spoke the truth (haqiqat). Much like the seventh-
century Persian mystic Mansur Al-Hallah, Shamsuddin had claimed that when he spoke
it was God and not he who spoke, and the Ulema accused him of blasphemy (kufr) and
declared him to be an apostate (murtadd) deserving death. As a result he had gone into
exile in Multan where he had been further reviled and driven almost to starvation by
people refusing him food. According to a version recounted to me by a carpenter it was
a poor man who eventually gave him some raw meat. The fact that it was a poor man
who had given the meat was significant because for my kammi informant it clearly
showed that the poor were among Shamsuddin’s supporters. Like them he was reviled,
denied the basic necessities of life, and treated with contempt by worldly and religious
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authorities. The story goes on to describe that the poor man who had given Shamsuddin 
the meat couldn’t cook it for him because he didn’t have any means to do so, and no one 
else was willing to help. Eventually, because people hadn’t left him any other choice, 
Shamsuddin held the meat up towards the sun, which came down out of the sky and 
roasted it for him. The sun also almost roasted the local inhabitants, who came running 
to Shamsuddin asking for forgiveness and pleading with him to send the sun back to its
9 1 0place. In this manner the arrogant and the powerful of the land had been humbled and 
Shamsuddin, somewhat like Hazrat Imam Hussain, stood as a figure representing the 
struggle of the poor and of truth against worldly authorities, tyranny and hypocrisy 
(munqfiqat).
The carpenter who recounted this version of the story identified with 
Shamsuddin and his plight for a variety of reasons. Although he wasn’t as poor as many 
other kammis, he still suffered the stigma of being a kammi when it came to interacting 
with the Gondal chowdris. He frequently complained about how the Gondals treated 
kammis like animals without feelings, while simultaneously preaching to them about 
Islam. He had personally experienced this when he had worked for an abusive Gondal 
chowdri who was a renowned miser and alcoholic who would sometimes even preach to 
him about Islam when drunk. To him these Gondals were only interested in worldly 
power and status and they thereby entirely missed the point of Islam which was about 
worldly detachment, love, charity and brotherhood. He pointed to people such as 
Ahmed Abbas and described them as a political (seasi) pirs who displayed their pride 
(maghruri) through their large houses and new cars, and who mixed with powerful 
politicians. Moreover he contrasted them with unpretentious fakeers such as 
Shamsuddin who had owned nothing more than a prayer mat (mussalla) and a vessel to
219 According to my informants it was because of Shamsuddin’s act that to this day Multan 
remained the hottest place on the entire subcontinent.
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carry water (lota). The young Tarkhan also had personal reasons for identifying with 
Shamsuddin’s plight. Upon returning from a visit to a shrine in Sargodha, his now 
octogenarian grandfather had once, much like Shamsuddin, claimed to be God before a 
large assembly of villagers gathered at the village darra. In subsequent years the old 
man had intermittently reiterated this claim. At the time of my fieldwork the old man 
walked around the village dressed in a frayed and dirty shalwar kameez carrying prayer 
beads in one hand and a long walking stick in the other, in the manner of wandering
79ftascetics. He was known to care little for human company and seldom spoke. When he 
did speak he made prophetic pronouncements that included warning villagers about 
me—the anthropologist who had allegedly come to pave the way for a British invasion 
of Pakistan. As had been the case for Shamsuddin most people other than his close 
kinsmen thought he was insane (pagal) and paid little attention to him. Moreover as in 
Shamsuddin’s case it was the religious authorities that were the most intent upon 
denouncing his heterodoxy. The village Imam and his relatives, who happened to be the 
next door neighbours of the old man and his large family, claimed that the old man had 
lost his mind as a result of walking several miles on a devastatingly hot summer day. 
They called the old man a crazy fool and said that his statements were deeply 
blasphemous. Although the village Imam didn’t openly confront either him or any of his 
descendants who endorsed his claims221 the Tarkhan family was aware of his views.
The young Tarkhan who recounted Shamsuddin’s story would often take me aside in 
order to tell me not to listen to everything that the village Imam told me about Islam. He 
told me that sometimes men who were close to God, like his grandfather, uttered
220 Wandering ascetics who circulated around the countryside asking for alms generally carried 
prayer beads and a long stick. The long stick served both as a walking stick as well as for protection 
against the fierce and occasionally rabid dogs that people kept at their farmsteads. Some of these sticks 
were made out of metal and had a forklike end to them in order to pin down attacking dogs.
221 For the sake of maintaining good neighbourly relations and because the claims didn’t pose a 
significant threat to the imam’s religious authority.
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statements which people who were excessively enmeshed in worldly affairs couldn’t 
understand. Without directly referring to his grandfather’s claim, he explained that 
when the great Sufis, such as Shamsuddin, had claimed to be God, it was in fact not 
they who were speaking but God himself speaking through them. Thus they weren’t 
personally claiming to be God as the village Imam accused his grandfather of doing, but 
rather they were claiming to be channels or vessels for God. According to him the 
reason that the village Imam failed to understand this was that he was far too concerned 
with superficial worldly matters. He believed that, like Sufi Ahmed Abbas, the village 
Imam was mainly interested in his material well-being, and the Tarkhan illustrated this 
by pointing to the fact that despite being well off he took bread from poor people on a 
daily basis. For him the fact that the village Imam was after all a zamindar, albeit a 
smallholder, and that he was on friendly terms with many of the village chowdris, 
meant that he was the Imam of the rich.
Conclusions
This chapter has sought to illustrate the fact that in Bek Sagrana there was no 
single overarching model of Islam from which the existing social order might be 
derived. Instead people placed different emphases on different aspects of Islam 
depending upon their position within the social order. In arguing this I drew some 
inspiration from the book Islam in Practice: Religious Beliefs in a Persian Village 
(Loeffler 1998) where Loeffler documents the views on Islam of twenty-one individuals 
differently located within the social order of a Persian village. Loeffler sought to 
demonstrate the fact that individuals creatively draw upon the vast wealth of Islamic 
thought and tradition in order to make sense of and give value to their lives. He argues 
that individuals cannot be subsumed under monolithic identities like ‘Muslim’ or 
tribesman, but must instead be understood as active, thinking agents with different
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interests, concerns and loyalties. This chapter similarly sought to show that people in 
Bek Sagrana creatively and selectively drew upon aspects of the Islamic tradition in 
order to make sense of and give value and legitimacy to their particular modes of 
existence. However the aim of this chapter was not to attempt to cover the entire range 
of religious views of people in Bek Sagrana (of which there are arguably as many as 
there are individuals in the village) but rather to propose a generalisation about the 
religious views of individuals at opposite poles of the social hierarchy who share similar 
access to political and economic resources. The point was not to deny that individuals 
within these groups had their different views on Islam arising from individual life 
experiences, but simply to show that their shared socio-economic position made them 
more likely to emphasise certain aspects of the faith at the expense of others.
The account that focused upon Sufi Muhamad Hayat illustrated how the Islam of 
the powerful was also the Islam of power. Ahmed Abbas and his sons’ understanding of 
Islam was particularly revealing of this. Their vision of the spiritual hierarchy of saints 
clearly mirrored aspects of how worldly hierarchies were structured. It was a hierarchy 
where spiritual power and barkat flowed down from God along particularistic lines of 
kinship, friendship and discipleship, just as in the social world patronage flowed down 
from political leaders along particularistic lines of kinship, friendship and patron-client 
relations. It was also a hierarchy where pirs expected devotion, services, and gifts from 
disciples and supplicants in exchange for their spiritual mediation and charity. This was 
paralleled in landlords and politicians expecting loyalty and services from clients in 
exchange for patronage and protection.
Although many other Gondal chowdris in the village, and the village Imam,
didn’t share some of Ahmed Abbas’s views on Islam (most notably his rejection of
certain aspects of Sharia), they too emphasised aspects of Islam where deference played
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an important role and where spiritual superiors provided spiritual mediation in exchange 
for loyalty, services and gifts. The village Imam, who was a proponent of Barelvi 
orthodoxy, went as far as saying that Sufi Ahmed Abbas was guilty of inventing his 
own religion just as, according to him, the Ahmedis had done. Nevertheless, like Sufi 
Ahmed Abbas, he too positioned himself as a spiritual mediator who obtained gifts and 
services in exchange for spiritual intercession.
In contrast, the Islam of the kammis was the Islam of powerlessness. Although 
their Islam also drew upon a tradition revolving around saint worship they emphasised 
different aspects of this tradition. The religious figures that they revered, including 
Hazrat Imam Ali and pirs such as Shamsuddin, didn’t resemble worldly patrons as 
much as they resembled the kammis themselves. Much like the kammis these figures 
were often scorned and oppressed by worldly authorities, and unlike ‘political (seasi) 
pirs’ as the grandson of the mystic carpenter called people like Sufi Ahmed Abbas, 
these figures had no concern for worldly things such as wealth, power and status. Their 
lack of concern with worldly matters was such that some of them, most notably the 
malangs, even rejected the exoteric rites of purity and worship associated with the 
Sharia. The kammis described here resembled the poor peasants described by Loeffler 
who believed that “true Islam does not consist in the fulfilment of formal ritual 
obligations” (Loeffler 1998). Instead they believed that true Islam was principally about 
sincerity and heartfelt, even passionate, devotion to God and the Holy Prophet.
Arguably such an inward focus was related to the fact that, unlike wealthy landlords and 
pirs, they couldn’t afford to make outward demonstrations of faith by virtue of their 
poverty and illiteracy.
222 The Ahmedis are a religious movement founded in the nineteenth century. Their origins lie in 
the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed who claimed to be the Messiah (Mehdi) and the prophesied 
redeemer of Islam, who was meant to come before the day of judgement anticipated by Muslims.
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This chapter has argued that any attempt to explore Islam in the abstract, either 
as a set of theological doctrines or as culture, independently of its social mooring in 
concrete political and economic formations, is ultimately misguided. This means that to 
blame a particular form of Islam, in this case one that revolves around saint worship, for 
the presence of authoritarianism is also misguided. Islam is a vast tradition which 
people often creatively draw upon in order to make sense and give value to life 
experiences that are circumscribed by their socio-economic position. It cannot be 
reduced to anything as simple and singular as the master-disciple relationship for 
example. Therefore, it is the distribution of power, wealth and status that ultimately 
explains authoritarianism and associated authoritarian ideologies. In this light, saints are 
only an obstacle to democracy and democratic ideologies in so far as they wield 
disproportionate power and wealth.
Finally this chapter has also shown that the very ideology that was put forward 
by the dominant class in the village was turned against it by the subordinate classes.
This brings to mind James Scott’s claim that
The most common form of class struggle arises from the failure of a dominant ideology to live 
up to the implicit promises it necessarily makes. The dominant ideology can be turned against its 
privileged beneficiaries not only because subordinate groups develop their own interpretations, 
understandings, and readings of its ambiguous terms, but also because of the promises that the 
dominant classes must make to propagate it in the first place (Scott 1985: 338).
In Bek Sagrana this inversion of the Islamic ideology upheld by the dominant class of
the village didn’t take the form of overt struggle, and criticism of this ideology was
never openly voiced. As in other aspects of their lives many kammis outwardly
accepted the lectures given to them on morality and Islam by their social superiors.
Whatever criticism they voiced was generally in hushed tones when they were well out
of earshot of any chowdri. However, it is not too much to assume that accusations such
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as those described in this chapter on the part kammis of a hypocritical betrayal of Islam 
by superiors could be stimulated to some form of action under the right circumstances, 
such as a militant movement.
On that score, I will expand the discussion in the concluding chapter beyond the 
limits of Bek Sagrana in order to explore the ways in which Islam was deployed by 
Pakistan’s ruling classes in order to create national unity and deflect class conflict and 
the ways in which this has backfired. Moreover I will explore whether the militant 
Islamic movements that are now wreaking havoc in Pakistan and beyond can in some 
sense be seen as one of the few existing channels for the expression of class grievances 
by the increasingly proletarianized rural poor.
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Conclusion
“...In every village there were generally faction feuds raging. Active minds were busy.. .devising plans for 
dishing the other side, detaching members from it, and generally putting their own side ahead.” (Carstairs 1912)
“There aren’t any. Not real peasants. Not revolutionary peasants. The ones I have met are fightingybr their 
feudal lords, not against them. They are fighting to preserve the status quo. They are fighting so that their feudal lords 
can keep them in their shackles. They are subverting the genuine class struggle of workers like me and you.”
Extract from the novel A Case of Exploding Mangoes (Mohammed Hanif 2008)
“The equation of Islam and the central government encouraged arguments, some more pious and others, 
about Islam’s potential leavening effects on all forms of social divisiveness. Its categorical pronouncements on the 
right to own private property, matched by a very broadly defined concept of social justice, could pre-empt moves by 
ungodly communist ideologues to promote class conflict. For the landlords of west Pakistan, anxious to cut short all 
moves towards agrarian reforms, for the trading and commercial groups, determined to make a killing without let or 
hindrance, for the urban propertied classes, looking to secure and augment their wealth, and for a state needing to 
consolidate and expedite the processes of capital accumulation, Islam offered a moral escape from one too many 
awkward realities. As Liaquat Ali Khan pontificated, the people of Pakistan should ‘follow the teachings of the 
Prophet and not those of Marx, Stalin or Churchill[sic] ’.
Extract from The State of Martial Rule. The Origins of
Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence. (Jalal 1999)
Deliverance or Danger: Militant Islam and the Rural Poor
Since Pakistan’s birth in the wake of the traumas of partition in 1947, one of the
dominant concerns of its ruling classes has been to establish the Islamic nature of the 
state. This concern diverted political attention away from agendas of fostering social 
equality and creating a more representative form of government; in fact, Pakistan’s 
ruling classes actively manipulated Islam in order to undermine such agendas.
Following Pakistan’s early commitment to the American side in the Cold War, Islam 
was deployed against leftist movements in order to prevent communism from gaining a
foothold in the country. This was particularly the case during the rule of General Zia-ul-
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Haq when the programme of land reform initiated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was reversed 
as un-Islamic. During this same period left-leaning student groups virtually disappeared 
from university campuses and were replaced by the Islami Jamiat-i Tulabah, the student 
wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami.223 Also, because at independence it had lacked a solid 
constituency, the Muslim League deployed Islam to give itself and the central 
government which it dominated legitimacy. The Muslim League also used Islam to 
create a sense of national unity in a culturally diverse population divided by extreme 
economic disparities. Most notoriously, the Pakistani government made use of Islam by 
sponsoring Jihadi groups to fight proxy wars in Kashmir and Afghanistan.
Jinnah himself, despite his secularist outlook, was quick to “take refuge in Islam 
to survive the cross-fire of provincialism and religious extremism” (Jalal 1999: 280). 
Unwilling to concede greater powers to centripetal provincial forces, Jinnah’s central 
government sought to establish itself as the guardian of the faith for which a huge 
number of people had sacrificed their lives at partition. Forces pressing for greater 
provincial autonomy and cultural recognition, particularly in East Pakistan and 
Baluchistan,224 were quickly accused of seeking to undermine the sacrifices made for a 
Muslim homeland. From Pakistan’s earliest days the central government accused its 
critics of being Indian agents working against Islam.225
Lacking significant measures to address economic and power imbalances 
between regions or social classes, government-led Islamisation neither gave the central
223 See Nasr (1994) for a detailed account of this process.
224 Urdu was made the national language despite the fact that the majority in the country was 
Bengali. This was one of a series of grievances that the Bengalis would have to endure as citizens of East 
Pakistan.
225 See Jalal (1999: 280) for an account of this during the early history of Pakistan. Even today 
groups that challenge the authority of the state are branded as anti-Pakistan and therefore as enemies of 
Islam. The equation of Pakistan with Islam has meant that even groups that are challenging the Pakistani 
state under the banner of Islam, such as the Taliban, are being branded by the government as enemies of 
Islam. Rumours, encouraged by politicians, are circulating that the Taliban are in fact non-Muslim agents 
on the payroll of either India or America, and are working to destabilise Pakistan and so undermine the 
only power capable of defending the world’s Muslims with nuclear missiles.
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government greater legitimacy nor fostered a sense of national unity. This became 
abundantly clear with the secession of East Pakistan in 1971 and with growing (and 
continuing) unrest in Baluchistan over provincial autonomy and shares in gas revenues. 
Without an institutional, democratic framework to facilitate the peaceful settlement of 
grievances, and with the often violent suppression of dissent, individuals increasingly 
made recourse to violence and agitation in order to redress their grievances. State-led 
Islamisation and the branding of political opponents as anti-Pakistan and anti-Islamic 
meant that political activity and agitation increasingly took place under the banner of 
religion.
By seeking legitimacy through Islam, the central government cleared the way for 
a wide array of Islamic ideologues to make their bid for power as legitimate opposition. 
Islam soon became the main point of contention between Islamic scholars from various 
traditions, all of whom vied to determine the extent to which the laws of the state were 
in accord with the teachings of Islam. In this way, rather than fostering national unity, 
state-led Islamisation engendered struggles between representatives of different Islamic 
traditions and eventually produced sectarian conflicts that have claimed thousands of 
lives in Pakistan to date. Islam in Pakistani society was never the monolithic identity 
that the ruling classes sought to portray. Not only did Pakistan’s citizens belong to a 
variety of different Islamic traditions, including various different Shia and Sunni 
schools of thought, but those traditions themselves varied not only according to region 
but, as discussed earlier, also according to class. Without a sustained effort to bridge the 
gap between state and society, forging a sense of national solidarity through Islam was 
likely to fail and even to backfire.
226 State patronage of Jihadi groups fighting proxy wars in Kashmir and in Afghanistan backfired 
by leading to the Taliban insurgency that now rages throughout large swathes of the North West Frontier 
Province and threatens to spill into the Southern Punjab.
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Poverty, lack of investment in an education system plagued by corruption and 
teacher absenteeism and the channelling of government funds into religious institutions 
meant that both the rural and urban poor increasingly flocked to the Deobandi religious
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schools (madrassas) that mushroomed throughout Pakistan after independence. The 
role of madrassas was particularly prominent in the Southern Punjab where feudal 
landlords much like the ones who are the focus of this thesis were opposed to villagers 
gaining a school education for fear that this might make them seek better employment 
and become more aware of their rights and more assertive in the process (see Abou 
Zahab 2002: 82). Several landlords, including the Gondals and some influential Shia 
landlords from Chiniot in the district of Jhang, told me that education gave villagers 
excessively high job expectations. One particular landlord from Jhang openly told me 
that if villagers gained education there would be no one left to work for them. Evidence 
further suggests that landlords in these areas also actively opposed the establishment of 
schools and that they frequently took over existing ones to use as deras or even 
cowsheds. According to one study conducted in 1998 there were 5000 ‘ghost schools’ 
in the Multan division and 800 in the Sargodha division (Abou Zahab 2002: 82) many 
of which were being used for purposes like the ones just cited. In light of the discussion 
in chapter four—where it was shown that the rural population was becoming 
increasingly, although not fully, proletarianised—it is likely that the landlords had a 
heightened awareness of the risk posed to their authority by increased independence and 
assertiveness on the part of their subordinates. For these reasons access to education 
occupied a key position between landlord control and the possibility of some 
emancipation from that control for the rural poor.
227 Estimates suggest that while there were only 150 madrassas at independence there were at 
least 2700 in the Punjab alone by 2001, and that while there were 24,822 madrassa students in 1960 their 
number increased tenfold to 249,534 by 2001 (Zaman 2002: 2).
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A key factor within education was that of cost, which also affected the 
attractiveness of the madrassas. Poor families often sent their children to madrassas not 
just because of the general shortage of functioning schools228 but also because this eased 
their financial burdens. Abou Zahab reports that sending children to madrassas meant 
that poor families had fewer mouths to feed since the madrassas lodged and fed their 
students and also provided them with an average of Rs. 100 per month. In light of the 
evidence presented in this work it is possible that many poor rural families might prefer 
sending their children to a madrassa than to work with the local landlords (even though
22q ,
it is well known that students at madrassas are often treated brutally). Sending 
children to madrassas might also diminish the possibility of poor households having to 
incur debts. In addition, a religious scholar in the family, and possibly even a Jihadi 
who might become a martyr (shaheed), could also significantly raise a village familiy’s 
prestige and social status, and families of martyrs were also likely to receive some form 
of monetary compensation from whichever militant outfit of which their son had been a 
member. The combination of all of these factors meant that the Southern Punjab 
contained the highest concentration of madrassas in the province with 1619 registered 
madrassas out of a total of 2512 for the entire province (ibid).
While these madrassas, like the shrines described chapter six, sometimes played 
an important social welfare function, they were frequently a source of social division
and conflict. Religious preachers at the madrassas spent a great deal of time denouncing
228 Unlike the Basic Health Unit and the wedding hall for the poor which were being used by the 
Gondals for their own purposes (see chapter two) the school in Bek Sagrana was operational.
229 Abou Zahab (2002:83) reports that physical abuse is the norm in many madrassas. This was 
corroborated by anecdotal evidence that I gathered during my time in Pakistan. Given the prevalence of 
physical abuse by teachers in the state school system, which I witnessed, reports of physical abuse in 
madrassas are credible. In Bek Sagrana few people sent their children to madrassas other than the one in 
the village meant for small children headed by the village imam. As pointed out in chapter four, the poor 
increasingly tried to avoid sending their children to madrassas or to work for landlords, where in either 
case they might be physically and mentally abused, by trying to apprentice them to mechanics, builders 
and other trades. Another reason for not choosing madrassas might be that there were few nearby 
Deobandi madrassas for the simple reason that the Deobandis hadn’t made significant inroads into the 
area.
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the heresies of rival schools of thought (not to mention the heresies of Christians and 
Hindus) and played a pivotal role in fashioning radical sectarian identities. Deobandi 
Sunnis were particularly vociferous in denouncing members of the Ahmedi sect as non- 
Muslim because of their alleged denial of the finality of Prophecy with the Prophet 
Muhammad, and they succeeded in having them officially declared as much by the 
Pakistani state in 1974.230 The same religious leaders, particularly activists from Sipah-i 
Sahaba,231 turned upon the Shias and sought to extend the anti-Ahmadi legislation to 
them, particularly during the Islamisation campaigns of the Zia era when Shias started 
pressing for separate religious education and objected to the imposition of a uniform 
Islamic tax (zakat). The result has been extensive violence between Shias and 
Deobandis with estimates suggesting that more than two thousand people were killed, 
with thousands injured and maimed, during incidents of sectarian violence from 1985 to 
2005 (ICG 2005b: l) .232
The central Punjabi district of Jhang, just south of the Sargodha district, was 
particularly hard hit by sectarian conflict. There the followers of preachers from rival 
Deobandi and Shia sects clashed in turf wars for the control of neighbourhoods and 
mosques. Deobandis also occasionally clashed with Barelvis whose style of saint- 
worship they denounced. Sectarian conflict in Jhang also appears to have channelled 
both rural and urban class grievances against the predominantly Shia rural landlords of 
the area. Sectarian leaders like Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi believed that the powerful 
Shia landlords that dominated the politics of Jhang were not only exploiting the rural 
population with their economic and political power but also with their spiritual
230 Some among the Shia leadership were also vociferous in denouncing the Ahmadis (Zaman 
2002: 114) but it was the majority Sunni religious leadership that raised their voices most influentially.
2 1 Sipah-i-Sahaba was founded in the 1980s by the Sunni cleric Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi to 
combat Shia influence. The organisation was declared to be a terrorist organisation and banned by 
General Musharraf in 2002.
232 Also see Nasr (2000) for an account of the rise of Sunni militancy.
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influence, because many of them were also pirs. Jhangvi believed that these Shia 
magnates were keeping the rural population ignorant of true Sunni Islam and that they 
were even gradually converting it to Shiism. Sipah-e Sahaba (which Jhangvi had 
founded) wished to further the interests of the predominantly immigrant Sunni merchant 
population against the political power of the wealthy Shias.234 The principal aims of the 
heavily armed Sipah-e Sahaba were to combat the local influence of the and also, more 
broadly, to ban Muharram processions, have the Shias declared a non-Muslim minority 
and make the Sipah-e Sahaba brand of Sunni Islam the official religion of the State.
Particularly relevant to this thesis is the fact that among the supporters of Sipah- 
e Sahaba, including many urban merchants, were people who had migrated to the cities 
from the countryside and who had experienced the high-handedness of landlords (see 
Zaman 2002:125). According to Zaman these people were particularly attracted to calls 
by Sunni preachers urging them to fight feudal oppression and “the ideological 
legitimation offered for it” (ibid). Segments of the urban population were also attracted 
to Sipah-e Sahaba because of its appeal to the interests of the common man in “an urban 
milieu where administrative and judicial authorities are inefficient and corrupt, and are 
widely held to act in concert with the landed elite” (ibid). Jhangvi himself, a man of 
humble rural origins, is alleged to have spent time looking after the welfare of the poor. 
He was particularly noted for having spent time at government courts and police 
stations helping poor illiterate litigants whose chances of a favourable outcome were 
limited without the help of a patron.
Recent press releases concerning the Swat valley in the North West Frontier 
Province suggest that the Taliban, who are known to have close ties with sectarian
233 Sipah-e Sahaba signifies ‘army of the companions of the Prophet.’
234 These Sunni merchants controlled eighty per cent of trade and business in the city of Jhang 
(Abou Zahab 2002: 86)
283
organisations throughout the country, also exploited class grievances in order to gain 
popularity and support. A New York Times article of April 17,2009 reported that the 
Taliban were mobilising tenants against influential Taliban-opposed landlords. After 
putting the landlords to flight, the Taliban encouraged the tenants to cut down their 
masters’ orchards and sell the wood for personal profit. It appears, however, that the 
Taliban had no consistent policy on the issue of land redistribution. In fact the New York 
Times article suggests that rather than redistribute the land, the Taliban simply took the 
place of the landlords by making the tenants work for them after the landlords had fled. 
However, the Taliban are reported to have acquired a degree of limited popularity by 
scrapping the elite-dominated official justice system and replacing it with rough-and- 
ready Sharia courts. The Taliban’s Sharia courts were praised by some members of the 
local population, despite the violent punishments that they inflicted upon the 
condemned, simply because cases were decided rapidly and on the basis of their merits 
rather than upon influence and connections. Like Jhangvi in the Jhang region, the 
Taliban made it possible for some of the poor to obtain a semblance of justice that was 
largely unavailable to them under the hegemony of the landlords.
The cases of Sipah-e Sahaba and the Taliban clearly illustrate how the forces
unleashed by the Pakistani elites to combat socialism (and therefore to allow them to
retain their own positions of privilege) have turned against them. Although State-led
Islamisation may have succeeded in seriously undermining leftist movements it did
nothing to lessen the class grievances that fed them. These grievances are now being
channelled through groups that raise the banner of Islamic justice against the very ruling
classes who first deployed Islam in order to undermine class conflict among other
things. Thus movements such as the Taliban and Sipah-e Sahaba are now accusing the
Pakistani state of betraying the standards of Islamic morality and justice that it helped to
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propagate. They see the state justice system as the instrument of a corrupt and 
westernised ruling class and want to replace it with what they consider to be a truly 
Islamic legal system where cases are decided on the basis of Islamic norms of justice 
rather than on those of personal influence and connections. The fact, illustrated in 
chapter six, that the Islamic ideology offered by landowning pirs to justify their 
privilege was interpreted against them by the subordinate classes further argues that 
Islam has become the language of class struggle.235
Nevertheless, given the preceding discussion it must be asked whether 
movements such as the Taliban and Sipah-e Sahaba regard redressing class grievances 
as a worthy and authentically Islamic end in itself or whether they simply exploit class 
grievances to further their own agendas. The available evidence seems to argue for the 
latter, as is often the case in revolutionary situations. Islamic militias appear to be 
exploiting the resentment of the masses to further the narrowly sectarian and 
authoritarian aim of imposing their own version of Islam on people. The empowerment 
of the poor is largely incidental to their aim of purging society of what they regard as 
un-Islamic practices and of enforcing such things as the wearing of beards and burqas. 
Thus, militant Islamic groups do not seek to empower the masses as such but rather to 
concentrate power within the hands of a leadership that claims the monopoly over the 
interpretation of Islam. The results can take a heavy toll not only on individuals but on 
social and political frameworks which could otherwise serve the ends of democratic 
change under other circumstances. The following can be cited on this score: individuals
235 The work of Marsden (1995) also suggests that this is the case by showing how former serfs 
who were madrassa educated challenged the Chitrali nobility in elections in 2002.
236 For Scott (1985) revolutions often fail to serve the interests of those in whose name they are 
carried out. For this reason he prefers to celebrate what he calls ‘the weapons of the weak.’ As argued in 
chapter four, however, the problem is that the weapons of the weak axe often ineffective in practical 
terms. The choice need not be between the weapons of the weak and bloody ‘revolution’ though. Political 
reform and democratisation axe a thixd possibility, but they depend upon whether the elite will relinquish 
at least some of their political and economic power, largely of their own accord.
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in the rank and file of these groups are expected to obey their leaders and are used as 
‘foot-soldiers’ whose lives are regarded as dispensable; they are required to fight and 
carry out suicide bombing missions, for example, in exchange for the promise of heaven 
but also in exchange for the promise of remuneration for the relatives that they leave 
behind upon becoming martyrs; in cases where these organisations provide avenues for 
individual upward social mobility they thereby weaken the unity of the subordinate 
classes; and finally, their narrowly sectarian outlook means that they violently suppress 
anyone who disagrees with them, crippling any kind of democratic political 
development of the subordinate classes. The claim of a narrowly sectarian outlook is 
evidenced by the fact that Sunni sectarian groups have been killing Shias and blowing- 
up Sufi shrines because they consider the types of worship surrounding them to be 
idolatrous, for example. In fact most of the more radical Deobandi groups seeking to 
challenge the established power structures are unlikely representatives of the rural poor 
because they are disdainful of Barelvi Islam and the popular forms of religiosity that the 
majority of Punjabis embrace.
To summarise, militant Islamic groups in Pakistan exploit class grievances as a 
means to power but do not appear to address the grievances in a way that would create 
political and social stability or improve the lot of the Pakistani poor. Whether these 
groups continue to attract followers largely depends upon whether the Pakistani state 
persists in its failure to give the majority of its citizens a stake in the country’s stability 
by at the very least providing real access to justice, healthcare, education and broader 
political representation. Toward this end, further measures could include the 
redistribution of wealth (principally in the form of land reforms), homestead reforms, 
micro-credit schemes to help indebted labourers237 and possibly even policies of
237 See Lieten and Breman for suggestions for the elimination of debt-bondage that include debt
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positive discrimination such as those implemented in India. If the state fails to provide 
at least some of these things then it is likely that the violent factional politics described 
in this thesis will persist. The result will be further political instability, not only because 
of the inherently unstable nature of Pakistani factional politics but also because 
disenfranchised segments of society will continue to join groups that take the law into 
their own hands either under the banner of religion or of national separatism as in 
Baluchistan.
Contributions of this Study and Areas for Further Research
This study of the rural Pakistani Punjab contributes to the anthropological and
sociological literature on a part of the world that has over the years received significant 
media and scholarly attention for its chronic political instability and, more recently, for 
the rising tide of Islamic militancy which has plunged the country into a violent armed 
conflict between militants and the state. Through an ethnographic approach to the study 
of the state238 and politics I have sought to make a contribution toward achieving a 
greater understanding of both in this region of South Asia. I believe that the material 
presented here on how factional, patronage based politics operates on the ground in a 
Punjabi village reveals a great deal about the causes of violence and political instability 
in Pakistan. It does so by showing how competition over control of the local institutions 
of the state in a winner-takes-all political game results in significant levels of violence 
magnified by the widespread availability of cheap automatic weapons. Moreover it 
shows how the appropriation of the local state institutions by landlord politicians itself 
leads to high levels of violence as institutions such as the police are used in order to 
harass, intimidate and even kill enemies and political opponents. Evidence presented in
redemption schemes, micro-credit schemes, homestead and land reform (Lieten & Breman 2002).
238 See Corbridge et al. (2005: 4). Also see Fuller and Harris (2001) who argue that states are 
best thought of as bundles of everyday institutions and forms of rule, and are therefore best studied 
ethnographically in order to avoid analytically reifying the state as a discrete or singular entity.
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chapter two in particular shows how the state is appropriated and used to settle scores 
with political opponents even at the highest levels.239 Another possibility suggested by 
this work, and that would benefit from further investigation, is that private fiefdoms 
beyond state control that make for the highly variable and unequal implementation of 
state law may provide spaces for militant groups to act and develop unhindered. 
Relatedly, this work may also help further understanding of how the violence and 
unpredictability that result from this personalised style of politics impinge upon the 
lives of all classes of people and fuel different types of regional and religious militant 
movements.
Furthermore this work helps elucidate the way that takeover of state institutions 
serves to consolidate the class position of Pakistan’s landed elite and how this 
exacerbates the vulnerability of the rural poor. The rural poor continue to depend upon 
the goodwill of the landlords for their livelihoods, safety and access to government 
institutions. As illustrated in chapter four, the consequence is that they remain subject to 
the whims of landlords who can effectively decide whether or not they will have access 
to healthcare, a loan or justice in court. The poor also rely on the very landlords who are 
responsible for the haphazard law and order situation to protect them from predatory 
policemen and their own hired thugs (goondas). Whether or not the landlords decide to 
extend their patronage and protection depends upon their chances of gaining political 
support or labour thereby, or simply whether or not they are feeling charitable. As a 
consequence the rural poor need to maintain the goodwill of the landlords through 
insincere sycophantic behaviour that both degrades them and fuels their resentment.
For the landlord-politicians themselves life in the modem day Punjab is also 
insecure because sudden shifts in power, particularly following elections or military
239 Such as in the feuds between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto that dominated Pakistani 
politics in the 1990s. See Bennet-Jones (2002) for an account of this.
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coups, frequently result in dramatic reversals of fortune. Overnight they could land in 
jail, lose access to government patronage or lose control over the police and find 
themselves bound up in a variety of real or fabricated court cases. As a result their rivals 
may gain an advantage, and among other things could even start encroaching on their 
land holdings. What’s more, landlords’ lives are almost constantly shadowed by the 
threat of being gunned down by their rivals. Yet even this danger to their lives does not 
put the arbitrariness and aggression they face on a par with that of their subordinates. 
The landlords do not lead a hand-to-mouth existence, they are not verbally and 
physically humiliated on a daily basis, their women are not sexually molested at whim 
by other men, and, other than for political reasons, they are not routinely harassed by 
the police and goondas. Thanks to their influence and contacts they do not experience 
government institutions as the impenetrable edifice that their subordinates experience. 
After all, the landlords’ influence means that they can literally get away with murder 
and then have their subordinates take the punishment. Perhaps even more surprisingly 
for these times, they can get away with flouting almost every Islamic moral injunction. 
Many of them drink alcohol, gamble, traffic drugs, protect and abet thieves, and have 
illicit sex with servants, prostitutes and mistresses.
In addition to documenting the factional, patronage based politics of a Punjabi 
village I have sought to explain reasons for it and to contribute thereby to the scholarly 
understanding of political factionalism in South Asia and beyond. In the process I also 
hope to have contributed to an understanding of the conditions that make greater labour 
assertiveness possible. I have argued that authoritarianism, powerful landed interests 
with control over the means of violent coercion, restrictions on political parties and the 
localisation of politics all contributed to preventing the political empowerment of the 
rural masses through the emergence of political coalitions that were representative of
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either caste-based or class-based interests. I have also shown that factional political 
alignments were neither the result of a cultural bias in Pakistani society (let alone South 
Asian society more widely) nor the result of equal relations of exchange whereby 
landlords provided their clients with patronage and protection in exchange for political 
support, votes and labour. Instead, I showed that factional political alignments were 
based on highly unequal relations of exchange whereby the landed elite was able to 
extract political support and labour on terms that were highly favourable to itself with 
scant regard for the compensation offered to rural labourers in return.241 The landed 
elite was able to do this through its appropriation for ‘private’ use of state institutions, 
its private control of various means of violent coercion and its ownership of the means 
of production (in this case mainly the land).
On the latter score, this work has sought to show that the landed elite’s control 
over the means of production (the land) is an important but not in itself sufficient 
explanation for their continued stranglehold over the rural population of the Punjab and 
the continued importance of vertical ties of patronage between chowdris and kammis. It 
was argued that, in addition to landownership, control over the state and its various 
institutions was the key to understanding the continued political and economic clout of 
local landlords. Control over state institutions through political office and patronage 
networks was not only what permitted landlords to retain the upper hand over their local
rivals but also, in part, what permitted them to control an increasingly proletarianized
241 This contrasts with Pettigrew when she claims of the Indian Punjab that clients that “are not 
those to whom favours are done, the victims of a system of charity that makes piecemeal adjustments to 
the inequalities of life. They have the capability to reciprocate for what they receive from a patron who is 
different from them only at that one point in time when they ask a favour.” (Pettigrew 1975:20). See 
especially Gellner (1997) for a discussion of patronage and of how patronage ideologies falsely claim to 
be based on reciprocity.
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population. Thus chapters one, two and three showed that landlords who did not engage 
in politics, or who did but stood in opposition to the government, not only risked being 
overtaken by their rivals but also risked losing much of their land and becoming 
entangled in either real or fabricated court cases. It was also shown that even extremely 
wealthy landlords, such as the Makhdooms or the Noons, could be relatively powerless 
in the face of less wealthy but more forceful, politically active and well-connected 
landlords such as the Gondals. It was also the case that landlords who were unwilling to 
make use of force and had no control over state patronage were unlikely to be able to 
control a rural population that was growing increasingly economically independent as a 
result of the growth of casual wage labour. This meant that landlords relied more and 
more on the threat of coercion and the capacity to grant and withhold patronage to gain 
both labour and political support. The result was that relations between labourers and 
landlords were increasingly fraught.
This work also made the case that the fact that the landed elite appropriated state 
institutions and put them to use for their own personal ends needed to be at least partly 
understood in terms of central government authoritarianism. I showed that the 
perpetuation of particularistic patron client networks maintained through face-to-face 
contact (which otherwise go under the name of ‘factions’) in rural Pakistan had as much 
to do with the landlords themselves as with authoritarian central governments. Thus 
chapters two and five in particular showed how authoritarian central governments 
helped undermine the impartiality of government institutions by repeatedly using the 
bureaucracy, the police and the judiciary to reward regime supporters and marginalise 
and harass opponents. In practice this meant that authoritarian governments effectively 
gave politicians who joined the ruling coalition free-rein to appropriate the spoils of 
power (and oftentimes engage in a diverse array of criminal activities) in order both to
consolidate their own political clienteles and economic clout and to undermine those of 
personal rivals. Central government authoritarianism, particularly during the Zia regime, 
perpetuated the landed elite’s capacity to build factional clienteles by reversing rather 
than deepening land reforms which would have deprived landlords of some of their 
economic muscle. If repeated military interventions hadn’t prevented the emergence of 
mass popular movements such as the one witnessed during the rise of Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto, it is likely that disenfranchised sectors of society could have started to enter into 
formal politics as happened in parts of India. This could have gradually led to the 
replacement of factional politics with class- or even caste-based politics. Although the 
emergence of disenfranchised groups into politics may not have put an end to corruption 
and the private appropriation of state institutions by politicians (as is illustrated by the 
rise of the Dalits in Uttar Pradesh, who made their own use of such practices), it would 
at least have redistributed power across broader segments of society. Arguably this 
might have given Pakistani citizens less reason to rise up against the state through 
regional separatist movements or Islamist insurgencies.
Lastly, this work shows that the power structures it documents weren’t 
unchangeable ‘traditional’ structures that Pakistanis were condemned to reproduce 
perpetually because of some deeply ingrained cultural bias or model. It is important to 
emphasise this point in light of Hardiman’s (1982) criticism of studies of factionalism242 
which he claims show that Indians are incapable of any form of politics that aren’t 
fractious and based on ‘vertical’ patron-client networks. Here I argued that even though 
General Musharraf s devolution programme simply ended up reproducing the 
previously existing factional political structure, it did so because it failed to radically 
alter the social distribution of power and because it was probably not fully genuine in
242 Ranging over those of authors such as Washbrook (1973), Weiner (1967), Bailey (1969), 
Lewis (1958), Nicholas (1965) and Brass (1965).
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pursuing its stated aim of democratisation. Therefore the principal reasons why the 
devolution programme resulted in ‘business as usual’ didn’t necessarily have to do with 
culture as such. In any case, the discussion of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s rise to power made 
it clear that class politics were indeed possible in Pakistan. In fact the discussion on 
militant Islam showed that it was impossible to discount the importance of class and 
class grievances as political forces in Pakistan. Similarly the discussion of the role of 
biraderis in politics in chapter three showed how medium-sized, economically 
independent landholders were often likely to create horizontal alliances amongst 
themselves in order to assert their interests against those of bigger landlords.243 This 
was shown to have been the case among the Bek Sagrana Gondals before they ceased 
having the Makhdooms as a common external enemy to unite them, and the upward 
mobility of some Gondals came to divide their ranks. The reason that upward social 
mobility caused division was because increased economic and political power meant 
that Gondal leaders could increasingly rely on clients rather than upon their fellow 
Gondals for political support. This pointed to the fact that patronage based factional 
politics crucially depended upon the existence of political and economic inequalities. 
Chapter six further argued that patronage politics didn’t have its roots in an ingrained 
cultural model. It did this by showing that the particularistic religious values 
surrounding the cult of pirs weren’t the cause for the particularistic practices evidenced 
in the political sphere.244 Instead the opposite was argued to be the case, namely that the 
religious values embraced by different segments of rural society could be seen as 
rationalisations, drawing selectively from a vast Islamic tradition, of the social world as 
they experienced it.
243 Hardiman (1982: 206) similarly argues that ‘lesser’ Patidars in Gujarat often acted as a class 
and didn’t necessarily follow the dictates of ‘superior’ Patidars.
244 Lyon (2004) makes a culturalist argument of this type when he claims that patron-client ties 
reflect asymmetrical cultural norms that Pakistanis are socialised into from childhood.
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From the above it emerges that inequality in the social distribution of power 
combined with the personalisation of state institutions are the principal conditions for 
the persistence of vertical patron-client ties. Given that without the personal 
appropriation of state institutions landlords and politicians are unlikely to be able to 
dispense the patronage required to build personal clienteles, I conclude by pointing to 
the need for vital further research into how state institutions, and in particular the police 
and the judiciary, are used by landlords to reinforce their own power, and how in the 
process they contribute to inequality and instability. Following Brass’s analysis of Uttar 
Pradesh,245 this work has argued that control over the police and local courts is central 
to the exercise of political power in the rural Punjab. Further research in this area would 
clarify how rural strongmen work with the police and the courts in order to consolidate 
their political power and enrich themselves through political abuse and criminal 
activities. Moreover such research may provide useful insights into the law and order 
conditions that make it possible for militant armed movements to flourish. Such 
research is particularly important also because these force and influence-based 
manipulations of state institutions of justice provide ammunition for militant religious 
movements such as Sipah-e Sahaba and the Taliban, who rally supporters around the 
call to replace a corrupt, arbitrary and oppressive system of law-and-order with then- 
own brand of Sharia law. Thus militant Islamic groups exploit the absence, as actually 
experienced by individuals, of Weberian-type state bureaucratic institutions in which 
opportunities to pursue individual interests are kept in check by legitimate procedures, 
processes and audits. The call of many militant Islamic groups appeals to the rural and 
urban poor who know all too well that it is the usurpation of state power by individuals 
that makes their lives so oppressive and unpredictable. Research on the Pakistani police
245 See Brass (1997) or (1984) for a shorter review of political trends in Uttar Pradesh from the 
1960s to the 1980s.
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and judiciary is therefore not only vital to a deeper understanding of “politics as usual” 
in Pakistan, but should also be considered a top priority in understanding and dealing 
with the growing challenges posed by militant religious movements.
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Appendix One: Land Distribution and Occupation by Biraderi
Table One: Land distribution and occupation by Biraderi in Bek Sagrana
13 77.5 16.7 4.2 62.5 8.3 8.3
14 9.7 0 4.9 47.6 19 28.5
14 4.8 25 4.2 50 4.2 16.6
5 0 66.7 0 0 0 33.3
3 1.46 0 33.3 50 16.7 0
2 0.53 25 25 50 0 0
2 0.53 0 0 100 0 0
1.1 0 0 100 0 0
0 50 0 0 0 50
3.05 0 0 100 0 0
0.53 0 0 50 50 0
1 0 100 0 0 0 0
8 0.3 66.7 5.6 16.7 0 0
8 0 52.9 23.5 5.9 11.8 5.9
5 0 75 0 25 0 0
5 0 53.8 15.4 30.8 0 0
3 0 28.6 14.3 50 7.1 0
3 0.5 0 0 100 0 0
15 0 70.8 29.2 0 0 0
3 0 55.5 44.5 0 0 0
2 0 100 0 0 0 0
1 0 75 0 25 0 0
1 0 66.6 33.4 0 0 0
6 0 53.8 0 38.5 7.7 0
Table Two: Land distribution and occupation by Biraderi at Astana-e Alam
Number of 
Households
% of 
total 
land 
owned
% of
working
population
working
as daily
wage
labourers
% of
working
population
working
for a
Chowdri
% of 
working 
population 
that is self 
employed
% of 
working 
population 
in
government
jobs
% of 
working 
population 
in private 
sector job
13 0 33 38 16.7 0 12.5
3 0.46 33.3 66.7 0 0 0
1 0 100
1 0 100
2 95 50 50
1 4.44
1 0
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